Alistair Riswick

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding her action was statute-barred.

She sought to admit a 2003 cheque as fresh evidence to show a payment on the mortgages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence because the appellant provided no explanation for failing to adduce it before the motion judge, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing an equipment financing lease, arguing the lease was illegal and void for contravening the Electrical Safety Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the lease contained non-recourse provisions and that not every statutory breach invalidates a commercial contract for illegality.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the lease's enforceability.

The appellant proceeded by way of power of sale but the Notice of Sale did not reference an obligation under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The respondent tendered the full amount of the debt specified in the Notice of Sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellant was bound to deliver the discharge upon tender of the specified amount, as finding otherwise would impermissibly clog the equity of redemption.

The appellant purchased 88 lots from the respondent developer.

The parties disputed who was responsible for paying certain development charges to the municipality under their Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The motion judge found the respondent was not required to pay charges due after the registration of the Plan of Subdivision, interpreting 'prerequisite' temporally.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that interpreting the contract as a whole required 'prerequisite' to mean an obligation to pay, giving effect to a clause permitting payment after registration.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a robotic weld cell it designed and produced for the respondent was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to find an implied term in the contract requiring the respondent to provide pretacked assemblies within tolerances suitable for robotic welding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contract documents and commercial realities placed the responsibility on the appellant, who had specialized expertise in robotic welding and knowledge of the respondent's facility.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding adverse possession and the subsequent costs award based on an offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the proper test for adverse possession and made factual findings well supported by the record.

The trial judge's view of the offer to settle was also deemed reasonable.

The tenant (TDL) leased property from a landlord and later signed a postponement and non-disturbance agreement (PNDA) with the landlord's mortgagee.

TDL obtained a judgment against the landlord for damages and costs, with a right to set off the amount against rent.

When the landlord defaulted on the mortgage, the mortgagee went into possession and demanded rent without the set-off.

The Court of Appeal held that under the PNDA, the mortgagee stepped into the landlord's shoes and assumed the existing state of accounts, including TDL's right of set-off.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging that the respondents, former officers and directors of a renovation company, conspired to divest the company of its assets to prevent the appellants from realizing on a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had only pleaded the tort of conspiracy and failed to prove that they suffered special damages as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and entitlement to punitive damages.

The appellant, Country Style Realty Limited, underwent CCAA restructuring.

It chose not to repudiate its commercial lease with the respondent landlord, Ivorylane Corporation.

Ivorylane had a pre-CCAA claim for rent arrears but did not receive notice of the claims process and did not file a proof of claim.

After Country Style emerged from CCAA protection, Ivorylane sued for the arrears.

Country Style argued the claim was barred by the CCAA Plan of Compromise.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that because the lease was not repudiated, the arrears constituted an 'Unaffected Obligation' under the specific terms of the Plan and Sanction Order, and therefore the claim was not compromised or barred.

The appellant appealed an order finding that a partnership was terminated on April 10, 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 32(c) of the Partnership Act does not require express notice of termination, and the application judge reasonably concluded that a letter sent on that date clearly conveyed an intention to dissolve the partnership.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,200.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that its defence was not valid against the respondent's claim under a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the doctrine of equitable set-off does not apply to claims under bills of exchange or promissory notes.

The court also found that a stay under Rule 20.08 was unavailable because the appellant's other action was against a different party.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it to be fact-driven and concluding that the appellant had not overcome the high hurdle required to overturn a trial judge's findings of fact.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that interpreted a share purchase agreement to include an unexpected income tax refund as an 'account receivable' and found them liable for a bankruptcy dividend distribution.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the agreement was unambiguous and did not contemplate the tax refund as an account receivable.

The Court also found that the bankruptcy dividend had been paid in full and that the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim for additional items.

The action was dismissed with costs.