CITATION: Her Majesty the Queen v. Gagnon & Carson, 2017 ONSC 516
COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-946-0000
DATE: 20170123
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
Ms. Elizabeth Barefoot, for the Federal Crown
- and -
Jamie Lee Gagnon &
Jordyn Carson
Ms. Sophia Newbould for Jamie Lee Gagnon, Accused; and
Mr. Kyle Noonan for Jordyn Carson, Accused.
Accused
HEARD:
January 16, 17, 18 & 19, 2017
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Conlan J.
I. Introduction
The Background
[1] On May 6, 2016, members of the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”), tactics and rescue, emergency response and drug enforcement units, under warrant, engulfed a residence on the Saugeen First Nation, Bruce County.
[2] The house was searched.
[3] A potpourri of illegal narcotics was found inside the house – 43.76 grams of methamphetamine (“meth”), 12.34 grams of powder fentanyl, and a small amount of hydromorphone.
[4] Other items were seized as well, including $1705.00 in Canadian currency and two cellular telephones.
[5] A motor vehicle on the property was also searched, under warrant, and cannabis was discovered, plus two more cellular telephones. A wallet was found inside the car which contained a Birth Certificate in the name of the accused, Jamie Lee Gagnon.
[6] The two accused persons, male Jamie Lee Gagnon (“Gagnon”) and female Jordyn Carson (“Carson”), were the only ones inside the residence when it was entered by the police.
The Charges
[7] Gagnon and Carson are charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. The formal charges read:
Jamie Lee Gagnon and Jordyn Carson stand charged that, on or about the 6th day of May, 2016 at the First Nation of Saugeen in the Judicial Region of Central West, did possess a substance included in Schedule I to wit: methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
AND FURTHER THAT Jamie Lee Gagnon and Jordyn Carson stand charged that, on or about the 6th day of May at the First Nation of Saugeen in the Judicial Region of Central West, did possess a substance included in Schedule I to wit: fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
[8] For the Court to find the accused guilty of possession of meth and/or fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, Crown counsel must prove each of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
i. that Gagnon and/or Carson were/was in possession of a substance;
ii. that the substance was meth (count 1) or fentanyl (count 2);
iii. that the accused knew that the substance was meth (count 1) or fentanyl (count 2); and
iv. that the accused had possession of the substance for the purpose of trafficking in it.
[9] If the Crown has not satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of those essential elements, I must find the accused not guilty.
[10] If the Crown has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of those essential elements, the verdict will be guilty.
[11] The key issue here is possession. There is no question that the substances were analyzed by Health Canada and determined to be meth and fentanyl. And the Defence has conceded the fourth essential element – that the possession, if proven, was for the purpose of trafficking.
[12] Thus, counts 1 and 2 boil down to the first essential element outlined above. In the circumstances of this case, if that first essential element is proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no question that the accused knew that the substance was meth or fentanyl, as the case may be.
[13] Let us examine the law of possession.
[14] Two or more persons may possess a drug at the same time.
[15] In addition, a person may have a substance in his or her possession in a number of different ways. Proof of any one of those ways beyond a reasonable doubt is enough to establish this essential element of the offence.
[16] It does not matter how long a person has a substance in his/her possession, as long as the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the requirements of possession have been met.
[17] Possession requires knowledge and some measure of control.
[18] A person who has actual physical control of a substance, as for example, by holding it in his or her hand, or keeping it in his or her pocket, has possession of that substance.
[19] A person who knowingly has a substance in the actual possession or custody of somebody else, or in some place for the use or benefit of himself or herself or somebody else, has possession of that substance, provided that he or she has some element of control over that substance.
[20] “Knowingly” means that the accused was aware of the possession or custody of the substance by another, or in another place, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.
[21] Regarding joint possession, where any one of two persons for example, with the knowledge and agreement of the other, has a substance in his or her possession or custody, both of them are in possession of that substance, provided that they both have some element of control over that substance. Knowledge and agreement by the other who is not in actual possession of the substance is essential. Mere indifference or doing nothing is not enough.
[22] “Substance” has its ordinary meaning and includes meth and fentanyl.
