Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
B. C.
Applicant
-and-
London Police Services Board and Murray Faulkner
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Eric Whist
Indexed as: B.C. v. London Police Services Board
APPEARANCES
B. C., Applicant ) Self-represented
London Police Services Board, ) Elizabeth Traynor, Counsel
Murray Faulkner, Respondents )
1This is an Application filed on October 22, 2009 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application alleges discrimination in the provision of services on the basis of sex.
2Rule 3.11.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure state that the Tribunal will use initials to identify children under age 18 in its decisions. This Rule also states that the Tribunal “may use initials to identify other proceeding if necessary to protect the identity of children.” In this case neither party has requested that the Tribunal identify the applicant by his initials in order to protect the identity of a minor. However, in my view, such anonymization is appropriate given there are allegations of a sexual assault involving the applicant’s minor child.
3The Application alleges that on October 22, 2008 the personal respondent, Murray Faulkner, who was, at the time, the Chief of the London Police Service (“LPS”), stated at a public meeting that “As men we have lost our way. We fight each other; we abuse our partners; and we sexually assault our own children.” The Application alleges this statement reveals a severe bias against men. The Application contends that Chief Faulkner’s bias and his directing role as the Chief of Police explains why the LPS did not lay charges against his former mother-in-law whom he alleged was responsible for the sexual assault of his daughter in 2003 or lay charges against his ex-wife’s family for vandalizing his car in 2005. The Application alleges that Chief Faulkner’s statement and the repeated failure of the LPS to lay these charges are related and should be considered to be a series of incidents of discrimination based on sex.
4The Application appears to further allege that the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure which is used to guide how the LPS responds to incidents of domestic violence discriminates against men and has been implemented in a discriminatory manner. The Application refers to the LPS accusing men of being perpetrators of domestic violence without supporting evidence while not arresting women including those who have committed mischief by making false statements to the police. The Application refers to the fact that the mother and grandmother of his daughter were not charged and to Chief Faulkner’s comments of October 22, 2008 as evidence of the LPS implementing its Domestic Violence Procedure in a discriminatory manner.
5The applicant has made three formal complaints to the LPS pursuant to the Police Services Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (“PSA”). The first complaint was made in March 2007. It alleges that the LPS’s investigations into the alleged sexual assault of the applicant’s daughter and the property crimes involving the applicant’s car were inadequate and complains about the failure of the LPS to lay charges in relation to these crimes against the applicant’s ex-wife and family. This complaint does not allege that the LPS’s actions were discriminatory. The complaint was found to be unsubstantiated by the LPS. The applicant requested that the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (“OCCPS”) review the LPS decision. The OCCPS upheld this decision. The second and third complaints were filed on March 12, 2009. The second complaint alleges that the LPS’s Domestic Violence Procedure discriminated against men. The applicant requested a review of this decision by the LPS Board who found that the complaint was unsubstantiated in a decision dated October 22, 2009. The applicant did not seek a further review of this decision. The third complaint primarily alleges that Chief Faulkner made a discriminatory comment at the community consultation meeting held on October 22, 2008. The LPS Board also found that this complaint was unsubstantiated in its decision dated October 22, 2009. The applicant did not seek to have this decision reviewed.
6A preliminary hearing was held on May 31, 2011 to consider whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part for delay pursuant to sections 34(1) and 34(2) of the Code and/or dismissed because the applicant’s complaints under the PSA have already in whole or in part appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application, pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code.
7At the hearing I heard submissions from the respondents then the applicant on the preliminary issues of delay and the applicability of section 45.1. I also heard submissions from the parties on whether Chief Faulkner’s comments were, in of themselves, a violation of the Code.
8I also had before me the respondents’ written submissions, the Application, Response and Reply, and a number of documents disclosed by the parties. Both parties provided case law for the Tribunal’s consideration.
DECISION
9The applicant’s allegations about the adequacy of the LPS investigations and the failure to lay charges in relation to the alleged sexual assault of his daughter and the property crimes involving his car are dismissed for delay under section 34 of the Code. I find that the investigations and the decisions not to lay charges occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the Application on October 22, 2009. I find that the comments made by Chief Faulkner on October 22, 2008 are not a further incident in a series of incidents that makes the allegations about the police investigations timely under section 34. Furthermore, the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for why the delay in filing his Application in relation to these allegations was incurred in good faith.
