Glenda D. McLeod

The Applicant sought costs following a partially successful motion for disclosure from a non-party, Blue Water Metals.

The court found the Applicant more successful than Blue Water Metals, which had unreasonably resisted disclosure.

Considering the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, including the importance of the issues, the parties' conduct, and counsel's rates, the court awarded the Applicant $7,000 in costs against Blue Water Metals.

No costs were ordered against the Respondent.

The applicant brought a motion for specified financial disclosure from a company owned by the respondent's parents, where the respondent was currently employed, and for the respondent's father to attend for questioning.

The applicant alleged the respondent was shielding income to reduce his child and spousal support obligations.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the non-party company to produce client lists and financial statements, and ordering the respondent's father to attend for questioning, finding it would be unfair for the applicant to proceed to the motion to change without this information.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing his motion to appoint private counsel for his two children.

The appellant sought to have private counsel appointed to conduct an investigation into the children's wishes regarding access arrangements, similar to what the Office of the Children's Lawyer would do.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the children had been consulted by OCL counsel two years prior and had indicated no desire for change, that they were well-functioning and not exhibiting behavioral or academic issues, and that appointing counsel would not be in their best interests.

The Superior Court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appointment of counsel for children is discretionary under the Family Law Rules and must focus on the best interests of the children, to which deference is owed to the motion judge's assessment.

The appellant appealed a family arbitration award that dismissed his claim to reduce spousal support.

The arbitrator found that the termination of child support was a material change in circumstances, but its only effect was to improve the appellant's financial position, thus not justifying a decrease in spousal support.

The appellant argued the arbitrator erred by not applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs) to recalculate support.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act, a court must only make a variation justified by the material change, rather than conducting a de novo review.

Since the original consent order was not based on the SSAGs, they had no application to the variation.

On appeal from a summary judgment decision, the husband challenged the characterization of over $1.3 million in investments derived from his parents' advances during a 37-year marriage.

The central issue was whether the funds constituted gifts to the parties or were held in resulting trust for the parents or as loans.

The motion judge found the presumption of resulting trust had been rebutted and characterized the advances as gifts to both parties.

The husband also challenged the suitability of summary judgment, the striking of portions of his affidavit, the treatment of dissipated assets, and the charge placed on the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision on all grounds.

The applicant father appealed a decision dismissing his motion for the appointment of private counsel for the parties' two children.

The father had previously sought to change the time-sharing arrangement after his retirement, but withdrew the claim after the Office of the Children's Lawyer presented the children's wishes to maintain the current schedule.

The appeal court found that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in determining that appointing private counsel was unnecessary, given the children had been represented two years prior and were doing well.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant and respondent, former romantic partners, brought cross-motions regarding interim custody, access, and child support for their child, Bryce.

The applicant sought an order confirming primary care and child support based on the respondent's stated income of $76,703.00.

The respondent sought a shared parenting regime with equal time and child support reflecting that arrangement.

The court found it could not resolve the factual disputes regarding the historical status quo of parenting time due to untested evidence.

Prioritizing the child's best interests and maximizing meaningful contact with both parents, the court ordered joint custody, with the child's primary residence remaining with the applicant.

The respondent was granted extended access, including alternating weekends from Friday after school to Monday before school, and every Wednesday after school to Thursday before school.

Child support was ordered at $697/month based on the respondent's income.

No costs were awarded due to the mixed result.

The appellant father appealed from a motion judge's order arising from a motion to change custody and access arrangements for two children.

The motion was limited by consent order to three specific recommendations from the Office of the Children's Lawyer report.

The motion judge adopted the recommendations providing sole custody to the mother with consultation requirements, maintained the existing access schedule, and modified the geographic restriction to allow the mother to live within 30 km of the father rather than being confined to Kitchener-Waterloo.

The father sought to characterize his access time as "care and control" and sought additional decision-making authority over school and medical decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error and dismissing the appeal on both merits and costs.

The applicant wife brought a motion for summary judgment for equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The central issue was whether substantial advances made by the respondent husband's parents during the marriage were gifts or subject to a resulting trust.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rebutted the presumption of resulting trust, and characterized the advances as gifts.

The court ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $592,308 and spousal support arrears, and granted the applicant security over the former matrimonial home.

This is a costs ruling following a motion where the father (applicant) sought variations to a consent order, which was dismissed due to no material change in circumstances.

The father subsequently sought costs, alleging the mother's (respondent's) unreasonable conduct.

The court rejected the father's arguments, finding his motion "unhelpful" and driven by a "fear of losing control" especially given his prior agreement to the mother having sole custody.

The court affirmed the mother's presumptive entitlement to costs as the substantially successful party.