[23] Gagnon and Carson are also charged with simple possession of a controlled substance. The formal charge reads:
AND FURTHER THAT Jamie Lee Gagnon and Jordyn Carson stand charged that, on or about the 6th day of May 2016 at the First Nation of Saugeen in the Judicial Region of Central West, did possess a substance included in Schedule I to wit: hydromorphone contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
[24] For the Court to find either or both accused guilty of possession of hydromorphone, Crown counsel must prove each of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
i. that Gagnon and/or Carson was/were in possession of a substance;
ii. that the substance was hydromorphone; and
iii. that the accused knew that the substance was hydromorphone.
[25] If the Crown has not satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of those essential elements, I must find the accused not guilty of the offence.
[26] If the Crown has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of those essential elements, the verdict will be guilty.
[27] Again, as with counts 1 and 2, the key issue to resolve with count 3 is possession. Health Canada analysis proves the nature of the “substance”.
The Basic Legal Principles
[28] The accused are presumed to be innocent of each and every charge. They have no burden to prove anything. That rests entirely with the prosecution.
[29] Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires more than proof of probable or likely guilt. It requires that the Court be sure of the guilt of the accused.
[30] This is a multi-count Indictment with charges against two accused, jointly. I must remember that the verdicts need not be the same across the various counts and need not be the same on any one count as against both accused.
The Trial
[31] This Judge-alone trial was heard in Walkerton over less than four full days, commencing on January 16, 2017.
[32] For the Crown, I heard from the following 18 witnesses (a summary of each witness’ involvement is included below):
(i) Spencer Knoll of the OPP, the acting supervisor of the drug team who participated in the search of the residence and found in the bathroom a satchel that contained 43.76 grams of meth, 12.34 grams of powder fentanyl, $1705.00 in Canadian cash in various denominations, and men’s camouflage pants that held a BLU cellular telephone;
(ii) Mark Thompson of the OPP, the officer-in-charge of the investigation who (a) was familiar with the target house and its prior resident from previous narcotics investigations, (b) conducted mobile surveillance on the subject property on four occasions prior to May 6th, (c) participated in the search of the house and the car, (d) took custody of Gagnon inside the house and heard him say that he did not live there, had just got there the night before and had gone into the bathroom to turn the shower on when he heard the entry being made by the police because he suspected a robbery, (e) seized marihuana from inside the glove compartment of the car, (f) took some photos of the property on the day of the searches of the house and the car, (g) spoke with Gagnon at the police station and heard him say that he did not understand why he could be charged when he was just staying there, (h) prepared the exhibits for analysis by Health Canada, (i) sent some items to Mount Forest for fingerprinting (which turned out negative or not suitable), and (j) delivered the cellular telephones to the Owen Sound Police Service for analysis, under warrant;
(iii) Mark Loucas of the OPP’s tactics and rescue unit, who was one of the first group of officers to enter the home and who, within seconds upon entry, observed Gagnon and arrested him, at which time Gagnon said that he did not live there and was worried that he might be shot;
(iv) Peter Reintjes of the OPP’s drug enforcement unit, who searched what appeared to be an unoccupied bedroom inside the home and who searched the car, which had no hood on it, and which contained (a) 18 grams of cannabis inside the glove box, (b) a wallet with the Birth Certificate referred to above and a probation and parole business card, (c) two Samsung cellular telephones, and (d) a small digital scale;
(v) Peter Fischer of the OPP’s emergency response team, who conducted scene security and containment and who did not see any civilians outside of the residence;
(vi) Barry Reid of the OPP, the canine officer, who also did not see any civilians outside of the residence;
(vii) Philippe Plassot of the OPP’s emergency response team, who conducted scene security and containment and who did not see any civilians outside of the residence;
(viii) Matt Coghlin of the OPP’s emergency response team, who conducted scene security and containment and who did not see any civilians outside of the residence;
(ix) Craig Corriveau of the OPP’s emergency response team, who conducted scene security and containment and who did not see any civilians outside of the residence;