10The applicant’s allegation that Chief Faulkner’s comments exhibit a bias towards men is dismissed on the basis that I find that these comments do not constitute an act of discrimination. I have not, under the circumstances, chosen to make a determination as to whether section 45.1 of the Code applies in this case.
11The applicant has not so clearly alleged in his Application, as he has elsewhere, that the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure discriminates against men and has been implemented by the LPS in a discriminatory manner. Nonetheless, I find that the applicant is prevented from pursuing these allegations by section 34 of the Code. These allegations arise out of his interactions with the LPS that take place more than one year prior to the filing of the Application on October 22, 2009. The applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for why he could not have made allegations about the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure in a more timely fashion.
DELAY
12Section 34 of the Code allows applications alleging infringements of rights under the Code to be made within a one-year time limit. It also gives the Tribunal discretion to accept late applications in certain circumstances. Section 34 specifically states:
34 (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
Submissions under section 34(1)
13The respondents submit that the applicant’s only timely allegations are in relation to Chief Faulkner’s public statement on October 22, 2008 and that all the allegations about prior incidents or actions should be dismissed for delay because they occurred more than one year before the applicant filed his complaint. They submit there is no “series of incidents” that allows these earlier incidents to meet the requirements of section 34(1)(b). They further submit that the applicant had not provided a reasonable explanation to show that the delay in filing his Application in relation to these incidents was incurred in good faith.
14The respondents submit that the alleged sexual assault of the applicant’s daughter occurred in 2003 and that the applicant complained to the police that his ex-wife and and/or her ex-in-laws put sugar in his car’s gas tank and cut his car’s brake cables. The respondents submit that these incidents were investigated in 2005, 2006 and 2007, and it was during this timeframe that it was determined that there was insufficient evidence to lay criminal charges.
15The respondents submit that the applicant was in ongoing contact with the LPS in 2005, 2006 and 2007, during which time the LPS investigations in regard to both the alleged property crimes and the sexual assault were conducted. The respondents submit that the applicant was explicitly told that no criminal charges would be laid against the family of his ex-wife. It appears from the LPS investigative report that the alleged property crimes involving the applicant’s vehicle were investigated in the period February 2005 to January 2007 at which time the investigating officer indicated to the applicant that charges would not be laid.
16It appears from the LPS investigative report that the alleged sexual assault was investigated by a different police officer beginning in November in 2006 when the matter came to police attention and it was determined prior to March 2007 that no criminal charges would be laid in the matter. The matter was then reinvestigated by yet a different police officer who concluded in December 2007 that no criminal charges would be laid.
17The respondents submit that while Chief Faulkner’s comments at the public meeting on October 22, 2008 do fall within the one year timeframe that is required to file an Application under section 34, the comments are not the last incident in a “series of incidents” that would make all of the applicant’s earlier allegations timely under section 34. They argue that this incident is not “of the same class” as the decisions by LPS officers not to lay criminal charges in relation to the sexual assault or other alleged criminal acts. The respondents submit that these comments are unrelated to the investigations conducted by LPS officers and that there is no evidence that Chief Faulkner was involved in the decisions not to lay charges. Moreover, they submit that Chief Faulkner’s comments were made more than one year after the decisions were made not to lay charges against members of the applicant’s ex-wife’s family and that this gap of more than one year between the decision not to lay charges and Chief Faulkner’s comments is a further reason to find that that cannot be considered to be part of a series of incidents for the purposes of section 34(1)(b). They submit that the applicant was obliged to come forward to the Tribunal within one year of when the decisions were made not to pursue charges if he wanted to file a timely Application in relation to these actions of the LPS.
18The respondents submit that the delay in filing the Application in relation to the police investigations and the failure of the police to lay criminal charges is not incurred in good faith. They submit that the applicant has vigorously pursued his concerns about the investigations with the LPS and could have filed his Application with the Tribunal in a timely fashion if he acted with due diligence. They submit that the applicant was capable of pursuing his rights under the Code given the fact that he has demonstrated that he was to able to pursue his rights in his direct interactions with the LPS and by means of his complaints under the PSA.
