Elizabeth Champion Barefoot

The offender, a 37-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of simple possession of cocaine (29.4 grams), methamphetamine, and codeine.

The Crown sought 6 to 8 months in custody, while the defence requested a suspended sentence and probation.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence due to the quantity of cocaine, but also considered the offender's lack of a criminal record, cooperation with police, and family circumstances.

The court sentenced the offender to 90 days in custody for the cocaine possession, and suspended sentences with 12 months of probation for the other two offences.

The accused were charged with possession of methamphetamine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and simple possession of hydromorphone, following a police raid on a residence.

The court found the male accused guilty of possessing the methamphetamine and fentanyl, as circumstantial evidence linked him to the drugs found in the bathroom.

The female accused was acquitted of those charges but found guilty of simple possession of hydromorphone based on her admission to police regarding spoons containing morphine found in a bedroom.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and simple possession of methamphetamine and codeine, following a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle and residence.

The court found the accused guilty of simple possession of methamphetamine and codeine.

Regarding the cocaine, while the Crown presented evidence including 29.4 grams of cocaine, a digital scale, cash, and text messages, the court had a reasonable doubt about the accused's intention to traffic, partly due to his exculpatory statements to police and the absence of debt lists or cutting agents.

The accused was acquitted of possession for the purpose of trafficking but found guilty of the lesser included offence of simple possession of cocaine.

During a trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown brought an application to qualify a police officer as an expert in the use, pricing, sale, and distribution of cocaine.

The court dismissed the application without a formal voir dire, finding that the proposed evidence failed the Mohan test for admissibility.

Specifically, the court held that the evidence lacked legal relevance as it was not grounded on proven facts and was unnecessary because the inferences sought by the Crown, such as interpreting text messages, did not require expert assistance.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary arrest and unreasonable search.

The police stopped the accused's vehicle and arrested him without a warrant based on confidential informant information and surveillance.

The police subsequently searched his vehicle incident to arrest and found cocaine.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and that the vehicle search was a valid search incident to arrest.

The accused was tried on six charges including trafficking fentanyl and hydromorphone, simple possession of fentanyl, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of prohibited weapons.

The Crown alleged the accused supplied fentanyl to an intermediary who sold it to an undercover officer.

The court found the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and convicted the accused of trafficking fentanyl.

However, the court acquitted the accused on the remaining charges, finding reasonable doubt regarding the source of the hydromorphone, the lawfulness of the excess fentanyl patches, the origin of the seized cash, and the accused's knowledge of the prohibited characteristics of the seized knives.

The Crown sought to change its position regarding the use of the accused's utterances and statement to police as part of its case at trial, contrary to a recorded pretrial conference position.

The accused opposed this change, arguing it would impair his right to a fair trial.

The court considered the Crown's non-compliance with the Criminal Proceedings Rules and the lack of a compelling explanation for the change.

The court ruled that the Crown must maintain its original position, disallowing the introduction of the utterances/statement as part of its case.

The Crown brought a pretrial application for a witness, Jesse Watson, to testify remotely via an audio-video link in a criminal trial.

The application was made under subsections 486.2(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, with the Crown primarily relying on subsection (1) due to the witness's mental disability.

The Defence opposed the application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the Crown had established the witness's ability to communicate evidence, potential difficulty in doing so due to mental disability, and that the Defence failed to rebut the presumption that the order would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.

In a multi-count indictment trial involving charges of human trafficking and prostitution, the Defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on three areas: a prior police attendance regarding an unrelated matter, internet postings from October 2015, and testimony from a Newmarket court proceeding in April 2016.

The court ruled that cross-examination on the prior police attendance and the Newmarket court proceedings was admissible.

These areas were deemed highly relevant to the complainant's credibility and the veracity of her allegations, particularly concerning her willingness to engage in prostitution, and were necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence.

The internet postings were found to have limited relevance and were not permitted.

The accused brought pretrial applications challenging various police searches and his statements under sections 8, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found several Charter violations, including an unreasonable "clearing search" of his residence, serious breaches of his right to counsel during police interviews, and an unreasonable search of his parents' residence based on unconstitutionally obtained information.

The court also found a section 8 violation regarding the search of electronic data outside the authorized time period.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded evidence from the clearing search, the accused's statements, and evidence from his parents' residence, but admitted the electronic data due to its importance and minimal impact on the accused's rights.