(x) Jeff Dudley of the OPP’s drug enforcement unit, who took entry and exit videos of the search and who searched the living room of the house and found a Court document in the name of Christopher Ward (someone known to the officer), empty hydromorphone pill capsules, and used clear plastic baggies;
(xi) Jeffrey Brazeau of the OPP’s drug enforcement unit, who (a) was one of the first officers inside the house to encounter Carson, crying and distraught in a bedroom with what appeared to be fresh needle track marks on her arms, a dresser nearby with two spoons on top of it which were later analyzed and found to contain hydromorphone, and an empty needle and an elastic band sitting on a nearby headboard, (b) arrested Carson, (c) asked Carson what was in the spoons, to which she replied morphine, (d) heard Carson say that she arrived at the house the day before, lived with her mother in Owen Sound and was friends with the “other guy” in the residence, (e) walked with Carson to the living room where she pointed towards a hutch in a way that caused the officer to conclude that she was taking ownership of some used hydromorphone pills in a bag that were in plain view, and (f) seized an Alcatel cellular telephone from a table beside the bed that Carson was first found in;
(xii) Angela Snedden of the OPP’s drug enforcement unit, who heard Carson say that she had been injecting needles for about six months and that the two spoons containing morphine on top of the dresser were hers;
(xiii) Grant Iaconis of the OPP’s tactics and rescue unit, who was the very first officer inside the house to observe Carson sitting on the bed in a bedroom and heard water or the shower running;
(xiv) Caleb Sawchuk of the OPP’s tactics and rescue unit, who also saw Carson sitting on the bed, distraught with her eyes closed most of the time;
(xv) Dean Croker of the OPP’s tactics and rescue unit, who was the last member of that unit to enter the home, prior to the drug officers, and who cleared the bathroom of any persons but did notice that the shower was running;
(xvi) Brian Skehen of the OPP’s tactics and rescue unit, who observed Gagnon standing outside a bedroom, very close to the entry of the bathroom, wearing just underwear;
(xvii) Tyler Stewart of the OPP’s drug enforcement unit, the exhibits officer; and
(xviii) Mike Holovaci of the Owen Sound Police Service, who downloaded the data to generate extraction reports for the four cellular telephones and the SIM card for one of them.
[33] Neither accused testified at trial, nor did the Defence call any evidence.
[34] In the course of the Crown’s case, however, certain utterances were led that could be considered exculpatory on the part of the accused.
[35] For example, there was evidence at trial from the police that Gagnon stated that he had just recently arrived at the house and did not live there. Similarly, there was evidence at trial from the police that Carson stated that she had just recently arrived at the house and lived with her mother in Owen Sound.
[36] To the extent that those types of utterances may be considered exculpatory and may amount to some evidence going against findings of knowledge and control of the various narcotics, I have kept in mind the standard instruction about an accused’s evidence.
[37] That standard instruction would normally be along these lines. If I believe Gagnon/Carson, I must find him or her not guilty. If I do not accept his or her denials but find that the accused’s evidence leaves me with a reasonable doubt, an acquittal must be entered. If I reject the accused’s evidence such that it does not leave me with a reasonable doubt, I still must not render a verdict of guilty unless the rest of the evidence at trial that I do accept convinces me, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused.
[38] Of course, the above wording does not neatly fit these circumstances because the utterances in question are not really denials but rather comments that may be interpreted as being exculpatory.
[39] In any event, I have considered those utterances as part of the overall assessment of the evidence adduced at trial.
II. Analysis
The Meth and the Fentanyl
[40] In my view, on counts 1 and 2, on the only contested issue of whether Gagnon possessed the meth and the fentanyl found in the black satchel beside the sink in the bathroom, the prosecution’s case is overwhelming.
[41] I accept the evidence of officer Skehen that, seconds after entry into the house, Gagnon was observed standing near the entrance to the bathroom, very proximate to where the black satchel was located, wearing just his underwear.
[42] I accept the evidence of officer Croker that the shower was running.
[43] I accept the evidence of officer Knoll that what appeared to be men’s camouflage pants were found on the bathroom floor. I also accept Knoll’s evidence that inside those pants was one of the cellular telephones that was seized by the police – the BLU one.