19The applicant submits that he is not prevented by the provisions of section 34(1) from pursuing all of the allegations contained in his Application. The applicant submits that the ongoing failure of the LPS to take action and to lay charges at anytime up until at least October 22, 2008 when Chief Faulkner made his comments means all of his allegations are timely. The applicant submits that he has continued to pursue the LPS to press charges including raising the issue of the sexual assault of his daughter at the October 22, 2008 public meeting with Chief Faulkner. The applicant submits the fact that he has been told that charges could still be laid if more evidence is forthcoming is evidence that the investigations into his allegations concerning his ex-wife’s family are ongoing and cannot be considered to be closed.
20The applicant further submits that ultimately it was Chief Faulkner’s decision not to lay the charges in response to his ongoing concerns about the alleged conduct of his ex-wife’s family. The applicant submits that this is because of his position as the Chief of Police. He submits that the Chief would have been well aware of his interests in charges being filed given his March 2007 complaint to the LPS under the PSA. The applicant submits that the October 22, 2008 statement of the Chief’s was an incident in which the chief indicated why he was not likely to lay charges because, in the Chief’s view, men are responsible for domestic violence, and as such this statement constitutes a further incident of discrimination.
21The applicant submits that many of the delays between the original alleged criminal acts and the filing of his Application are not his fault but are rather the fault of the LPS. He argues that the length of time it took the police to investigate then later to respond to his complaints explains, in part, why the filing of his Application was delayed.
22The applicant submits that he was not aware of the requirement to file an Application within 12 months of an alleged incident of discrimination until October 2009 after which he immediately filed his Application.
Analysis
23I am of the view that the only incident of alleged discrimination that is timely is Chief Faulkner’s comments on October 22, 2008, one year before the Application was filed on October 22, 2009. The applicant was well aware prior to October 22, 2008 that the LPS were not going to lay charges either in regard to the property damage to the applicant’s car or to the alleged sexual assault of his daughter. The applicant was first told in January 2006 that charges would not be laid in relation to the property crimes and in March 2007 that charges would not be laid in regards to the sexual assault. He continues to challenge these decisions including making a formal complaint under the PSA in March 2007, 32 months before he filed his Application.
24It appears that a further investigation was conducted into the sexual assault with the investigating officer concluding in December 2007 that no charges would be laid. The applicant continued to put forward his arguments for why charges should be laid during his interactions with the LPS and the LPS investigation of his March 2007 complaint under the PSA. The LPS report following its investigation of the March 2007 complaint was issued on April 24, 2008 and concluded that the decisions not to lay charges were supported even thought there were some minor flaws with the investigations. On July 15, 2008 the LPS upheld the report findings determining that there had been no misconduct in the investigation of the property crimes and the sexual assault and the decision not to lay charges. The applicant did not file his Application for another 15 months.
25I do not accept the applicant’s argument that there was an ongoing failure by the respondents to lay charges. The applicant knew certainly by no later than December 2007 that the LPS did not intend to lay charges and by July 2008 that the LPS was of the view that there was no misconduct in relation to the decision not to lay charges or in terms of how the LPS conducted its investigations. If the applicant was of the view that the investigations and the decision not to lay charges were discriminatory, he had an opportunity to act in order to file an Application within a one year timeframe. I do not accept his argument that the delay in filing his Application is because of the time it took the LPS to respond to his concerns given that it is not until October 2009 that he filed his Application.
26The applicant also submits that the LPS had indicated to him on several occasions that if further evidence became available they might lay charges and that the ongoing nature of the police investigations makes his Application timely. I disagree. The fact that new evidence may become available is irrelevant to the applicant’s obligation to act on his allegations that the police ought to have filed charges on the evidence that they did have before them and that their investigations were flawed.
27The applicant submits that he raised the issue of his daughter and the failure of the police to lay charges at the October 22, 2008 meeting. Raising a complaint of discrimination does not, in itself, create a further incident of discrimination.
28I do not accept the applicant’s contention that Chief Faulkner’s comments of October 22, 2009 constitute a further incident in a series of incidents of discrimination that brings all the earlier alleged discriminatory actions into time under section 34(1)(b) of the Code. In considering the meaning of the term “series of incidents” under section 34(1)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal has adopted the following definition of the word series: “a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial or temporal succession”. See Pakarian v. Chen, 2010 HRTO 457. I agree with the respondents that Chief Faulkner’s comments are not of the same class as the earlier alleged incidents.
