Grigorakis v. Essex County Soccer Association, 2012 HRTO 906

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Helen Grigorakis

Applicant

-and-

Essex County Soccer Association, Ontario Soccer Association and Canadian Soccer Association

Respondents

decision

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson

Date: May 7, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 906

Indexed as: Grigorakis v. Essex County Soccer Association

APPEARANCES

Helen Grigorakis, Applicant ) Self-represented

Essex County Soccer Association and ) Robert Richler, Counsel Ontario Soccer Association, Respondents )

Canadian Soccer Association, Respondent ) Richard Sinclair, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on May 17, 2011, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of sex.

Decision

2For the reasons which follow I dismiss the Application.

Background

3The applicant is the president of the Tecumseh Soccer Club (“TSC”) and a member of the Essex County Soccer Association (“ECSA”). The applicant was nominated for the position of Treasurer on the ECSA board at ECSA’s Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) held on January 30, 2011, and she accepted the nomination. The Treasurer position was the only contested vacancy. Winnie Brown, Ontario Soccer Association (“OSA”) Director-at-Large, chaired the elections.

4After the applicant was nominated, someone informed Ms. Brown that the applicant could not run for the ECSA board because she was president of TSC. The applicant agreed that the rule was that one cannot hold positions on two boards at the same time, but the practice in the past was to resign from one’s club position after being elected to ECSA board. Ms. Brown took the position that the applicant had to give her resignation to TSC in advance to be eligible to run for the ECSA board. The applicant was not allowed to contest the election, despite protests from others in attendance that candidates had been allowed to resign their club positions after being elected to the ECSA board.

5The applicant stated that in a meeting conducted by the president and vice-president of ECSA, a member challenged her knowledge of soccer in a demeaning manner. She was the only woman present. Neither the president nor vice-president made any comment. She asserts that no man has ever been asked to verify his credentials to hold a position on a club board. In her Reply, the applicant clarified that this meeting occurred on February 24, 2010, and that Waseem Habash, Vice President, Academic Operations, was the person who questioned her. She stated that Mr. Habash apologized to her after the meeting.

6The applicant also asserted that ECSA and the OSA are not “women friendly” in their operations. The applicant stated that ECSA refused to pay for trophies for a women’s league and removed a TSC’s girls’ team from a higher-level league. OSA refused the appeal regarding the girls’ team. ECSA runs a men’s tournament called the Association Cup, which has a monetary prize, but has no equivalent tournament for women. The Canadian Soccer Association (“CSA”) did not respond to any inquiries regarding either soccer league operations or the applicant’s individual complaints.

7By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated October 25, 2011, the Tribunal ordered a summary hearing to determine whether the Application should be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success. The summary hearing was held on February 24, 2012.

Summary Hearings

8The summary hearing process is described in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paragraphs 8-10, the Tribunal made the following observations on the type of inquiry that may be involved in a summary hearing:

In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.

In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.

In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed following the summary hearing.

Submissions

9The applicant submitted the rule prohibiting one from holding executive positions on more than one board had not changed, but the respondents, ECSA and OSA, interpreted it to prevent her from running for the ECSA board. The applicant stated that no one else had ever been required to resign prior to an election for the ECSA board. In this regard, the applicant noted that several male candidates, including her husband, had run for ECSA board positions without first resigning their club positions. The applicant noted that a female candidate, Jackie Malcolm, had also been allowed to run in an ECSA election without resigning her club position first, but asserted she was afforded special treatment because her husband was on the Lasalle Soccer Club and ECSA boards. The applicant submitted that the minutes of the AGM would support her allegations once they are disclosed.

10The applicant stated that she has been involved in soccer for 40 years and in that time she has been intimidated, abused and attacked verbally. The applicant submitted that, in her experience, she was almost always the only woman attending ECSA meetings and was often subjected to demeaning behaviour. She asserted the ECSA community is a close-knit group where women are not allowed.

11The applicant submitted that the CSA is the “ultimate power” in soccer and is the final step in the complaint process. The CSA, however, never responded to her inquiries, either regarding her own complaint or regarding complaints regarding the unfair treatment of girls and women’s teams. According to the applicant, the CSA has a responsibility to act, but her complaints were ignored. The applicant submitted that the CSA was her only realistic avenue of redress because ECSA and the OSA were acting together.

12The applicant explained that she provided examples of the poor treatment meted out to female teams to demonstrate that her experience was not isolated. She stated that her case was not about rudeness, but about impediments to women, whom she submitted were not viewed as important.

13ECSA and OSA submitted that the applicant’s allegations regarding trophies for the women’s league, the Association Cup and the removal of a TSC girls’ team from a rep league had no connection to the applicant personally or to employment or volunteering.

14ECSA and OSA submitted that the complaint that someone asked her a question about her skill was vague and, in any event, candidates will be asked about their skills if they are unknown. The applicant presented no evidence that the question was asked because of her gender and the question had no negative repercussions for the applicant.

15ECSA and OSA acknowledged that the procedure followed at the January 30, 2011 AGM was different than at other AGMs regarding the enforcement of by-laws. They submitted that it was not a gender-motivated decision and was due to the particular people who made the decision. In this regard, the chair of the meeting, Ms. Brown, was female, although ECSA and OSA acknowledged that this does not eliminate the possibility of gender discrimination. Ms. Brown was also an outsider to ECSA, since she was an OSA member and was not familiar with the daily operations of ECSA. The requirement to resign prior to accepting a nomination applied equally to anyone seeking a nomination, but, as it happened, the applicant was the only one affected. ECSA and OSA noted that Ms. Malcolm was elected to an ECSA position and was subject to the same requirements as male candidates, although she was not required to resign her club position in advance of that election. ECSA and OSA submitted that the applicant was treated differently because of the interpretation of a rule, not because of her gender.

