Clifford Cole

The respondent, a former CEO and director of the appellant corporation, was removed from his position by shareholders.

He filed a claim for enhanced severance, a bonus, and a share appreciation rights (SAR) cancellation award under his management services agreement.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached his fiduciary duties by establishing the bonus and SAR cancellation awards for his own benefit, but still awarded him the enhanced severance, finding the breach did not constitute a default under the agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the corporation's appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement ignored s. 134(3) of the Business Corporations Act and led to a commercially absurd result.

The respondent's breach of fiduciary duty constituted a default disentitling him to the enhanced severance.

A professional accounting body sought a statutory injunction under s. 30(1) of the Certified General Accountants Act, 2010 to prevent the respondents from using the designation “CGMA” (Chartered Global Management Accountant) in Ontario.

The applicant argued the designation contravened s. 26 of the Act by incorporating the protected initials “CGA” and implying the holder was a Certified General Accountant.

The court applied modern statutory interpretation principles and the rule that statutes creating professional monopolies must be strictly construed.

It held that the specific quoted designations protected by the statute did not extend to the acronym CGMA and that the designation did not imply a Certified General Accountant.

The court found the applicant failed to establish a contravention of the Act on a balance of probabilities.

Following a summary judgment motion resolved by agreement, the applicant sought costs against the respondent Figueira.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to full indemnity costs based on the clear wording of a promissory note signed by the respondent, which provided for 'all costs of the collection'.

The court apportioned the total costs claimed among the three respondents and awarded the applicant $39,500 in full indemnity costs against Figueira.

Following a nine‑day trial concerning whether corporate decisions favouring a chief executive officer were protected by the business judgment rule and whether the executive was entitled to severance benefits, the court found that the executive breached fiduciary duties but remained entitled to severance under his employment arrangements, subject to recalculation excluding benefits arising from the breach.

Both sides claimed substantial success and sought significant costs awards, including requests for substantial indemnity costs based on abandoned allegations and trial outcomes.

The court held that the litigation involved two principal issues—fiduciary breach and entitlement to severance—and each party succeeded on one of them.

Because success was effectively divided and no settlement offers were made, the court determined that neither party should recover costs.

The applicant, a creditor of the debtor company under CCAA protection, sought an order authorizing it to file a plan of compromise or arrangement and directing meetings of affected creditors to vote on the plan.

The proposed plan did not include a shareholder vote.

The debtor opposed the application, arguing the plan was not in the best interests of stakeholders and improperly excluded shareholders.

The court found that because the debtor's shares had potential equity value depending on the outcome of pending litigation, and the proposed plan would radically alter the economic prospects of the shares, a shareholder vote was required.

The application to order a meeting of creditors without a shareholder vote was denied.

The applicant sought an anti-suit injunction restraining the respondents from continuing a patent and contract dispute before a United States federal court in Illinois.

The respondents alleged that the applicant, as successor to a corporation that had entered a settlement agreement containing an Illinois forum selection clause, was bound by the agreement and had engaged in conduct infringing U.S. patents.

Applying the test in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), the court held the applicant failed to show that the foreign court assumed jurisdiction inconsistently with forum non conveniens principles or that substantial injustice would result if the foreign proceeding continued.

The Illinois court had jurisdictional connections including U.S. patents, Illinois governing law, and attornment by other defendants.

The application for an anti-suit injunction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for libel arising from statements published on a personal website and posted on third-party websites about an interior designer.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by applying a 'completely true' test instead of a 'substantially true' test, and erred in applying the doctrine of fair comment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly stated and properly applied the 'substantially true' test, and correctly concluded the defence of fair comment failed because the underlying facts were not true.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class proceeding against the manufacturer of the drug Vioxx sought to have a former federal Minister of Health represent them on a certification motion.

The defendant successfully moved to disqualify the lawyer under rule 6.05(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer who has left public office from acting in a matter for which they had substantial responsibility.

The plaintiffs appealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge reasonably concluded that the lawyer's former responsibility for Health Canada during the drug's approval created potential private and public conflicts of interest.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order setting aside a default judgment against four defendants.

The plaintiff argued there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, alleging the motions judge failed to find an arguable defence, ignored false affidavits, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motions judge applied the correct legal principles and provided sufficient reasons for the limited purpose of setting aside a default judgment.

The court also held the issues were specific to the parties and not of general importance to warrant leave to appeal.

The motion was dismissed without costs due to the defendants' lack of diligence.