Elizabeth M. Traynor

The applicant was entirely successful in its application to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The applicant sought its costs of the application on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,832.18.

The respondent, who was self-represented, did not file responding materials.

The court reviewed the claimed fees and disbursements, reducing the hourly rates for junior counsel and the law clerk to reflect local rates, and reducing the disbursements claimed for photocopying and process serving.

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $4,785.00 on a partial indemnity scale.

The applicant employer sought an order declaring its former employee a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Following the end of his employment, the respondent initiated numerous unsuccessful judicial and non-judicial proceedings against the applicant and others, and sent hundreds of abusive and threatening emails.

The court found that the respondent's conduct met the criteria for a vexatious litigant, as he persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings to re-litigate determined issues, brought actions for improper purposes, and engaged in a strategy of abuse and harassment.

The application was granted, prohibiting the respondent from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave of the court.

The respondents moved to quash an appeal brought to the Court of Appeal for Ontario on the basis that the appellant was seeking to appeal interlocutory orders of the Superior Court of Justice, which should have been appealed to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant sought to appeal orders made by Justice Lynne Leitch and Justice A. Duncan Grace, including an order transferring a judicial review application to the Divisional Court and a costs order of $10,000.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and granted the motion to quash, awarding nominal costs of $2,000 to the respondents.

The respondent in a human rights application requested an order to amend its Response after retaining new counsel.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing prejudice and delay.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding it was made early in the proceedings, related directly to the issues in dispute, and caused no prejudice or delay to the applicant.

The applicant, an atheist, refused a modified work assignment monitoring a Salvation Army kettle, alleging it conflicted with her religious beliefs.

A WSIB Appeals Resolution Officer determined the work was suitable and denied her loss of earnings benefits, finding the refusal was for personal reasons not requiring accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The applicant then sought to reactivate her human rights application.

The Tribunal dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Code, finding that the WSIB proceeding had concurrent jurisdiction, dealt with essentially the same issue, and appropriately dealt with the substance of the application without unfairness.

The applicant requested to amend her human rights application to add three individuals as personal respondents: the president, the general manager, and an assistant manager of the corporate respondent.

The Tribunal applied the Smyth and Persaud factors and granted the request.

The Tribunal found that the applicant made specific allegations of sexual harassment against two of the individuals, and that the president was allegedly the directing mind behind the corporation and attempting to sell the business, raising concerns about the corporate respondent's ability to remedy any Code infringement.

The applicant alleged discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of disability, claiming she suffered a panic attack at work and was subsequently terminated or forced to resign.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to establish she had a disability, as the medical evidence provided was vague and did not support her claim of a panic attack.

Consequently, there was no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between the respondents' actions and a Code ground.

The application was dismissed.

The respondents requested an interim order to strike allegations predating April 26, 2012, and to remove the personal respondent as a party.

The Tribunal deferred the request to strike the allegations, finding it to be an evidentiary matter for the hearing adjudicator since the applicant was only relying on them as factual background.

The Tribunal denied the request to remove the personal respondent, finding her alleged conduct was a central issue and, as the directing mind and sole shareholder of the corporate respondent, her inclusion would not unnecessarily complicate the proceedings.

The applicant, who self-identifies as Black, filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race and colour after being unsuccessful in 16 job competitions with the respondent.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's belief that he was not hired due to his race was speculative and that he failed to point to any evidence linking the respondent's hiring decisions or an interviewer's comments to a prohibited ground.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, an injured worker and self-identified atheist, alleged discrimination on the grounds of disability and creed after her employer required her to participate in the Salvation Army Kettle Campaign as part of a modified return to work program.

When she objected, the WSIB determined she would lose her loss of earnings benefits if she refused the assignment.

The WSIB requested that the human rights application be dismissed or deferred pending the applicant's objection to the WSIB Appeals Branch.

The Tribunal deferred the application until the WSIB Appeals Resolution Officer determines the objection, noting significant overlap in the issues.