Considering the mother's Offer to Settle, she was awarded partial indemnity costs to a certain date and full indemnity thereafter.

The court found the mother's total costs claim of $28,718.21 to be fair and reasonable.

Rebecca Steckly moved to set aside a default order granted to Nolan Steckly in an uncontested family law trial, which dealt with custody, access, equalization, and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court applied the three-part test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (by analogy to Family Law Rules 1(7)): timeliness, plausible explanation for default, and arguable defence on the merits.

The court found Rebecca met all three criteria, noting her lack of awareness of deadlines and consequences of default, and significant discrepancies in evidence regarding child care, finances, and spousal support.

The default order was set aside, and terms were imposed for filing materials and proceeding to a case conference, with interim custody/access terms maintained.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support, interim child support, and the sale of the matrimonial home, while the respondent sought interim exclusive possession of the home.

The court determined interim support based on a respondent income of $225,000 and applicant income of $25,000, applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines with child support formula.

The court ordered interim child support and spousal support retroactive to the commencement of the application.

The respondent’s request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home was dismissed, and the court ordered the home sold under the Partition Act, subject to a 30‑day opportunity for the respondent to buy out the applicant’s interest.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion to change regarding child support and arrears.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, noting the applicant's offer was closer to the final order than the respondent's.

The court found the respondent's conduct unreasonable, as he had failed to disclose income for years and was previously found in contempt.

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the applicant costs of $18,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The court determined costs following a temporary custody motion where the respondent father achieved substantial success by obtaining joint custody and increased parenting time, contrary to the applicant mother's request for sole custody.

Both parties made offers to settle, but neither achieved a result more favourable than their offer.

The court awarded the respondent father partial indemnity costs fixed at $5,000, payable from the equalization payment owing to the applicant mother.

In a family law trial, the court addressed outstanding issues including the calculation of the equalization payment, entitlement to child tax benefits, and costs.

The applicant argued that the respondent's valuation-day debt should be reduced based on hindsight evidence of a post-separation consumer proposal.

The court rejected this argument, holding that hindsight evidence cannot be used to alter the actual value of a debt at the date of separation.

The court also found the respondent was the primary caregiver for the first year post-separation and entitled to full child tax benefits for that period.

The respondent was highly successful on the property issues and was awarded costs of $30,000 plus HST.

Following a bitterly contested motion regarding child custody where the respondent was wholly successful, the respondent sought costs of $13,671.87 on a full recovery basis, including costs for prior appearances, and requested they be payable personally by the applicant's counsel.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $4,000 for fees plus disbursements and HST, limited to the motion before the court.

The court declined to order costs against counsel personally and refused to delay payment until the sale of the matrimonial home, ordering payment within 30 days.

The applicant father brought a motion for interim spousal support, and the respondent mother brought a cross-motion for interim child support.

The father claimed he was unable to work due to a workplace injury and was receiving social assistance.

However, WSIB records revealed he had received extensive retraining but refused to seek employment in those fields.

The court imputed an annual income of $21,320 to the father based on minimum wage.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and Child Support Guidelines, the court ordered the father to pay $320 per month in child support and the mother to pay $320 per month in spousal support, offsetting the two amounts.

The mother was also ordered to make a one-time spousal support payment of $2,000 to the father.

The moving party brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, including retroactive support.

The parties had a shared custody arrangement for one child, while another child resided primarily with the responding party.

The court ordered the responding party to pay interim child support based on his employment income, with adjustments for the changing custody arrangements over time.

The court also found the moving party had established a prima facie case for interim spousal support due to her medical condition and financial dependency, ordering support in the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Following a settlement conference in a family law proceeding concerning custody and relocation of three children, the court was required to determine costs for that step in the litigation.

The parties ultimately resolved the substantive issues through Minutes of Settlement permitting the children to relocate to the father's care in British Columbia, including arrangements for ongoing medical treatment for one child.

The court found that the mother had acted unreasonably by pursuing delay tactics despite recommendations from the children's counsel and medical professionals supporting relocation.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and considering proportionality and reasonableness, the court ordered substantial costs against the mother for the preparation and attendance relating to the settlement conference and motions.

Payment of the costs was deferred until the parties’ property equalization or trial.

A costs decision following multiple urgent family law motions concerning custody, residence of the children between provinces, access, and the appointment of representation for the children.

The court found that success on the motions was divided but that the respondent on the underlying motions achieved comparatively greater success, including an order appointing counsel for the children rather than a s. 30 assessment.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court determined that costs should be apportioned due to divided success and that the conduct of the responding party was not sufficiently unreasonable to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the more successful party.

Payment of the costs award was deferred pending the division of property or further order due to the other party’s financial circumstances.