The applicant, David D’Souza, facing a thirteen-count indictment for human trafficking, prostitution, firearms, and drug offences, brought a pretrial application for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court analyzed the 28-month delay from the charge date to the anticipated trial completion, attributing 4.5 months of Crown/institutional delay in the Ontario Court of Justice and 6.5 months in the Superior Court of Justice, totaling 11 months.

This total was found to be below the guidelines set out in R. v. Morin.

While acknowledging some actual prejudice to the accused (exacerbated stress, anxiety, foreclosed employment opportunities, and inability to travel), the court characterized it as between slight and moderate.

Balancing the prejudice against society's interest in having the charges tried on their merits, the court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The Crown applied for an advance ruling to qualify a police detective as an expert witness in cocaine use, pricing, sale, distribution, and modus operandi for a jury trial involving drug trafficking and other charges.

The defense opposed the application or sought to curtail the evidence.

The court partially granted the application, allowing the expert to provide general information about cocaine and drug trafficking indicators (e.g., money, debt lists) but disallowed specific interpretations of text messages and an ultimate opinion on whether the seized cocaine was for trafficking, finding these unnecessary and too close to the ultimate issue for the jury.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, alleging errors by the trial judge in assessing credibility and claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principles and found no reversible error in the credibility findings or apprehension of evidence.

Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court scrutinized trial counsel's preparation and tactical decisions during cross-examination, concluding that counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range of professional judgment and did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender, a 29-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine and cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought 4.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for mid-level drug trafficking operations motivated by profit.

Balancing the serious nature of the offences with the offender's guilty pleas, lack of prior record, and strong family support, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, reduced by 6 months for strict bail conditions, resulting in 42 months imprisonment.

Accused charged with multiple assaults against their children sought disclosure of third‑party records held by a child protection agency.

The defence argued the records were likely relevant to the credibility and reliability of the child complainants because they contained allegations made by the children against other individuals.

Applying the likely relevance test from O’Connor and related authorities, the court held that speculative requests for third‑party records are impermissible but found sufficient case‑specific evidence that similar allegations had been made and at least partially recanted or determined unfounded.

The court concluded the threshold for stage‑one production was met and ordered the records unsealed for judicial review before determining whether disclosure to the defence should occur.

The Crown applied to summarily dismiss the defence's pretrial applications for a stay of proceedings and for third-party records.

The accused, charged with assaulting their children, sought a stay based on alleged warrantless police attendances at their property and sought records from the Children's Aid Society.

The court allowed the third-party records application to proceed in part, despite service issues, but summarily dismissed the stay application as frivolous under Rule 6.11(2), finding it had no reasonable prospect of success even if the alleged facts were true.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging an arbitrary arrest contrary to s. 9 of the Charter after police stopped a vehicle targeting another suspect and arrested the applicant passenger without any prior information or reasonable grounds.

The court found that the arresting officers had no subjective or objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant, whose only connection was being a passenger in a vehicle driven by the target of a drug investigation.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court held the Charter breach was serious and had a significant impact on the accused’s liberty and privacy interests.

Although the drug evidence was reliable and central to the prosecution, the seriousness of the violation required exclusion.

With the evidence excluded, the Crown called no further evidence and an acquittal was entered.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of their s. 8 and s. 9 rights during a drug trafficking investigation.

The police arrested one accused based on confidential informant tips and surveillance, and subsequently conducted a warrantless 'clearing search' of the accused's residence before obtaining a search warrant.

The court found the arrest was lawful and based on reasonable and probable grounds.

However, the court held the warrantless 'clearing search' violated s. 8 of the Charter as there were no exigent circumstances.

Despite the s. 8 breach, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach was not serious, the police acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The applications were dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of break-in instruments.

Police stopped the accused's vehicle and found 211 grams of marijuana packaged in multiple baggies, digital scales, cash, and various tools including lock picks.

Text messages on the accused's phone indicated drug trafficking activity.

The court dismissed the break-in tools charge, finding insufficient evidence of intent to use them for an improper purpose.

However, the court found the accused guilty of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, rejecting his claim that the drugs were solely for personal medical use.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana under 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and possession of break-in instruments contrary to section 351(1) of the Criminal Code.

Police discovered 211 grams of marijuana in the accused's vehicle, along with digital scales, cash, and break-in tools.

The accused held a valid medical marijuana authorization permitting possession of 45 grams only.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages, packaging of marijuana in multiple baggies, and expert testimony regarding street jargon and drug pricing.

The accused testified that all marijuana was for personal use due to chronic pain management.

The court found the accused guilty of trafficking but acquitted him of the break-in tools charge.