Grant D. Bodnaryk

The defendants brought a motion to impose a discovery plan in a Simplified Rules motor vehicle accident claim.

The parties disagreed on whether the plaintiff should be required to produce certain medical and employment records prior to oral examinations, and who should bear the upfront cost of obtaining them.

The court ordered the plaintiff to use her best efforts to obtain and disclose the disputed productions prior to discoveries, finding them relevant and proportionate.

The court also held that under Rule 76.03, the plaintiff is presumptively required to obtain and disclose these documents at her own expense.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to produce all materials and a transcript from her Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefit application hearing.

The plaintiff had applied to convert her CPP retirement pension to a disability pension, but the application was dismissed because she missed the 15-month window, and the substantive merits of her disability were never adjudicated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested documents were irrelevant to the issue decided by the tribunal and that the request amounted to a fishing expedition.

The court also noted that the plaintiff had already produced approximately 1,200 pages of medical records from her CPP file, making further production disproportionate.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to conduct examinations for discovery of the defendant after the trial record had been filed.

The plaintiff argued that discovery was not conducted earlier due to a belief that liability would not be contested, or alternatively, due to inadvertence.

The court applied the flexible approach from BNL Entertainment Inc. v. Ricketts, finding that a brief discovery would not delay the scheduled trial or prejudice the defendant.

The motion was granted, but no costs were awarded as the motion was necessitated by the plaintiff's counsel.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.

The defendant brought motions for security for costs in two related motor vehicle accident actions commenced by spouses.

Although the plaintiffs had moved to Ghana and were therefore ordinarily resident outside Ontario, they proposed transferring the actions to Small Claims Court.

The court held that if the actions were transferred, security for costs would not be available because the Small Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to order it.

The decision on the motions was therefore reserved for 120 days to allow the plaintiffs to pursue transfer of the actions.

The plaintiff insurer sought summary judgment against the defendant insurer for equitable contribution and unjust enrichment regarding the costs of a life-saving drug, Soliris, paid on behalf of a mutual insured.

The defendant had initially denied coverage improperly.

The court found that the defendant was unjustly enriched and obligated to pay 90% of the drug costs as the primary insurer.

However, the court held that the plaintiff discovered the claim in October 2009, meaning claims for payments made more than two years before the action was commenced on April 4, 2012, were statute-barred.

Applying the principle that a new cause of action arises with each monthly payment, the court ordered the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for all payments made after April 4, 2010.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that bifurcated the trial into liability and damages phases.

The moving party argued that the bifurcation order conflicted with appellate jurisprudence, specifically the rule that a trial cannot be bifurcated without consent when a valid jury notice is in place.

The court found that there was a conflicting decision and good reason to doubt the correctness of the bifurcation order, satisfying the test for leave to appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was granted.