29I find that Chief Faulkner’s statement of October 22, 2008, recorded by the applicant as: “As men we have lost our way. We fight each other; we abuse our partners; and we sexually assault our own children” is an opinion about men and their conduct. In my view Chief Faulkner expresses this opinion about men’s involvement in domestic violence in an attempt to describe a social problem. It is a comment made to the public at a consultation meeting. It is not directed specifically at the applicant. This is decidedly different, in my view, from the allegations that the LPS discriminated against the applicant in the investigation of an alleged sexual assault and several property crimes. It is not a further event or incident in which the respondents allegedly denied the applicant a service or singled the applicant out for differential treatment.
30It appears that the applicant’s principal assertion about the comments of October 22, 2008 is that they are evidence of Chief Faulkner’s involvement in the alleged discriminatory decisions not to lay charges against his ex-wife’s family. However, I do not accept the argument that this alleged link means that the comments of October 22, 2008 are a further incident in a series of incidents of discrimination. Again, the applicant was not denied a service or treated differently on October 22, 2008. Moreover, I find this alleged link between Chief Faulkner’s comments and earlier alleged discriminatory acts to be highly speculative. It is a bald assertion made by the applicant with no real evidentiary base, in my view. The applicant’s argument that part of the evidence to support this claim is that LPS statistics on domestic violence have been deliberately manipulated in order to support Chief Faulkner’s biased view that only men are responsible for sexual assaults is not, given the information before me, credible.
31Additionally, as I will indicate later, I find that Chief Faulkner’s comments are not, in of themselves, an act of discrimination, and as such they would not constitute a further incident of discrimination.
Submissions and Analysis under section 34(2)
32The Code states in section 34(2) that an applicant may not apply to the Tribunal more than a year after the last event giving rise to the application unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith. In dealing with requests that applications be considered outside the one-year limitation period, the Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applications to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241.
33The applicant submits that he was unaware of the one year requirement to file an Application until October 21, 2009 at which time he acted diligently. I am not satisfied that this is a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing. The applicant clearly was able to make a complaint informally and formally under the PSA to the LPS over an extended period of time in order to promote his interests. However, the applicant is essentially claiming ignorance of his rights under the Code as the reason for not filing an Application with the Tribunal within the required timeframe. The Tribunal has determined that it is not enough for a party who must establish good faith to say that he or she was ignorant of their rights. See Lutz v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 1137 and Ababio v. Humber River Regional Hospital, 2009 HRTO 286. The applicant has not met the fairly high onus the Tribunal requires to show that the delay in filing his Application was incurred in good faith pursuant to section 34(2) of the Code.
Allegations concerning the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure
34As stated earlier, the applicant briefly refers to the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure in his Application. He makes no allegations in relation to this policy in his narrative of what happened (Section 8) and in his Reply he explicitly states that his complaint with the respondents is threefold with no reference to concerns with the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure. The applicant does state in sections C2 and C3 of his Application that under the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure the LPS would accuse men of being the perpetrators without supporting evidence while not arresting women including those who have committed mischief by making false statements to the police. The applicant refers to the mother and grandmother of his daughter not being charged as an example of how the procedure was implemented in a discriminatory fashion.
35I find that the applicant’s allegations related to the Domestic Violence Procedure are barred from proceeding by section 34 of the Code. While the applicant has made some general statements about the discriminatory nature of the policy, the only particularized incidents he refers to as evidence of this discrimination are ones involving his own experiences with the LPS that take place prior to October 22, 2008. These incidents are all more than one year prior to the filing of the Application and thus are untimely and fail to meet the requirements of section 34(1).
36I also find that Chief Faulkner’s comments of October 22, 2008 do not constitute a further incident of discrimination in relation to the LPS Domestic Violence Policy that would make the applicant’s allegations regarding the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure timely. These comments do not constitute an action or incident of discrimination related to the LPS procedure or its implementation. The applicant’s contention that these comments by Chief Faulkner about men and their involvement in domestic violence is evidence that the LPS has acted in a discriminatory manner when implementing the LPS Domestic Violence procedure is speculative and is an assertion made with no evidentiary foundation. If the applicant had concerns about the LPS implementation of its Domestic Violence Procedure arising out of his experiences with the LPS he needed to bring these forward to the Tribunal prior to October 2009. As stated in Miller, supra, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence when they seek to pursue a human rights claim.