The applicant, a father and primary caregiver, alleged sex discrimination because the respondent offered child minding services at a nearby women-only fitness club but not at the co-educational club he attended.

The Tribunal dismissed the application on a preliminary basis for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that section 20(3) of the Human Rights Code permits recreational clubs to restrict services based on sex, and that substantive equality does not require the respondent to provide identical services at a nearby co-educational facility.

The applicant requested to amend his human rights application to add new allegations and individual respondents.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the new allegations were not raised in a timely fashion and that there was no compelling reason to add individual respondents, as the organizational respondent could fulfill any order.

The request was granted only to correct the respondent's legal name.

The applicant filed human rights applications alleging discriminatory discipline and discharge.

He had previously grieved his discipline and discharge under a collective agreement.

The arbitrator found just cause for discipline and no violation of the Human Rights Code.

The respondents requested dismissal of the human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Code.

The Tribunal held that the arbitrator's finding of just cause implicitly incorporated a finding that the discipline did not violate the Code, and that the arbitrator had explicitly ruled on the Code issues.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Figliola, the Tribunal dismissed the applications to prevent relitigation, except for two allegations unrelated to the discipline.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of sex by the London Police Services Board and its Chief of Police.

The allegations stemmed from the police's failure to lay charges in relation to an alleged sexual assault and property crimes, as well as a public statement made by the Chief of Police about men's involvement in domestic violence.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations regarding the police investigations and the domestic violence procedure for delay, as they occurred more than one year before the application was filed and the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The Tribunal also dismissed the allegation regarding the Chief's public comments, finding that the comments did not constitute an act of discrimination.

The applicant objected to the admissibility of three audio tape cassettes, arguing they were disclosed during a confidential mediation and were irrelevant.

The respondents argued the tapes were relevant and referenced in the applicant's Reply.

The Tribunal found that two of the tapes were admissible because the applicant's Reply referenced 'other taped conversations', making their existence relevant despite being disclosed at mediation.

The third tape was ruled inadmissible as it pertained to a conversation months after the applicant's resignation and was irrelevant.

The applicant sought production of documents not disclosed during a prior grievance arbitration, arguing they were relevant to whether the arbitration appropriately dealt with the substance of his human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Code.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission also sought leave to intervene.

The Tribunal granted the Commission's unopposed request to intervene.

The Tribunal also granted the applicant's production request, finding that the undisclosed documents were arguably relevant to the s. 45.1 analysis.

The applicant filed three separate human rights applications against the respondents relating to the same events.

The respondents requested that the applications be consolidated and subsequently dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that a recent grievance arbitration decision appropriately dealt with their substance.

The Tribunal ordered the consolidation of the three applications due to common issues of fact and law.

The Tribunal scheduled a teleconference to hear oral submissions on the respondents' request to dismiss the consolidated application under s. 45.1.

Two applications for judicial review were brought regarding preliminary awards by a labour arbitrator.

Solidwear sought to review the arbitrator's decision denying it party standing as a potential related employer.

Valleycroft, a bankrupt employer, sought to review the arbitrator's decision refusing to allow it to argue that the union's grievance was untimely.

The Divisional Court dismissed a preliminary motion to quash Solidwear's application for delay.

The Court dismissed Solidwear's application, finding the arbitrator's decision on standing was not patently unreasonable.

However, the Court granted Valleycroft's application, holding that the arbitrator's refusal to hear arguments on the timeliness of the grievance was a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted board of arbitration.

The moving party union sought to quash the responding party employer's application for judicial review of a preliminary arbitration award on the basis of undue delay.

The employer had delayed 16 months in commencing the application and 21 months in perfecting it.

Applying the test for undue delay, the court found that while the delay was substantial, there was no actual prejudice to the union because the underlying employment relationship had ceased years prior due to bankruptcy, and the issue was a pure question of law regarding related employer status.

The motion to quash was dismissed, and the employer's cross-motion to have its application heard together with a related application was granted.