Dylan James MacLeod Crosby

The applicant father sought an interim order prohibiting the respondent mother from relocating the parties' four-year-old child to Deep River, Ontario, and requesting primary care.

The mother had been the primary caregiver since birth and moved to reside with her new partner.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley factors, the court found that the mother was likely to succeed at trial regarding primary care and that the move was made in good faith.

The court dismissed the father's motion, permitting the interim relocation pending trial.

The applicant, a grandmother, sought a temporary order for access to her 5-year-old granddaughter.

The parents and other family members opposed the motion, citing concerns about the applicant's disrespect for parental decisions, promotion of religious views, and attempts to facilitate contact with an estranged aunt.

The court, applying the principles from *Chapman v. Chapman*, found that the parents were attentive, capable, and loving, and had not shown an inability to act in the child's best interests.

The court determined that the parents' decision to limit access was not arbitrary or unreasonable, despite the potential impact on the grandmother-granddaughter relationship.

The motion for temporary access was dismissed.

The court heard urgent applications and a cross-application for the appointment of a guardian for personal care and property for an incapacitated individual.

The primary applicant sought guardianship to challenge a doctor's life support plan at the Consent and Capacity Board, while the cross-applicant (spouse) intended to consent to the plan if appointed.

The court dismissed both applications for guardianship of personal care, finding that the need for decisions could be met by a less restrictive alternative, specifically by allowing the Consent and Capacity Board to determine the appropriate substitute decision-maker.

The court emphasized that the Board is the expert body for such life-and-death decisions.

Applications for guardianship of property were adjourned.

The primary applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the spouse and a statutory fee to the Public Guardian and Trustee, partly due to the inappropriate conduct of counsel and the lack of admissible evidence.

Following an unsuccessful defence motion for summary judgment on a discoverability issue in a motor vehicle accident action, the court addressed the appropriate quantum of costs payable to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought over $50,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court found the requested fees excessive, noting duplication of work among multiple counsel and disproportionate time claimed by senior counsel who did not draft the materials.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized fairness, reasonableness, and the expectations of the parties.

Costs were reduced and fixed at a lump sum of $29,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent insurer for breach of the duty of good faith.

The motion judge had found the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in the standard automobile policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the cause of action did not arise until the insured's liability was finally ascertained by judgment.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of the independent duty of good faith is not a claim under the insurance contract, and is therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period rather than the one-year statutory condition.