David A. Reid

The father brought a motion to change a 2003 custody order to change the primary residence of his 13-year-old twin boys from the mother's home to his own.

The mother opposed the motion, citing concerns about the father's parenting ability, alcohol consumption, and past conduct.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer conducted an assessment and recommended the change, noting the boys' strong, independent, and genuine desire to live with their father.

The court found a material change in circumstances and held that respecting the mature children's wishes was in their best interests.

Joint custody was ordered, with primary residence transferred to the father.

Two applications were brought regarding the estate of the deceased.

One beneficiary sought to remove all three current executors and appoint an independent trustee, citing irreconcilable differences and hostility.

Two of the executors brought a cross-application to remove the third executor, who was operating the estate's main asset (a family farm) and had an interest in purchasing it.

The court found that the third executor had a conflict of interest and was primarily responsible for creating a climate of distrust that impeded the estate's administration.

The court removed the third executor and allowed the other two to continue as sole executors, dismissing the application to remove all three.

A child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two children who had been in the care of their paternal grandparents pursuant to a section 57.1 custody order.

The children were apprehended due to concerns about physical harm.

The paternal grandparents agreed they could no longer care for the children.

The biological parents each sought placement of the children with them, alternatively seeking access.

The court found the children were in need of protection and made a crown wardship order, granting access to the paternal grandparents but denying access to the biological parents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and accessing child pornography.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and that the trial judge erred in relying on certain photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the child pornography conviction.

The Court also declined to consider a 'private use' exception raised for the first time on appeal due to an insufficient evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she was an independent contractor rather than an employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual touching of the young complainant, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, particularly given the presence of the appellant's semen on the complainant's bed sheets.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a conditional sentence for sexual abuse of a child in his care, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent one-third of the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's conduct during the trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge excessively interrupted the testimony of the parties, asking hundreds of questions, cross-examining the appellants, and making sarcastic and condescending remarks.

The Court held that the trial judge's interventions crossed the line, usurped the function of counsel, and destroyed the image of judicial impartiality.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a construction dispute, challenging the trial judge's assessment of a quantum meruit claim, the failure to award damages for delay, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of reasonable labour and findings regarding delay were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court also declined to interfere with the discretionary costs award, fixing costs of the appeal at $15,000.