Ground

The defendant appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion for leave to issue a third party claim.

The Master had dismissed the motion due to an 18-month delay, finding the defendant failed to prove there would be no prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the onus is on the opposing party to establish prejudice, and the plaintiffs had not opposed the original motion.

The court found the delay would not cause undue prejudice that could not be compensated by costs, and granted leave to issue the third party claim to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The respondent school board brought a motion to strike paragraphs of an affidavit filed by the applicant union in support of an application for judicial review of an arbitration award.

The arbitration award upheld the termination of a teacher.

The union argued the affidavit was necessary to show the arbitrator's findings of fact were unsupported by evidence.

The court held the motion was not premature and struck the paragraphs, finding there was no basis in law under the Keeprite test to admit the affidavit to augment the record, as there was ample evidence before the arbitrator to support the findings.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike portions of the plaintiff's statements of claim in two related defamation actions.

The primary issue was whether the plaintiff could salvage a defamation claim regarding radio broadcasts by commencing a second action after failing to provide the required Section 5 notice under the Libel and Slander Act prior to the first action.

The court granted leave to appeal the refusal to strike the paragraphs in the second action relating to the radio broadcasts, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and noting the issue's importance to the administration of justice.

Leave to appeal was denied on the other grounds.

The applicant brought a motion to stay ongoing discipline proceedings before a hearing panel of the Law Society of Upper Canada pending a proposed application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the established principle that the court will not intervene in or fragment ongoing administrative proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.

The court noted the applicant must exhaust her remedies, including an appeal to the Law Society's appeal panel, before seeking judicial review.

The defendants appealed an order of a Master that set aside a default judgment on the condition that the amount claimed in the construction lien action be paid into court.

The plaintiff argued the appeal was improperly brought before the Divisional Court.

The court held that an order setting aside a default judgment is an interlocutory order, not a final order, because it does not finally determine any substantive rights of the defendants.

Consequently, under section 17(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal should have been brought to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order certifying a class action.

The certification judge had certified the proceeding on the basis that 'waiver of tort' constituted an independent cause of action.

The Divisional Court found good reason to doubt the correctness of this conclusion, noting conflicting decisions and academic commentary suggesting waiver of tort is merely a choice of remedy rather than a standalone cause of action.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order made after a summary judgment motion.

The motions judge had found the defendants' summary judgment motion reasonable but unsuccessful, and reserved costs to the trial judge.

The plaintiff argued this conflicted with case law requiring costs to be fixed on a partial indemnity basis and payable forthwith under Rule 20.06(1).

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, as the cited cases merely reflected the exercise of judicial discretion regarding costs.

The applicants, chartered accountants charged with professional misconduct, brought a motion for review of an order dismissing their request to compel the respondent's Professional Conduct Committee to file a record of proceedings under section 10 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the committee's power to investigate and charge is not a 'statutory power of decision' as defined in the Act, and therefore section 10 does not apply.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision refusing to bifurcate a personal injury trial where a jury notice was outstanding.

The motion judge found that there were conflicting decisions on whether bifurcation could be ordered in the face of an outstanding jury notice, specifically noting a conflict between the lower court's decision and Morniga v. State Farm.

Finding the issue to be of general importance to the personal injury bar and the administration of justice, the court granted leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision finding breaches of the Mortgage Brokers Act and revoking its licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no breach of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, ample evidence of regulatory breaches, and no apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the penalty, finding the Tribunal erred in law by imposing licence revocation without allowing submissions on penalty, considering alternatives, or reviewing similar cases.

The revocation order was set aside and replaced with conditions on the appellant's licence.

The tenant appealed a Tribunal decision, arguing that pertinent evidence regarding bad faith was ignored.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting that bad faith is a question of fact and an appeal lies only on a question of law.

The court found it was open to the Tribunal to find no bad faith on the evidence as a whole.

However, the court ordered the landlord to refund $900 in rent paid for April.

The appellant, who had been detained in a mental health facility for 23 years, appealed an order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as his litigation guardian.

The order was made by a judge on his own motion at a Call-Over Court immediately after removing the appellant's solicitor of record.

The appellant was not present and had no actual notice of the intention to make such an appointment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that there was no basis in law for the appointment and no evidence before the presiding judge concerning the factors required under the Rules.

The appellants appealed an order of a motions judge awarding costs of an interlocutory injunction motion to the respondents, payable within 30 days.

The appellants argued that, following established principles, costs of an interlocutory injunction should typically be reserved to the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure preserves the motions judge's residual discretion to fix costs payable forthwith.

The court found the motions judge reasonably exercised her discretion based on the appellants' conduct, including unauthorized cashing of cheques and retention of property.

The tenant appealed a Tribunal decision regarding her ability to reasonably participate in a proceeding and a motion to set aside a default order.

The Divisional Court found the appeal to be moot.

Applying the Borowski factors, the court declined to hear the appeal, concluding that the issue was not of public importance requiring prompt resolution.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,500.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award concerning the interpretation of a collective agreement and an employee's status under the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review.

The court found the arbitrator's analysis of the collective agreement and the employee's status to be reasonable and dismissed the application with costs.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order staying his action for statutory accident benefits pending the return of $10,000 in settlement monies and a failed mediation.

The plaintiff argued he was incapacitated at the time of the purported settlement.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as incapacity does not prevent mediation or the return of funds.

No costs were awarded due to the plaintiff's impecuniosity.

The applicant, Homeland Oasis Corp., sought an adjournment of its application for judicial review against the Town of Markham to obtain documents.

The court found that arguments regarding the merits of the application and the relevance of the documents were premature.

The court granted the adjournment on the condition that the applicant proceed immediately under section 51 of the Municipal Freedom of Information Act to obtain the documents and report back by October 15, 2004.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order staying his action for statutory accident benefits pending the return of $10,000 paid under a disputed settlement and the completion of a failed mediation.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting that the plaintiff's alleged incapacity at the time of settlement did not prevent mediation or the return of funds.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs due to the plaintiff's impecuniosity.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding it liable for rent arrears and property damage under a commercial lease.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to discount damages by 50%.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in interpreting the lease acknowledgment or assessing the evidence of damage to the premises.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of an Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal order terminating the tenancy.

The tenant argued that the application for vacant possession for the purchasers' own use was improper, that he was denied the right to call certain witnesses, and that the application was made in bad faith.

The Divisional Court found that the tenant's grounds did not raise any valid questions of law, as the statute permits possession for purchasers' own use, the evidentiary rulings were not errors of law, and good faith is a question of mixed fact and law.

The appeal was quashed and the stay of the eviction order was vacated.