Nicole Matthews

The applicant father brought a motion seeking equal parenting time.

The parties had previously signed temporary minutes of settlement for parenting time, which included a review clause for an upcoming case conference.

The respondent mother argued the father must show a material change in circumstances to vary the temporary order.

The court held that no material change was required because the temporary order was intended to bridge the gap until the case conference, and the father only brought the initial urgent motion because the mother had denied him parenting time.

The court granted the father's request for extended parenting time, finding that overnight stays instead of evening drop-offs were in the children's best interests.

Following a motion where the applicant father was overwhelmingly successful in obtaining primary residence of the children, he sought full recovery costs of $9,930.

The respondent mother argued she could only afford $1,500 due to her limited financial circumstances and receipt of Legal Aid.

The court found the mother's conduct unreasonable but not rising to the level of bad faith required for full recovery.

The court held that while ability to pay is a factor, it cannot shield a litigant from the consequences of unreasonable behaviour, nor is the receipt of Legal Aid a relevant factor in determining costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000.

The parties, who share joint custody and equal parenting time, brought a motion to determine which school their two children should attend after missing the first nine days of the school year due to an impasse.

The mother proposed a school near her home, while the father proposed one near his.

The court found both proposals evenly matched but selected the mother's proposed school because the father had better transportation options to facilitate the children's attendance on his parenting days.

No costs were awarded as both parties behaved unreasonably in delaying the decision.

Following a motion for child and spousal support, both parties sought costs against each other.

The court noted significant deficiencies in both parties' presentations, including inadequate financial disclosure and delayed action.

Although the respondent was more successful overall in obtaining support, her costs claim was significantly reduced due to divided success and poor presentation.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $1,000 in costs.

The applicant father brought a motion for temporary primary residence of the parties' eight-year-old son and expanded access to their 16-month-old daughter.

In his affidavit, the father attached nude photographs and graphic text messages of the respondent mother, obtained without authorization from her discarded cell phone.

The court struck the offensive materials from the record, finding them completely irrelevant to the parenting issues and a malicious attempt to humiliate the mother.

The court declined to make major changes to the timesharing arrangement pending an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation, maintaining the children's primary residence with the mother while slightly expanding the father's access.

The applicant was previously awarded costs for a motion and counter-motion regarding financial disclosure and setting the matter down for trial.

The court found that the respondent intentionally refused to produce relevant documentation to frustrate the determination of child support.

The applicant claimed $13,143 in total costs.

To send a message that nothing short of full financial disclosure is acceptable, the court fixed costs at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Children’s Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment within a child protection application seeking Crown wardship without access for a young child apprehended at birth due to parental substance abuse, instability, and neglect.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of the mother’s long-standing drug addiction, housing instability, missed access visits, and failure to cooperate with services, as well as the father’s extensive criminal history and repeated incarceration.

Applying Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the parents’ evidence did not establish a realistic possibility that the child could safely be returned to their care.

Considering the statutory timelines and the child’s need for permanence, the court concluded that Crown wardship was the only appropriate disposition.

The court also held that neither parent established that continued access would be beneficial and meaningful to the child.