Christopher D.J. Hacio

The applicants, Gina Gustafson and Juanita Curle, sought an order to wind up two corporations, Norall Group Inc. and Norall Group Contracting Inc., and a declaration of share ownership.

The respondents, Bruce Johnson and Allan Curle, opposed the winding up and claimed that the applicants held their shares in trust for their husbands.

The court found that the shares were validly gifted to the wives, rejecting claims of estoppel by convention, resulting trust, and constructive trust.

The court determined that the corporations had become dysfunctional due to management disputes, tax evasion convictions of the directors, and cessation of business, which prejudiced the shareholders.

Consequently, the court ruled it was just and equitable to wind up the corporations.

The appellants were passengers injured when another passenger, who was experiencing delusions, grabbed the steering wheel of a Greyhound bus, causing it to crash.

The appellants sued the bus company, the driver, and police officers who had interacted with the passenger before he boarded.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care by any of the respondents.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by excluding expert evidence on police crisis management and bus safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the expert evidence because it was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining the applicable standards of care.

The applicant, a Registered Practical Nurse, resigned in lieu of termination after admitting to stealing and ingesting a patient's narcotic medication.

She filed a human rights application alleging the respondent failed to accommodate her disability, specifically her addiction to alcohol.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as there was no evidence that her misconduct was causally related to her alcohol addiction or that her judgment was impaired at the time of the theft.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on disability after being terminated for stealing narcotic medication, which she attributed to her addictions.

During the hearing, the adjudicator raised the issue of whether documents prepared for the College of Nurses of Ontario's fitness to practice investigation were admissible under section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Tribunal ruled that documents prepared for the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee and Fitness to Practise Committee proceedings were subject to an absolute statutory bar and therefore inadmissible.

The parties were directed to provide further submissions on the impact of this evidentiary ruling.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought funding for a four-year university teaching degree as a vocational rehabilitation measure under section 15 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the applicant failed to submit a Treatment Plan (OCF-18) prior to incurring the expenses, as required by section 38.

The arbitrator held that the insurer could not rely on the applicant's failure to submit a Treatment Plan because the insurer breached its duty under section 32(2)(c) to assist the applicant in applying for benefits and failed to adjust the claim in good faith.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant the costs of two years of university tuition and books, plus interest and a 35% special award due to the insurer's unreasonable withholding of benefits.

The plaintiffs moved under Rules 53.03 and 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to abridge the time for service of multiple expert reports and to obtain leave to tender expert opinion evidence shortly before trial.

The defendants opposed the late service, arguing prejudice due to the cumulative effect of numerous expert reports served days before the scheduled six‑week trial.

The court held that the late service undermined the purpose of Rule 53.03, which is to facilitate orderly trial preparation through adequate notice of expert opinion evidence.

While the evidence was relevant and probative to significant damages claims arising from a traumatic brain injury, the defendants required a fair opportunity to respond.

Leave was granted to admit the expert evidence, but the trial was adjourned and the defendants were given time to prepare responding expert reports.

The applicant co-operative sought a writ of possession to evict the respondent, a member with a physical disability, for failing to keep her unit clean, damaging the unit, and allowing an unauthorized person to reside there.

The respondent argued the eviction violated her rights under the Human Rights Code and that the co-operative failed to accommodate her disability.

The court found no prima facie case of discrimination, noting the cleanliness issues stemmed from the respondent's choice to keep pets, not her disability.

The court upheld the eviction but adjourned the final order to allow the respondent time to find suitable alternative housing, imposing interim conditions including the removal of her pets.

A housing co-operative applied for a writ of possession following termination of a member’s membership and occupancy rights for permitting a non-member partner to reside in the unit beyond the permitted period.

The respondent, who had disabilities and relied on assistance from her partner, argued that eviction was unreasonable and discriminatory.

The court reviewed the board’s decision under a reasonableness standard and found the board relied on irrelevant prior complaints and failed to properly consider the partner’s membership application.

The evidence did not support concerns about misconduct, overcrowding, or funding risk.

Relief from forfeiture was granted and the writ of possession refused.

The moving defendants sought an equitable set-off between interim costs orders arising from two unrelated proceedings: a shareholder oppression action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and separate matrimonial litigation.

They argued that costs they owed to five plaintiffs in the corporate dispute should be offset against costs owed by one plaintiff to one defendant in the matrimonial matter.

The court held that equitable set-off requires a close connection between the claims and generally mutuality of parties.

Because the debts arose from entirely different proceedings involving different parties, and lacked any sufficient nexus, the test from Holt v. Telford was not satisfied.

The court also found no procedural authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure to grant such relief on an interim motion.

Following a lengthy civil trial involving multiple plaintiffs arising from a motor vehicle incident, the plaintiffs’ claims against several defendants—including a transportation company, police officers, and the provincial Crown—were dismissed.

The successful defendants sought substantial costs after a 56‑day trial and extensive pre‑trial litigation.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs rather than a strict accounting exercise.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis up to the defendants’ settlement offers and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, with adjustments made for excessive claims and unnecessary attendance of junior counsel.