16The CSA stated that it sympathized with the applicant, but submitted that there simply was no evidence to establish a prima facie case against CSA, which had no involvement in the incidents in question. Counsel for the CSA explained that there are three levels to soccer in Canada: local soccer leagues and clubs; provincial, which includes district association and competition between leagues; and national, which includes provincial associations and interprovincial leagues. Local and district associations are not part of CSA and CSA does not have direct governance of provincial associations such as the OSA. Rather, CSA stated that appeals must first be made to the OSA, after which they can be taken to the CSA. The CSA also has an Appeals Committee and in some cases FIFA is the ultimate appellate level. CSA submitted that the applicant did not appeal to OSA and therefore her complaint was not properly before the CSA.

17The CSA submitted that the applicant made no allegation that CSA was involved in the ECSA elections and none of the examples she provided have any connection to CSA. The applicant provided no evidence that CSA’s treatment of the applicant’s concerns was in any way related to gender.

Analysis and Decision

18At the summary hearing stage, an applicant is required to point to evidence that she has or is reasonably available to her that could show a link between the respondents’ actions and the alleged prohibited grounds of discrimination. The applicant is required only to describe what her evidence would be and the Tribunal does not generally evaluate or weigh evidence. There is no dispute that the applicant was not permitted to run for Treasurer of ECSA at the AGM in January 2011 because she had not resigned her position with TSC. The applicant pointed to evidence that she was the only person affected by this interpretation of ECSA election rules because the Treasurer position was the only contested position in January 2011 and candidates were not required to resign in advance of other ECSA elections. ECSA and OSA do not dispute this. The applicant gave examples of several male candidates who were permitted to run for ECSA positions without first resigning their club positions.

19The applicant submitted that soccer organizations are biased against women and she gave examples of her personal experience and examples of girls’ and women’s team being subject to allegedly discriminatory treatment. Accordingly, her belief that gender discrimination explains why she was prevented from running for the ECSA board in January 2011 is understandable. In my view, however, the applicant did not point to evidence linking ECSA’s or the OSA’s actions to the prohibited ground of sex. The evidence the applicant described was that Ms. Brown, the OSA Director-at-Large chairing the election, was informed of a by-law prohibiting an individual from holding executive positions on two boards at the same time. She interpreted the rule to mean that the applicant had to resign her position with TSC before running for ECSA. The applicant pointed to no evidence that Ms. Brown participated in the allegedly sexist behaviour attributed to ECSA or that she or anyone else in OSA colluded with ECSA to keep the applicant off of the ECSA board. Ms. Brown’s interpretation of the by-law is evidently at odds with ECSA’s practices before and since, but the applicant did not describe any basis for concluding that it was a sexist decision. The applicant did not identify the person who alerted Ms. Brown to the by-law in question. Accordingly, the evidence the applicant described does not link this action to anyone who had treated her in an allegedly sexist manner in the past or to ECSA. As a result, the evidence the applicant has or reasonably has available to her does not establish a link between the respondents’ alleged actions regarding the ECSA AGM in January 2011 or a prohibited ground of discrimination.

20The other allegations against ECSA and OSA related to allegedly discriminatory treatment of girls and women’s soccer teams. The applicant was involved in these incidents in her capacity of president of TSC, but the remedies the applicant seeks regarding these allegations are for the players, not herself. She did not file the Application on behalf of the players. In any event, the applicant included these allegations as historical background to her allegations regarding the ECSA election and she made minimal submissions regarding these incidents. In my view, the applicant did not point to evidence that would connect them to a prohibited ground of discrimination.

21Mr. Habash allegedly questioned the applicant’s knowledge of soccer an ECSA meeting in February 2010. The applicant was affronted by this question and attributed it to her gender. The applicant stated that she was the only woman in the meeting and that men are not asked such questions. In this context, the applicant inferred that Mr. Habash questioned her knowledge of soccer because she was a woman.

22The Tribunal has found that a single incident, if sufficiently serious, can amount to a violation of the Code. See Wamsley v. Ed Green Blueprinting, 2010 HRTO 1491, and Murchie v. JB’s Mongolian Grill, 2006 HRTO 33. In Berisa v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 912, and B.C. v. London Police Services Board, 2011 HRTO 1644, the Tribunal reviewed jurisprudence considering whether a single incident can amount to harassment or discrimination. Such determinations are necessarily fact-specific and the outcomes were mixed depending on the circumstances of each case. However, the Tribunal noted that some single incidents of harsh slurs have been found to not amount to harassment or discrimination in employment. Even if the content of the alleged question is accepted as true, it was not a sexist slur and did not contain derogatory or demeaning language. The applicant was offended by the inferences the question raised about her, but this is not sufficiently serious to find this single incident to amount to a course of vexatious or harassing conduct and therefore I find these allegations have no reasonable prospect of success.

23The applicant did not allege that the CSA was responsible for any of the incidents of discrimination she experienced. She submitted the CSA was obliged to act to address her allegations when she brought them to the CSA’s attention. The CSA explained that the appeal process was to first appeal to the OSA and, if she received an unfavourable result, then to the CSA. The applicant pointed to no evidence contradicting this explanation and she acknowledged that she did not appeal to the OSA regarding the election. Therefore she could not and did not appeal to the CSA. Consequently, the applicant described no evidence that her complaint was ever properly before the CSA or that the CSA had jurisdiction to review ECSA’s or OSA’s actions, other than by an appeal of an OSA decision. Consequently, the applicant in my view has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing that the CSA’s failure to address her concerns was connected to a breach of the Code.

24For the above reasons, I find the Application has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed.