Evan L. Tingley

The appellant municipality entered into an agreement to sell surplus land to the respondent developer but failed to give public notice of the proposed sale as required by s. 268(3)(c) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

When the municipality refused to close the transaction due to a zoning dispute, the developer sued for breach of contract.

The municipality argued the agreement was void because of its own failure to provide the statutory notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statute requires notice to be given before a binding agreement is signed, the failure to do so did not render the contract void or unenforceable, as the statute does not expressly invalidate such contracts and public policy does not favour voiding contracts for technical deficiencies.

The appellants appealed an order vacating their construction lien and dismissing their lien action for failing to set the action down for trial within the two-year statutory limitation period under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellants argued it was impossible to set the action down because the fundamental issue of whether the work was lienable was under reserve by the Divisional Court at the time the limitation period expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was no practical or legal impossibility preventing the appellants from complying with the strict statutory requirements to set the action down for trial.

The appellants appealed an order vacating their construction lien and dismissing their action for failing to set the matter down for trial within the two-year limitation period under section 37(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

The appellants argued it was impossible to set the action down because the fundamental issue of whether the work was lienable was under reserve by the Divisional Court at the time the limitation period expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was no practical or legal impossibility preventing the appellants from complying with the strict statutory requirements.

The appellant was ordered by the Ministry of the Environment to remove hundreds of thousands of used tires from its property.

The appellant hired the respondent to perform the cleanup.

After allegedly being paid only a fraction of what it was owed, the respondent registered a construction lien against the property.

The appellant moved to discharge the lien, arguing the work was not an 'improvement' under the Construction Lien Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the removal of contaminated tires constituted an alteration and repair to the land.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the removal of the tires was an improvement.

The appellant currency exchanger accepted stolen money orders and sought to recover their face value from the issuer, arguing it was a holder in due course of a bill of exchange.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding a money order is not a bill of exchange.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed the matter to trial, holding that the legal status of a money order is a commercially important issue that requires a full factual record and should not be decided on a summary judgment motion under the Simplified Procedure.