37The applicant provided no explanation for why he did not file an Application regarding the Domestic Violence Procedure in a more timely fashion. He was able to make a related complaint under the PSA. As stated earlier, the Tribunal has determined that it is not enough for a party who must establish good faith to say that he or she was ignorant of their rights. Therefore the applicant’s allegations regarding the LPS Domestic Violence Procedure are dismissed.
38As a result, the only allegation not dismissed for delay is in relation to Chief Faulkner’s comments of October 22, 2008.
OCTOBER 22, 2008 COMMENTS
Submissions in Relation to Chief Faulkner’s Comments
39Both parties provided submissions on the issue of whether section 45.1 of the Code applies to Chief Faulkner’s comments given that the applicant filed a complaint about these comments under the PSA. The respondents submit that the complaints process under the PSA is a proceeding, whether a complaint filed under this process is reviewed by OCCPS or is resolved by a Police Service. The respondents submit that in this particular case, the applicant’s complaint about Chief Faulkner’s October 22, 2008 comments filed under the PSA were appropriately dealt with by the LPS Board. The respondents Request that the allegations against Chief Faulkner be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1.
40The applicant explicitly stated that he accepts that the PSA complaints process is a proceeding under section 45.1 whether the matter proceeds to review by OCCPS or not. He disputes that the decisions made by the LPS under the PSA appropriately dealt with the substance of his Application.
41I have decided not to make a determination on whether section 45.1 applies in this matter. The Tribunal currently has two Applications before it in which the issue of whether section 45.1 ought to be applied to a public complaint under the PSA, in particular a complaint that is not reviewed by OCCPS and where the Tribunal has invited the intervention of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and others. See Claybourn v. Toronto Police Service, 2011 HRTO 1406 and Shallow v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2011 HRTO 1407. In the present case I essentially heard no arguments as to whether a complaint under the PSA constitutes a proceeding. Under the circumstances, and given my decision, below, to dismiss for other reasons, it is not necessary for me to decide the issues raised under section 45.1.
42This decision is made, in part, because I specifically did ask the parties for submissions on whether Chief Faulkner’s comments on October 22, 2008 constituted an act of discrimination in of itself and both parties made submissions on this issue. I am of the view that I can decide this issue and have done so. I find that these comments do not constitute an act of discrimination.
43The respondents submit that Chief Faulkner’s comments are a factual observation, that it is reasonable to say that men are responsible for domestic violence as most perpetrators are men. The respondent noted that national and London area police statistics show that the overwhelming number of perpetrators of domestic violence are indeed men. The respondents submit that such a truthful statement does not constitute an act of discrimination. The respondent also refer to the Tribunal decision in Borraro v. Greater Sudbury Police Force, 2011 HRTO 239. In Borraro the applicant argued that a statement in a police procedure on domestic violence that the overwhelming majority of domestic violence cases involve men abusing women constituted a stereotype that gives police officers the message that the man is the “bad guy” in any domestic violence situation. The Tribunal found in Barraro that this statement provided a social context for police officers who deal with domestic violence situations, and did not stereotypically portray men as the “bad guy” (para 58).
44The applicant alleges Chief Faulkner’s comments suggest that all men are perpetrators of domestic violence, and these comments present a negative stereotype of men that is offensive and that constitutes an act of discrimination. He submits that if Chief Faulkner’s comments had been made about another group, for example “Blacks”, then people would readily accept that the comments were an act of discrimination.
45The applicant submits that the statistics the respondent seeks to indicate that men are responsible for domestic violence are inaccurate, that he knows of at least one incident of domestic violence in London from 2007 perpetrated by a woman that belies the LPS statistics from that year that show 100% of incidents of domestic violence from that year were perpetrated by men. The applicant alleges that the LPS deliberately falsified these statistics to reinforce the argument that men are responsible for domestic assaults.
Analysis
46The nature of the comments made by Chief Faulkner were not in dispute. The respondents did not challenge the applicant’s recollection of what was said on October 22, 2008. I proceed on the basis that Chief Faulkner did say “As men we have lost our way. We fight each other; we abuse our partners; and we sexually assault our own children.”
47I am also prepared to accept that a single comment can constitute a breach of the Code. In Berisa v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 912, the Tribunal reviewed some of the case law in relation to human rights cases involving single incidents involving verbal comments. It was noted that findings of discrimination were made in Abdallah v. Thames Valley District School Board, 2008 HRTO 230, where a teacher said to a student during a heated exchange that “I am sick and tired of immigrants crying discrimination when they don’t get what they want,” and in Pillai v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2003] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 26 where there was an ongoing pattern of racial slurs uttered behind the applicant’s back and where there was one instance of a slur being shouted at the applicant in the midst of an argument. However, it was also noted in Berisa that in other cases where single instances in which explicit comments were made no findings of discrimination were made. This included in Trang v. Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010 ABQB 6, where the Court stated that in an employment context, an isolated racial slur, even one that is very harsh does not necessarily amount to discrimination (paragraph 1129). In Dhanjal v. Air Canada, [1996] C.H.R.D. No. 4, it was concluded that an isolated slur did not by itself constitute harassment (paragraph 212). Finally, the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (“BCHRT”) found in Banwait v. Forsyth, 2008 BCHRT 81, that although the applicant’s colleague had referred to him as a “fucking Hindu” during the course of a heated exchange this single racial slur did not constitute a violation of the British Columbia Human Rights Code.
48I agree with the decision in Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71, in which the BCHRT helpfully stated at para. 12:
(…) all the circumstances must be taken into account when considering whether a single comment could constitute a contravention of the Code. Without suggesting that this is an exhaustive list, some of the relevant factors would be the egregiousness or virulence of the comment, the nature of the relationship between the involved parties, the context in which the comment was made, whether an apology was offered, and whether or not the recipient of the comment was a member of a group historically discriminated against
49In my view, Chief Faulkner’s comments on October 22, 2008 are not egregious or virulent. They express an opinion about men’s involvement in domestic violence in an attempt, in my view, to describe a social problem. It is noteworthy, in my view, that Chief Faulkner begins his remarks by saying “As men we” thus including himself in the description of persons who have “lost their way, who fight, who abuse partners and who sexually assault children.” In my view, no reasonable person would conclude that Chief Faulkner was suggesting that he personally was responsible for an act of domestic violence. Similarly, no reasonable person would conclude that he was suggesting that all men are so guilty. It is also not clear to me that his comments can be construed to mean that only men are responsible for domestic violence. Nor do the comments, in my view, express a hostility towards men. In my view, Chief Faulkner’s reference to men in general is a rhetorical means to communicate the fact that domestic violence is a serious and significant issue involving men.
50The comments are made at a public, community meeting and as such are made to everyone present. They are not directed at the applicant nor any other particular person. The comments do not single out any individual, including the applicant, for derisive treatment. The comments are not made about “others”, including a member or members of a group historically discriminated against or disadvantaged. It is also not clear, in my view, whether Chief Faulkner and the applicant are in a service relationship when these comments are made which could lead to a finding of discrimination under section 1 of the Code. The fact that the applicant personally found the remarks offensive is not, under the circumstances, enough to conclude that they violated the Code.
51The respondents argue that Chief Faulkner’s comments are essentially statements of truth. They submit that men are generally responsible for incidents of domestic violence. I accept this to be accurate and this contributes to my view that Chief Faulkner’s comments are not egregious or virulent. The applicant submits that if the comments had been made about another identifiable group that one would readily conclude that it was an act of discrimination. I do not find this conjecture particularly helpful in making a determination as to whether there was an act of discrimination in the present case.
52The circumstances of this case are that Chief Faulkner made some general comments about men, clearly including himself in describing men’s behaviour. He has used, in my view, a certain amount of deliberate hyperbole to make a point about domestic violence and a reasonable person would not take his comments literally. The applicant states that he was personally affronted by the comments, stating that they revealed a bias against men. The allegation of bias appears to be, in some measure, related to the applicant’s own previous dealings with the LPS and the LPS’ failure to charge his ex mother-in-law in relation to an incident of alleged sexual assault. I do not find that the comments in themselves suggest a bias towards men. I do not find that they constitute an act of discrimination.
53For all these reasons the applicant’s Application is dismissed
Dated at Toronto this 2nd day of September, 2011.
”signed by”________
Eric Whist
Vice-chair