Derek Zuraw

The offender was found guilty of multiple sexual offences and sentencing was scheduled.

The probation officer failed to complete the requested presentence report in time, citing missing contact information, incorrect documents, and holiday schedules.

The court reviewed the statutory duties under sections 720 and 721 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing the requirement to sentence as soon as practicable.

The court found the delay was due to probation workload and holidays, not complications, and adjourned the sentencing to allow completion of the report.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for forcible confinement and sexual assault against his estranged wife.

He argued that the Crown failed to disclose the complainant's Sexual Assault Examination Kit (SAEK), that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessments.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the undisclosed SAEK contained evidence that could have undermined the complainant's credibility and supported the appellant's defence.

The court also found that trial counsel was ineffective in proceeding without the SAEK and that the trial judge engaged in circular reasoning when assessing credibility.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder of his common-law wife in 2003, applied under the 'faint hope clause' (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code) for a review of his parole ineligibility period.

The court applied the pre-2011 screening test, requiring the applicant to show a 'reasonable prospect of success' before a unanimous jury.

Considering the applicant's significant institutional progress, completion of programs, remorse, and reduced security classification, the court found the threshold was met and ordered a jury to be empaneled.

The appellant appealed her convictions for threatening death and assault with intent to resist arrest.

She raised several grounds of appeal, including ineffective assistance of counsel, reversal of the burden of proof, and improper admission of prejudicial evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to assist the court with her evidence and using disbelief of her evidence to accept the Crown's evidence.

The court also found that highly prejudicial bad character and hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, arguing it was involuntary and obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as there were no threats, inducements, or oppressive circumstances.

However, the court held that the police breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by failing to provide him with an immediate opportunity to consult counsel upon arrest, despite facilities being available.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's rights.

The statement was excluded.