G. E. Taylor

The applicant purchased a property to operate a salvage yard and sought a declaration that its use was a lawful non-conforming use under s. 34(9)(a) of the Planning Act.

The respondent municipality argued that the previous owner had discontinued the salvage yard use, thereby losing the non-conforming status.

The court found that the previous owner had continuously conducted salvage operations as part of its business, maintaining the legal non-conforming use.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's more intensive salvage operation did not constitute a wholly different use that would extinguish the non-conforming status.

The application for a declaration was granted.

Following a 14-day trial where the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim was dismissed, the successful defendant sought costs.

The plaintiff argued that his impecuniosity, relying on social assistance, should insulate him from an adverse costs award.

The court rejected this argument, noting the plaintiff had access to after-the-event insurance and that impecuniosity rarely prevents a costs award.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs, reducing the claimed fees and disbursements to an amount reasonable for an unsuccessful litigant to pay, fixing total costs at $158,000.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault, sought to exclude two statements made to police on January 3, 2020, and May 4, 2020.

He alleged the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Following a blended voir dire, the court found that the police treated the accused respectfully, no threats or inducements were made, and the accused's Charter rights were not breached during either detention.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible at trial.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, brought a pretrial application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated completion of the trial was 30 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 4.5 months of defence delay caused by counsel's scheduling inflexibility, bringing the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceeding, and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a general warrant.

The accused argued that the authorizing judge was deprived of relevant information regarding the police's operational plan, including the intention to obtain a statement and the use of the Emergency Response Unit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that cross-examination was not necessary because the arguments regarding the omissions and the use of a youth record could be made based on the evidence already before the court.

The Crown sought to introduce a videotaped police statement of a deceased witness at the accused's trial for first degree murder under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the statement met the necessity requirement but failed to establish threshold reliability, as it lacked procedural safeguards and substantive reliability due to inconsistencies and the witness's intoxication.

The statement was ruled inadmissible under the principled exception, though specific portions were admitted as pure narrative to provide context to the jury.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, common assault, and disobeying a court order against his domestic partner.

He argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for conviction and erred in finding bodily harm for one of the assaults involving strangulation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the substantive issues and credibility challenges, and that the evidence of strangulation causing pain and difficulty swallowing met the legal threshold for bodily harm.

Following a motion for the production of documents in a motor vehicle accident case that resulted in divided success, the court received written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the plaintiffs submitted there should be no costs in accordance with the court's preliminary view.

The court found the defendant's position unreasonable, noting it was not significantly more successful than the plaintiffs and there was no conduct justifying an enhanced scale.

The court ordered no costs for the motion.

The defendant in a motor vehicle accident action brought a motion for production of the plaintiff's long-term disability file, statutory accident benefits file, and employment file.

The court ordered production of the long-term disability file and employment file, finding them relevant to the plaintiff's claims for income loss and physical disability, subject to redactions for personal information in the employment file.

The request for the statutory accident benefits file was dismissed, as the plaintiff had already produced the portions in their possession, and the defendant was directed to bring a Rule 30.10 motion against the independent adjuster for any remaining documents.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, an estate trustee, sued her former lawyer alleging he settled a share sale without authority and for less than fair market value.

The court found that the issue of the shares' value had already been conclusively determined in a prior application, making the current claim regarding share value an abuse of process.

However, the court allowed the claim regarding the lawyer's actual authority to proceed as a triable issue.

Costs were awarded to the defendants against the estate and the trustee personally.

The Crown brought an application under s. 669.2 of the Criminal Code to have the accused's trial continued before a different judge after the original pretrial judge became unavailable due to an extended medical leave.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the original judge was only temporarily unavailable and offering to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The court granted the application, finding that the original judge was unable to continue and that society's interest in a timely trial for sexual offences involving a minor outweighed the accused's preference to wait for the original judge's uncertain return.

The plaintiff was injured after falling or jumping from the roof of a commercial building owned and occupied by the defendants.

The plaintiff and the individual defendant had gone to the roof to smoke, but the door locked behind them, leaving them stranded.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the plaintiff was solely responsible for her injuries by venturing away from the door.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a trier of fact could conclude the defendants breached their duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act and that such breach was a proximate cause of the injuries, thus presenting a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order to evict a tenant and her disabled son due to ongoing noise complaints and nuisance, or alternatively an order for compliance with condominium rules.

The unit owner brought a separate application to vacate a lien for legal costs registered against the unit.

The court found the tenant had breached the rules but held that eviction was too draconian a remedy.

The court ordered the tenant to comply with the rules and the owner to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance.

The court upheld the lien and awarded partial costs to the condominium corporation, noting both parties had adopted overly confrontational positions.

Following a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff obtained judgment for a portion of its claim for drywall installation and extras, both parties sought costs.

The plaintiff claimed $78,810 and the defendant claimed $95,056.76.

The court found both claims totally unreasonable and criticized the parties for ignoring the proportionality principles set out in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

To discourage wasteful use of court time, the court awarded the plaintiff significantly reduced costs of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff drywall contractor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant general contractor for the balance owing on a construction contract and for over $1.1 million in alleged extras.

The defendant admitted a portion of the contract balance and a portion of the extras but disputed the remainder, citing delays, deficiencies, and lack of written authorization for the extras.

The court granted partial summary judgment for the $750,641 admitted by the defendant but dismissed the balance of the motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding verbal authorizations, design changes, and project delays required a trial.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' constructive dismissal action, the defendant sought costs, arguing for substantial indemnity from the date of its Rule 49 offer.

The court held that Rule 49 does not apply when a plaintiff's claim fails entirely.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were forced to proceed to trial because the defendant's offers were nominal.

The court awarded the successful defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $50,000 plus HST.

The plaintiffs, a married couple who were long-term employees of the defendant, resigned and claimed constructive dismissal.

The wife had received a letter of reprimand for insubordination after refusing to start work earlier and being rude to a new manager.

The plaintiffs alleged the workplace was unsafe and unsanitary due to clutter, mice, and bats.

The court dismissed the action, finding the letter of reprimand was a moderate response to insubordination and the workplace conditions, while not ideal, did not amount to an unsafe environment or a fundamental change to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs' resignations were not justified on an objective standard.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for nonpayment of mortgage loans and a credit card debt.

The defendants did not dispute the amounts owing but alleged they were encouraged to borrow the funds by unnamed financial advisors to make unsuccessful investments.

The court found the defendants' evidence lacked specific facts and failed to raise a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the outstanding debts and possession of the mortgaged property.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in Minnesota and settled their claims there for $600,000.

They subsequently sued their Ontario insurer under the OPCF-44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement for under-insurance.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their pleadings and to determine questions of law under Rule 21 regarding whether the Minnesota defendants were underinsured and whether legal fees from the Minnesota action could be claimed as special damages.

The court held that the Minnesota defendants were underinsured with respect to one plaintiff whose settlement reached the foreign statutory limit, but not for the other plaintiff who settled below the limit.

The court further held that the legal fees incurred in the foreign action could be claimed as special damages by the eligible plaintiff.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was entitled to one-half of the remaining proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned matrimonial home.

The parties had previously entered into a domestic contract excluding a specific property from equalization and opting out of the statutory property regime under the Family Law Act.

After the excluded property was sold, the parties purchased a replacement home in joint tenancy using the respondent’s equity.

The court interpreted the marriage contract and held that ownership determined entitlement to property acquired afterward, and the contract did not extend exclusion protection to the replacement home.

As the property was held in joint tenancy, the applicant was entitled to half of the sale proceeds.