Brian Anthony Crane

The respondent, an unmarried mother, voluntarily surrendered her child for adoption.

The day after the surrender was signed, the child was placed for adoption.

The respondent subsequently attempted to withdraw her consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under s. 15(6) of The Child Welfare Act, the right to withdraw a voluntary surrender is conditional upon the child not having been placed for adoption.

Since the child had already been placed, the respondent was not entitled to the return of the child.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant was injured when his bicycle hit a pothole on a municipal road.

He sued the municipality for negligence.

The trial judge found the municipality liable for failing to maintain a constant inspection system.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Municipal Act, the municipality had the power but not the duty to maintain highways.

The frequency of road inspections was a matter of policy, and absent operational negligence in carrying out that policy, the municipality could not be held liable.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act after spilling 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into tidal waters.

The appellant sought an order of prohibition, arguing that s. 33(2) was ultra vires the federal Parliament as it related to general water pollution rather than fisheries, and that the information was multiplicitous.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 33(2) is intra vires as its true nature and character is the protection and preservation of fisheries, a valid exercise of federal power under s. 91(12) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Court also found the information was not multiplicitous, as the accused was not prejudiced in preparing a defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of both conspiracy to traffic in heroin and the substantive offence of trafficking in heroin.

He appealed his trafficking conviction, arguing that under the Kienapple principle, he could not be convicted of both offences since the trafficking transaction occurred during the conspiracy period and involved his co-conspirator.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions did not apply because the two offences were not for the same cause or matter and did not involve the same elements.

The conspiracy charge depended on proof of a prior illegal agreement, which transcended the substantive trafficking transaction.