D. Silvestro

The decision addresses whether intercepted telephone communications of a complainant, disclosed to the accused in a sexual assault prosecution, constitute "records" under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code and, if so, whether they are admissible under section 278.92.

The court finds that the intercepted calls are "records" and that limited cross-examination on certain topics (money, parole, and civil action) is permitted, as the probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The ruling clarifies the application of the s. 278 regime to institutional records and the balancing of privacy and fair trial rights.

This decision addresses two pretrial motions: the Crown’s application to admit prior consistent statements of the complainant, and the admissibility of statements from both the complainant and Mr. Burnette as res gestae and, for Mr. Burnette, as after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviews the legal framework for prior consistent statements, the narrative exception, and the admissibility of after-the-fact conduct, ultimately allowing certain narrative evidence and after-the-fact conduct to be admitted, but excluding the audio recording of a prior consistent statement as evidence.

The decision addresses a pretrial motion regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence about the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The Applicant sought to introduce evidence from Brittany Crozier regarding the complainant’s alleged drug use and trafficking while incarcerated, arguing it was relevant to credibility and reliability.

The court found the evidence to be collateral, of low probative value, and likely to distract and confuse the jury, and excluded it.

The ruling reviews the collateral fact rule and its exceptions, and applies the balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

This decision addresses whether compelled statements made by a correctional officer during a disciplinary investigation can be used in a subsequent criminal trial.

The court held that the statements, made under statutory compulsion and in an adversarial context, are excluded from use for any purpose in the criminal proceedings, including for cross-examination on credibility.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. White and R. v. Nedelcu, emphasizing the protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault against his great-great nephew, who was between three and five years old at the time.

The offences involved anal intercourse and a significant breach of trust.

The Crown sought a 14-year consecutive sentence, while the defence proposed four to six years concurrent.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, rejecting the offender's expression of remorse due to his false testimony at trial.

Applying the principle of totality, the court imposed a global concurrent sentence of eight years in custody, along with mandatory weapons, DNA, non-communication, and SOIRA orders.

The accused, an Indigenous man with a significant criminal record including a prior manslaughter conviction, pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the beating death of the victim.

The court considered the brutal nature of the assault, the use of weapons, and the accused's callous disregard for the victim's life as aggravating factors.

Applying Gladue principles, the court acknowledged the accused's traumatic background but emphasized the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection.

The accused was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to approximately 12 years after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and breach of probation following a night of heavy drinking and drug use with the complainant and others.

The complainant alleged she woke up partially undressed and believed the accused had assaulted her while she was passed out, though she admitted to severe memory loss.

The accused testified that they had consensual sexual intercourse.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to extreme intoxication, memory loss, and inconsistencies in her statements about being choked.

Furthermore, DNA from an unknown male was found on the complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

This decision addresses an application under sections 276 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The accused sought to adduce evidence of prior consensual penetrative intercourse with the complainant to explain the presence of his DNA, and evidence of other male DNA found on the complainant to suggest an alternative perpetrator.

The court ruled that both types of evidence were admissible, with limitations, as they were relevant to issues at trial and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, after considering the factors in subsection 276(3).