Naomi Overend

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation.

He subsequently filed a Request for Interim Remedy.

The Tribunal denied the request because it lacked a signed declaration and did not contain sufficient information to determine if the application had merit or if the balance of harm favoured granting the remedy.

The Tribunal also dismissed allegations against individuals and entities who were not named as respondents, as it lacked jurisdiction over non-parties.

The remaining allegations were directed to be served on the respondent college.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging both individual and systemic discrimination on the basis of race and sex regarding her failed bid to become Dean of the Faculty of Law.

The Tribunal held that an individual applicant under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code does not have standing to bring public interest allegations that are unrelated to the alleged infringement of their own individual rights.

The applicant was directed to amend her application to remove allegations over which she lacked standing and to clarify which matters were allegations of discrimination versus contextual evidence.

The applicant requested reconsideration of two interim decisions: one denying her request for production of documents as premature, and another consolidating her two applications.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding that the interim decisions were not final decisions and therefore could not be the subject of a reconsideration request under Rule 26.1.

The Tribunal also noted that the applicant's concerns regarding her need for extra time to review materials due to her disability could be addressed by the adjudicator assigned to hear the matters.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in the provision of services on the basis of creed, disability, and sexual orientation.

A summary hearing was scheduled to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

After several adjournments and scheduling issues, the applicant failed to attend the rescheduled summary hearing and failed to provide the Tribunal with current contact information.

The Tribunal found the application to be abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging that the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) discriminated against him on the basis of disability when it declined to investigate his complaint regarding police conduct in 1991.

The respondents brought a request to dismiss the application, arguing the SIU performs an adjudicative function not covered by the Code as a service, and that the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the SIU's investigative function is a service under the Code, but dismissed the application because the applicant had no reasonable prospect of success in proving the SIU's refusal to investigate was based on his disability.

The applicant, a part-time employee in the respondent's catering business, quit after the respondent used a homophobic slur during an angry rant.

The applicant alleged that the respondent's volatile temper and use of the slur created a poisoned work environment and constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's use of the slur, in the context of his anger and the applicant's vulnerability, poisoned the work environment and amounted to discrimination in employment.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay $5,000 as compensation for injury to the applicant's dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision dismissing his human rights application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal had previously found that the applicant, a bus driver for OC Transpo, was a federally-regulated employee because the employer regularly engaged in inter-provincial transportation.

The applicant submitted new documents indicating he was moved to a 'city wide position' and later laid off.

The Tribunal found that the applicant remained a federally-regulated employee during the relevant period and denied the request for reconsideration.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision dismissing her human rights application for delay.

The Tribunal granted the reconsideration because the applicant had not received notice of the respondents' request to dismiss.

Upon reconsidering the issue of delay, the Tribunal found that the application was filed 18 months after the last alleged discriminatory incident, well outside the one-year time limit under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that subsequent internal investigations and academic appeals constituted continuing acts of discrimination.

As the applicant provided no explanation for the delay, the Tribunal concluded it was not incurred in good faith and dismissed the application.

The applicant failed to comply with the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure regarding the delivery of witness lists, witness statements, and documents.

Despite a Case Assessment Direction warning that failure to comply could result in the application being dismissed as abandoned, the applicant did not provide the required materials or contact the Tribunal.

The respondent complied with its obligations and requested dismissal.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had abandoned her application due to her persistent failure to respond to directions, and dismissed the application.

The respondents requested reconsideration of an interim decision that declined to defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of the applicant's civil claim.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the interim decision was not a final decision that disposed of the central issues in the complaint, and therefore could not be the subject of a reconsideration request under Rule 26.1.

The applicant filed two separate human rights applications against Humber College and the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, alleging failure to accommodate her learning disabilities and reprisal.

The Tribunal considered whether to consolidate the applications pursuant to Rule 1.7(d) of its Rules of Procedure.

Despite the applicant's opposition based on the complexity of dealing with both matters simultaneously, the Tribunal found common issues of fact and law and a public interest in avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Tribunal ordered the applications consolidated, noting that case directions could be used to manage the complexity for the applicant.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal based on the respondent having previously filed a human rights application against him.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay and lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found the application was filed more than two years after the incident and the applicant failed to provide a good faith explanation for the delay.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found it plain and obvious that the application was outside its jurisdiction, as being named in a human rights application does not itself constitute discrimination or reprisal.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed their applications alleging reprisal.

The applicants argued there were new facts and that the decision conflicted with established case law.

The Tribunal found that the applicants failed to establish any of the threshold criteria justifying reconsideration under Rule 26, noting that pleadings in civil actions are protected by absolute privilege and cannot form the basis of a reprisal claim.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The respondent requested the dismissal of portions of the human rights application on the basis of delay and abuse of process.

The applicant's union also requested intervenor status.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene, noting that a bargaining agent generally has an interest in an employment discrimination application.

The Tribunal denied the respondent's request to dismiss, finding that the earlier allegations were either provided for context regarding the reprisal claim or formed part of a series of incidents where the last incident occurred within the one-year limitation period.

The respondent requested early dismissal of the human rights application, arguing it was barred by section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had also filed a civil action for wrongful dismissal.

The Tribunal found that the civil claim and the human rights application involved widely divergent allegations, and the civil claim did not seek remedies for Code violations.

The request for early dismissal was denied.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss because the initial application failed to link the alleged harassment to a protected ground.

In response, the applicant alleged she was subjected to racial and sexist slurs by the co-owners of the respondent company.

The Tribunal held it was not plain and obvious that the application fell outside its jurisdiction.

The Tribunal directed that the application be processed and served on the respondent.

The applicant requested to reactivate her human rights application after the Landlord and Tenant Board issued a decision on a parallel application.

The respondent opposed reactivation because the LTB decision was stayed pending a review.

The Tribunal extended the deferral of the human rights application until the LTB review process is completed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the respondent's application of its Attendance Management Program.

The applicant's union, CUPE Local 79, requested to intervene.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene, noting that a bargaining agent nearly always has an interest in such applications.

Additionally, because the applicant had filed a grievance concerning the same subject matter, and neither the applicant nor the union opposed deferral, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the completion of the grievance process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment and services on the basis of disability, ten years after the last incident.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay.

The applicant argued he was pursuing WSIB appeals.

The Tribunal found that waiting for other legal proceedings does not constitute a good faith explanation for delay.

The application was dismissed as the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, sex, and reprisal.

The events in question occurred primarily between 1999 and 2004, with some possible references to 2009, but the application was not filed until significantly later.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay.

The applicant claimed her delay was due to mental health issues, but provided no medical evidence and did not explain why she was able to pursue other complex legal claims during the same period.

The Tribunal found no evidence that the delay was incurred in good faith and dismissed the application.