Carnwath

The appellants appealed a decision finding oppressive conduct and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge found that the corporation was represented to the respondent investor as the owner of a specific technology, but the individual appellant deliberately withheld title to the patents for his own purposes.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings, noting that the investor was entitled to rely on the representations made and that the doctrine of reasonable expectations applied.

The court also upheld the remedy, which included declaring the corporation the owner of the process and directing an accounting for profits derived from a related contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for social assistance but failed to disclose trust funds held for her minor sons.

The local social services department cancelled her benefits and demanded repayment, finding the funds were accessible assets.

The Social Benefits Tribunal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that because the trust was discretionary and the co-trustee refused to release the funds, the funds were not accessible to the beneficiaries.

The appeal was allowed, and the trust funds were excluded as assets for determining eligibility.

The appellant, owner of a mixed-use building, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision upholding the assessment of its residential units as an income-producing multi-residential rental property.

The residential units were subject to a 999-year lease arrangement where 'co-owners' held an undivided percentage interest in the lease and a right to occupy specific units.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by strictly applying property law distinctions between leasehold and fee simple interests.

The Court held that under the Assessment Act, the leasehold interests were sufficiently similar to fee-based co-ownerships (like condominiums) to warrant similar assessment treatment.

The appellant was receiving $350 per week in spousal support from her first husband's estate, which terminated when she remarried the respondent at age 56.

The second marriage lasted only one year.

The trial judge dismissed her claim for periodic spousal support, awarding only a $10,000 lump sum, emphasizing the short duration of the marriage and her knowledge that remarriage would terminate her prior support.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in principle by over-emphasizing the short marriage and the appellant's decision to remarry.

Applying the Divorce Act and the Moge framework, the court held the economic consequences of the marriage should be shared equally.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent was ordered to pay $175 per week in spousal support until the appellant turns 65.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action without complying with the defendant insurer's request for a Functional Capacities Assessment under s. 258.3(1)(d) of the Insurance Act.

The defendant successfully moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to submit to the examination.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order compliance and was restricted to considering non-compliance in awarding costs under s. 258.3(9).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court retains discretion to order compliance to further the legislative objective of facilitating early settlement.

The appellants, subcontractors on a school construction project, appealed a trial judgment limiting their construction lien recovery to the general contractor's 10 per cent statutory holdback.

The general contractor had posted a lien bond to vacate one of the liens before the primary subcontractor abandoned the project.

The appellants argued that posting security made the full bond amount available to all lien claimants in addition to the statutory holdback, relying on previous case law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that posting security under section 44 of the Construction Lien Act does not enlarge a contractor's liability beyond the statutory holdback and proper set-offs.

The court explicitly rejected the prior ruling in Francon, confirming that a contractor's liability to lien claimants is restricted to the amount fixed by the Act.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought an application for judicial review of an interim decision made by the Board of Inquiry regarding the production of records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing hearing before the Board.

The Court held that the Board's decision was a reasonable exercise of its discretion at a preliminary stage, particularly in applying the balancing test from A.M. v. Ryan and considering the confidentiality undertaking in place.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent employer against the Commission.

The applicant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, attempted to file nomination papers for the office of Mayor of Toronto.

The City Clerk rejected the nomination before nomination day on the basis that provincial legislation rendered members of the House of Commons ineligible to hold municipal office.

The applicant sought mandamus and an order quashing the relevant statutory provisions, arguing they violated his democratic rights under section 3 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the clerk had the discretion to reject the nomination early and that the restriction on holding municipal office did not infringe the applicant's Charter right to be qualified for membership in the House of Commons.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board order regarding its jurisdiction to extend the boundaries of an adopted official plan amendment and to change the proposed uses.

The Divisional Court held that the Board has jurisdiction to do both as a matter of general principle, though it could exceed its jurisdiction by acting unreasonably.

However, the court quashed the appeal as premature because the Board had not yet made a decision on the specific modifications.