[44] Besides Carson, fully clothed and in one of the bedrooms, and the police, nobody else was inside the house or on the property.
[45] The only reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts is that Gagnon was in the bathroom just prior to the police entering the house and was about to take a shower. The pants on the bathroom floor were his.
[46] The possibility that Gagnon was a mere guest of the house that very morning is eroded by the fact that his Birth Certificate was found inside the car at the rear of the property, and that car had been there for days (at least since May 3rd). As to the former fact, I accept the evidence of officer Reintjes as to where he found the Birth Certificate. As to the latter fact, I accept the evidence of officer Thompson that the same car that was searched by the police on May 6th was there when he drove by the property on May 3rd, 4th and 5th.
[47] I find as a fact that Gagnon was at the house since at least the night before the raid by the police. That is consistent with what even Gagnon told officer Thompson.
[48] I accept that Gagnon told Thompson that he had gone into the bathroom to turn on the shower because he feared a robbery when he heard the commotion at the door, however, I do not accept that as a truthful statement.
[49] It makes absolutely no sense. Why would someone think it would be safer to turn on the shower in the bathroom in order to protect oneself from being robbed? I have no idea.
[50] In my opinion, Gagnon lied to Thompson as to his reason for entering the bathroom because he wanted to distance himself from what he knew was sitting in plain view on the sink counter – a bag that contained a substantial quantity of meth, fentanyl and money.
[51] I find as a fact that the BLU cellular telephone was Gagnon’s.
[52] On May 6, 2016, at 4:38 a.m., a message was sent to that device from someone else which said “Glad to hear and oh good did you get a hood yet”.
[53] As it turns out, the car at the rear of the property, which motor vehicle was tied to Gagnon in that it contained his Birth Certificate inside a wallet, had no hood on it when photographed by Thompson on May 6th. That is hardly a common occurrence.
[54] Obviously, the person who sent the above message to the BLU cellular telephone was communicating with someone who had an interest in the car with no hood on it. That someone was Gagnon.
[55] That Gagnon was the person connected to the car is reinforced by the fact that one of the two Samsung cellular telephones found inside that motor vehicle contained messages from outside sources to jamieleegagnon78@gmail.com, and vice-versa. Not only does that email address of the user of that Samsung device correspond precisely with the full name of Gagnon, but the “78” corresponds with his year of birth as shown on Exhibit 15 – 1978.
[56] In addition, under the “User Accounts” of the extraction report regarding that Samsung device, the user is listed as jamieleegagnon78@gmail.com.
[57] Clearly, Gagnon was the user of that Samsung device.
[58] The Court does not need official subscriber information to conclude that.
[59] In summary, the car at the rear of the property was not registered to but was, for all practical purposes, Gagnon’s. It contained his Birth Certificate and his Samsung cellular telephone. The pants on the floor in the bathroom were Gagnon’s and contained his BLU electronic device. The satchel with the drugs was right there as well, beside the sink in the bathroom. And Gagnon was observed by the police standing nearby, within inches or feet of the narcotics, in his underwear, with the shower running. The only other civilian around, Carson, was fully clothed in a separate room of the house.
[60] I am convinced that the black satchel and its contents belonged to Gagnon. He knew about and had control over the meth and the fentanyl.
[61] Ms. Newbould, in able submissions on behalf of Gagnon, has done her best to cast a cloud of uncertainty over the case. This was a known drug house that clearly contained things that did not belong to Gagnon. I agree. It had previously been occupied by one P. Ritchie. I agree. It was full of native décor. I agree. It had funeral notices posted on a bulletin board that contained names seemingly without any connection to Gagnon. I agree. It contained family photos without any apparent connection to Gagnon. I agree. No keys were found. Agreed. And no documentation in the name of Gagnon inside the home. Agreed. Nor any fingerprints or DNA. True. And no debt list or significant drug packaging materials. Correct. There were no personal care products, like a toothbrush, found inside that can be proven to be that of Gagnon. I agree.
[62] None of that, alone or cumulatively, makes me pause, however.
[63] I agree with Ms. Newbould that all of those things ground a finding that someone other than Gagnon also had some element of control over that house.
