Detective Margetson

Talel Khan was charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The trial involved applications regarding the voluntariness of Khan's statement to police and alleged breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter rights (right to counsel).

The court found Khan's statement voluntary but his s. 10(b) rights were violated due to delayed access to counsel and police eliciting a statement after he requested a lawyer.

The elicited statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but physical evidence (fentanyl, scale, money) was admitted.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown failed to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt, as a reasonable alternative inference was that Khan's common-law spouse was in sole possession.

Khan was found not guilty on both counts.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant argued that the police fabricated the existence of a confidential informant or the information provided, and that the information was absurd and uncorroborated.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the information provided by the confidential informant was compelling, credible, and strongly corroborated by police investigation, providing a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to grant the warrant.

The offender was found guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of two and a half years' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's mental illness, lack of prior drug record, and the delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition.

During a jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of possession of a prohibited weapon, alleged to be a push‑dagger concealed within a cane‑sword.

The court considered whether the Crown had adduced any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the weapon was commonly known as a push‑dagger under the relevant Criminal Code regulations.

The Crown relied on testimony from police officers who lacked expertise in weaponry and did not call expert evidence to establish the definitional elements of a push‑dagger or to address the statutory exclusion for an aboriginal ulu knife.

The court held that the absence of evidence on these essential definitional elements created a fatal evidentiary gap.

As a result, there was no evidential basis upon which the jury could convict on the charge.