The court also held the plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for the liability portion of the defendants’ costs, while allocating damages‑related costs severally among individual plaintiffs.

Requests for a Sanderson order and third‑party costs were denied.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of a defence medical examination report and later sought costs after the report was produced following service of the motion.

The defendants argued the motion was unnecessary and that no order for a medical examination had been made under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, rendering rule 33.06(2) inapplicable.

The court held that disclosure obligations could still arise under the broader document production rules and found the defendant failed to produce the report promptly after receiving it.

Although the motion was resolved prior to argument, it was reasonable for the moving party to have brought it.

Partial indemnity costs of $1,000 were awarded, reflecting both the defendant’s delay and the plaintiff’s own failure to comply with an earlier order to set the action down for trial.

The moving defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and for containing allegedly scandalous or vexatious material.

The court applied the leave test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

While the moving parties argued that the motion judge misapplied established pleading principles, the court held that the issues raised were confined to the interests of the parties and did not involve matters of broader importance warranting appellate review.

The court concluded that the case concerned a routine pleadings determination and that the second requirement for leave—matters of sufficient importance—was not met.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

A costs decision arising from a multi‑plaintiff bus accident action where one plaintiff settled prior to trial.

The settling plaintiff sought costs based on a proportional share of a collective liability account and individual damages account maintained for all plaintiffs.

The defendants disputed various docketed entries, including costs relating to unrelated proceedings, unsuccessful motions, and non‑taxable disbursements.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality between the settlement value and the requested costs.

The court rejected the full amount sought and instead fixed a global costs award considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Following the dismissal of a motion by certain defendants to strike the statement of claim, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ entitlement to costs.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on a rejected settlement offer made prior to the motion.

The court held that while the plaintiffs were entitled to costs as the successful parties, the complexity of the case and the reasonableness of bringing the pleadings motion did not justify substantial indemnity.

Considering the scope of the motion materials and the time required for the hearing, the court reduced the claimed amount.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of HST, payable forthwith by the moving defendants.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiffs’ statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively to strike portions alleged to be scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious under Rule 25.11.

The claim alleged that the defendants conspired to remove the plaintiffs from corporate control and divert the business of two companies to another entity controlled by the defendants.

The court held that, assuming the pleaded facts to be true, the statement of claim disclosed multiple viable causes of action including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, inducing breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and breaches of corporate duties.

The court also declined to strike contextual narrative allegations from the pleading, finding they were not so egregious as to warrant removal.

The motion was dismissed, with the court noting that a demand for particulars would have been the more appropriate procedural step.

Following a successful motion for partial summary judgment dismissing an insurance claim for contents loss arising from a hotel fire, the insurer sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $25,000.

The plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of the claimed hours, the use of two counsel, and the hourly rates applied.

The court reviewed the governing principles under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant appellate authority emphasizing reasonableness, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Although the insurer succeeded on the underlying motion, the court found the time docketed and partial indemnity rates somewhat excessive and reduced the requested amount.

Costs of $17,500 plus HST were awarded as fair and reasonable for the summary judgment motion.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The applicant's union, CUPE, filed a Request to Intervene after the application against it was dismissed.

The respondent filed a response expressing concern that the union intended to represent the applicant, which the union clarified was not its intent.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene, noting that a union typically has an interest in an application brought by a member of its bargaining unit.

The plaintiff's hotel and business were damaged by fire.

The plaintiff claimed $825,296.32 for destroyed contents under its insurance policy with the defendant insurer.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the policy did not include contents coverage, and brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the contents claim.

The court applied the rules of construction for insurance contracts and found the policy clearly and unambiguously did not provide contents coverage, as no specific limit or premium was shown for contents on the declarations page.

The insurer's motion for partial summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their action for delay under rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after failing to set the action down for trial by a deadline established at a status hearing.

Applying the contextual approach articulated in Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the affidavit evidence explaining the delay was limited, the record demonstrated the action had progressed through discoveries and expert reports and that counsel’s failure to meet the deadline was inadvertent rather than deliberate.

The defendants filed no evidence of prejudice and other related actions arising from the same accident remained active.

Balancing the relevant considerations and the principle favouring determination on the merits, the court set aside the registrar’s dismissal order but declined to award costs due to the plaintiffs’ responsibility for the missed deadline.

The plaintiffs were passengers on a Greyhound bus who were injured when another passenger, Davis, suddenly grabbed the steering wheel, causing the bus to crash.

Prior to boarding, Davis had exhibited signs of mild paranoia and had interacted with OPP officers, who concluded he was not a danger to himself or others.

The plaintiffs sued the OPP, the officers, Greyhound, and the bus driver for negligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action against all defendants except Davis, finding that the police officers acted reasonably and had no legal grounds to apprehend or detain Davis under the Mental Health Act or common law.

The court also found that the bus driver and Greyhound met the high standard of care expected of a common carrier, as the sudden attack was not reasonably foreseeable and the driver's actions were reasonable in the circumstances.

The court proceeded to assess the hypothetical damages for each plaintiff.