[64] It is not the house that matters, though. It is the black satchel and its contents.
[65] The Defence submits that perhaps the drugs belonged to Mr. Ward, whose name appears on a Court document found in plain view on a table inside the home. Or P. Ritchie. Or Casey Ritchie who lives nearby and is known to the police as being involved with drugs. Or someone who was there not long before the police raid but fled because he or she was tipped off about the authorities coming or for some other innocuous reason. Or someone who simply left the valuable narcotics there. Or someone who was using Gagnon’s cellular telephone(s). Or someone with long hair such that a strand or two were left near the sink in the bathroom.
[66] Maybe.
[67] But we do not decide these cases on the basis of mere speculative conjecture. The Crown is not required to prove possession to an absolute certainty.
[68] Ms. Newbould highlights the testimony of officer Holovaci who admitted that he could not verify the accuracy of the times and dates of the messages downloaded from the electronic devices.
[69] Assuming without deciding that the dates and/or times of the messages alluded to above are inaccurate, the content remains. It is the content that ties the two cellular telephones mentioned, the BLU and the one Samsung, to Gagnon, consequently connecting him to the car and to the pants lying on the bathroom floor.
[70] Ms. Newbould argues that Holovaci is ignorant of the technical information. I do not necessarily agree, although it does not matter because the Court does not need any assistance from Holovaci or from any other technocrat to see that Gagnon was the person using the BLU device and at least the one Samsung cellular telephone.
[71] The Defence disputes the Crown’s claim that the cellular telephones contain language consistent with drug trafficking. Assuming without deciding that Ms. Newbould is correct, it matters not. Possession is proven beyond a reasonable doubt without regard to whether certain messages on the electronic devices show drug activity. And it is expressly conceded by the Defence that, if possession is proven, it was for the purpose of trafficking for both the meth and the fentanyl.
[72] Ms. Newbould submits that Gagnon was not observed by the police at the subject property before May 6th. That is correct. But the car was observed there, a motor vehicle that I have found to be essentially that of Gagnon.
[73] The Defence challenges the reliability of officer Thompson’s observations of the car and the property before May 6th. I simply do not share those concerns.
[74] Ms. Newbould invites the Court to find that Gagnon may not have told officer Thompson that he went into the bathroom to turn on the shower because he thought that he might be getting robbed. I have reviewed my notes and the audio recording of Thompson’s evidence in direct and in cross-examination. His answer to Ms. Newbould’s question I find to be unclear. I do not agree with Ms. Newbould that Thompson clearly contradicted himself. I prefer to rely upon the simpler and clearer exchange between Ms. Barefoot and Thompson in direct examination.
[75] Even if Gagnon did not say that to Thompson, however, I would still have found possession to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[76] The Defence argues that it is a stretch to conclude that the camouflage pants on the floor in the bathroom were Gagnon’s because officer Knoll could not definitively say what size they were or even that they were men’s.
[77] I disagree. The Crown is not required to prove individual findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, I can see for myself in the photographs marked Exhibit 1 that the pants were more likely being worn by a male than a female. I agree with Knoll that the approximate size and style of the pants are more consistent with them being men’s bottoms.
[78] Finally, Ms. Newbould repeatedly pointed out in her closing submissions that the black satchel is opaque. It certainly is. But it was within inches or feet of Gagnon, in plain view, on the sink counter, in a bathroom that was about to be used by Gagnon to shower in and which contained his pants and his cell phone, in a house that he was at since at least the night before, on a property that stored his car which contained his Birth Certificate and his Samsung device, with nobody else in sight except Carson in another room with all of her clothes on.
[79] I have no doubt that the meth and the fentanyl were Gagnon’s.
[80] With regard to Carson, she is in a different position than Gagnon concerning the meth and the fentanyl. Unlike Gagnon, she was not observed by the police to be very close to the bathroom and the black satchel. Unlike Gagnon, she was in a state of dress that would seem inconsistent with being about to take a shower. Unlike Gagnon, other than what she was wearing and what she may have claimed responsibility for, she cannot be tied to any specific item of personal property within the house or the car. Unlike Gagnon, she cannot be tied to anything, like clothing or a cellular telephone, that was found inside the bathroom. Unlike Gagnon, she gave the police a specific address where she was living, and with whom (I accept the evidence of officer Brazeau in that regard).
[81] In the circumstances, as a mere “found-in”, I am not prepared to conclude to the requisite standard of proof that Carson had knowledge of and some element of control over the black satchel and its contents.
[82] Put another way, vis a vis Carson, the Crown has failed to prove possession of the meth or the fentanyl in any of the ways alluded to earlier in these reasons, whether personal, joint or constructive possession.
[83] I give the Crown credit for not making any closing submissions against Carson on counts 1 and 2, effectively inviting the Court to acquit her on those two charges.
The Hydromorphone
[84] Regarding count 3, the hydromorphone, I accept the combined evidence of officers Brazeau and Snedden and find as facts that Carson admitted to ownership of the two spoons on top of the dresser in the same bedroom that she was found in, which spoons she acknowledged to the police contained morphine.
[85] Clearly, she had knowledge of and control over those spoons and what they contained.
[86] I was impressed with Mr. Noonan’s cross-examinations of Brazeau and Snedden and with his closing submissions. Mr. Noonan pointed out some factors that may have caused the Court to wonder about the reliability of Carson’s confession – the fact that she was distraught, crying and maybe a little dazed at the time, combined with the commotion inside the house, together with the absence of any notes by Snedden as to what Carson said about the morphine in the spoons being hers, and finally the lack of any verbatim recording of Carson’s alleged utterances by either Brazeau or Snedden.
[87] I have carefully considered those things. I am confident, however, that Carson knew what she was saying and that she clearly confessed to ownership of the spoons and the morphine inside them.
[88] In the end, I do not accept Defence counsel’s invitation to find that Carson was simply a drug user who was found inside the house but who did not have any control over the spoons.
[89] Although a relatively small quantity of hydromorphone on two spoons, Carson is guilty of possession of that controlled substance.
[90] Gagnon, on the other hand, I am not so sure about. Unlike Carson who appeared to have fresh needle track marks on her arms and was located very close to an empty needle that was on top of the headboard of the bed that she was sitting on (I accept the evidence of officer Brazeau on those points), there is an absence of any similar evidence concerning Gagnon. And Gagnon, unlike Carson, made no incriminating utterances to the police about the spoons or the morphine. Finally, Gagnon did not lead the authorities to the discovery of other used hydromorphone pill capsules within the residence, as Carson did (I accept the evidence of officer Brazeau on that point).
[91] Ms. Barefoot encourages the Court to rely upon the content of the electronic devices, which telephones contain terms like “hydro”, for example, which may refer to hydromorphone, and the clothing and the hats that were in the bedroom with the spoons.
[92] On the latter, I agree with Ms. Newbould that it would be unsafe to find that any of those belongings were those of Gagnon.
[93] On the former, even if I concluded that Gagnon did, at some point before the police raid, possess hydromorphone, I would still not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he had any control over that which Carson clearly admitted to being hers – the spoons and the morphine inside them.
[94] The Crown has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gagnon had knowledge of and some element of control over the spoons and what they contained.
[95] In other words, regarding Gagnon, possession of the hydromorphone, whether personal, joint or constructive, has not been proven.
III. Conclusion
[96] For all of the above reasons, the verdicts are as follows.
[97] On count 1, possession of meth for the purpose of trafficking, I find Gagnon guilty and Carson not guilty.
[98] On count 2, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, I find Gagnon guilty and Carson not guilty.
[99] On count 3, simple possession of hydromorphone, I find Gagnon not guilty and Carson guilty.
[100] I thank Ms. Barefoot, Ms. Newbould and Mr. Noonan for their helpful assistance throughout the trial.
Conlan J.
Released: January 23, 2017
CITATION: Her Majesty the Queen v. Gagnon & Carson, 2017 ONSC 516
COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-946-0000
DATE: 20170123
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
- and -
Jamie Lee Gagnon &
Jordyn Carson
Accused
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Conlan J.
Released: January 23, 2017