Loretta Mikus

The grievor previously signed Minutes of Settlement waiving his employment rights under Article 20 of the collective agreement in exchange for a surplus package.

Years later, after returning from long-term disability, the Employer mistakenly sent him a letter offering him bumping rights and a potential job relocation.

The Employer quickly rescinded the offer upon realizing the error.

The Union argued the Employer was estopped from relying on the prior settlement due to the mistaken offer.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievance, finding the mistaken letter was not intended to alter the legal relationship and the grievor had not relied on it to his detriment.

The Union filed a grievance alleging that overcrowding at the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre violated the collective agreement.

At a preliminary hearing, the Union sought production of documents related to the facility's capacity and the Employer's efforts to reduce occupancy.

The Employer argued that the Union must first provide particulars of its allegations before disclosure is required.

The Grievance Settlement Board agreed with the Employer, holding that the Union must provide particulars regarding when, where, and how the alleged overcrowding violated the collective agreement before the Employer is obligated to produce the requested documents.

The grievor filed a grievance alleging failure to accommodate and harassment.

The grievance was denied at the second stage, but the referral to arbitration was delayed by approximately three years.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection regarding timeliness.

After the initial hearing, the Employer requested to reopen the hearing to present recent binding jurisprudence.

The arbitrator allowed the hearing to be reopened, finding it necessary to decide the matter based on the correct legal principles.

Applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Leisure World, the arbitrator held that section 48(16) of the Labour Relations Act does not confer jurisdiction to extend time limits for referring a grievance to arbitration.

The Employer's motion was granted and the grievance was dismissed.

The union brought a motion for interim relief seeking to return the grievor to work at the Amethyst School pending the arbitration of her grievance.

The grievor had been temporarily accommodated at Amethyst but was returned to her regular position at the Robarts School, which she claimed caused her psychological stress due to the requirement to use American Sign Language.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the motion, finding that without medical information identifying the necessary restrictions for her psychological condition, there was insufficient evidence to establish an arguable case on the merits.

The union filed a grievance challenging a change in the employer's policy regarding the payment of meal allowances for Hearing Clerks at the Assessment Review Board.

Under the new policy, clerks were only reimbursed for meals if they traveled outside their newly expanded regions of responsibility, effectively denying meal allowances for travel over 24 kilometers within those regions.

The arbitrator found that the employer's new policy violated the collective agreement, as the employer could not unilaterally redefine the areas in which a clerk is 'normally working' to avoid paying meal allowances for travel exceeding 24 kilometers from their home.

The grievance was allowed.

The union filed a grievance regarding the conversion of the grievor to a Social Worker II position at the Cecil Facer Youth Centre.

The matter was referred to mediation/arbitration.

The arbitrator ordered that the grievor be converted to the Classified position of Social Worker II, with the employer continuing to provide and fund additional French language training for the grievor.

The union filed a grievance regarding a job competition for a Youth Worker position at the Cecil Facer Youth Centre.

The matter was referred to mediation/arbitration under the collective agreement.

After reviewing the evidence and submissions, the arbitrator ordered that the grievor be appointed to the classified position of Youth Worker.

The parties reconvened to resolve an implementation dispute regarding Minutes of Settlement that restored the grievor's full-time classified status.

The union argued the employer improperly pro-rated the grievor's vacation and sick leave credits by applying part-time provisions.

The Grievance Settlement Board found the settlement language clear and unambiguous, holding that specific clauses expressly limited the grievor's short-term sickness and vacation accruals based on her former regular part-time status and hours worked.

The grievance was dismissed.

The Employer brought a motion to consolidate two grievances concerning job classifications and work assignments with a third grievance concerning health and safety and workload issues.

The Grievance Settlement Board denied the motion, finding that the grievances raised distinct allegations that only tangentially touched on the same facts.

Consolidating the grievances would delay proceedings, result in additional costs, and complicate the resolution of the individual grievances.

The union requested that the arbitrator reconvene the board to clarify a previous award regarding compensation for missed overtime opportunities.

The employer argued that the arbitrator was functus officio and could not interpret her own award.

The arbitrator held that she retained jurisdiction to clarify the award by adding words that were omitted in the final summary, as the omission created an inconsistency with the reasoning in the body of the award.

The arbitrator clarified that the union's preliminary objection regarding promissory estoppel succeeded, and the employer was estopped from changing its practice for the duration of the collective agreement.

The grievor filed grievances concerning missed overtime opportunities.

The Union argued that a previous Grievance Settlement Board decision regarding the same parties and issue rendered the matter res judicata, or alternatively, that the Employer was estopped from unilaterally changing its long-standing practice of paying monetary compensation for missed overtime to offering an in-kind remedy.

The Board dismissed the res judicata argument, finding the previous decision dealt with entitlement, not remedy.

However, the Board found the Employer was estopped from changing its practice for the duration of the 1998-2000 collective agreement due to the Union's detrimental reliance.

On the merits, the Board held that an in-kind remedy is generally appropriate for missed overtime and does not violate the collective agreement.

The grievor, who suffered a workplace injury and was later converted to classified status, was denied Long Term Income Protection (LTIP) benefits because she was unclassified at the time of her injury.

She grieved the denial and the employer's failure to pay premiums.

The employer raised a preliminary objection that the Grievance Settlement Board lacked jurisdiction, arguing the collective agreement granted exclusive jurisdiction over benefit eligibility disputes to the Joint Insurance Benefits Review Committee (JIBRC).

The union argued the denial constituted discrimination based on handicap under the collective agreement and the Human Rights Code.

The Vice-Chair held that while JIBRC has exclusive jurisdiction over general benefit eligibility claims, the Board retains concurrent jurisdiction to hear allegations of discrimination in the denial of those benefits.

A group of employees filed a grievance alleging that the employer violated the collective agreement and the Human Rights Code during the divestment of services provided by the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The employer and the union had previously entered into Minutes of Settlement resolving all outstanding matters flowing from the outsourcing.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievance, finding that the Minutes of Settlement confirmed the employer had met its responsibilities under the reasonable efforts provision of the collective agreement and were binding on the employer, the union, and the employees.

The Union filed a policy grievance alleging that the Employer violated the collective agreement by failing to designate newly created Government Information Centre (GIC) positions as permanent bargaining unit positions.

The Union argued that the Employer's delay in classifying these positions denied surplussed employees the right to bump into them and prevented bargaining unit members from applying for them.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the preliminary issue, finding that under article 31 of the collective agreement, the Employer has the right to wait up to two years before converting unclassified positions to classified ones, absent bad faith.

The Board also noted practical reasons for the delay, including unresolved funding and classification issues.

The grievor, a Correctional Officer, suffered multiple workplace injuries resulting in intermittent absences.

The union grieved the employer's decision to cease full salary continuation under Article 41.2 of the collective agreement, arguing that each recurrence of an injury constituted a new claim triggering a fresh 65-day entitlement.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievance, following a previous arbitration decision which held that intermittent absences from the same originating injury do not trigger a new entitlement period, as the collective agreement specifically ties intermittent absences to the first absence of the originating claim.

The Union sought to introduce an estoppel argument regarding the Employer's practice of placing part-time employees into full-time positions, which it had not raised during the grievance procedure or in initial particulars.

The Employer objected, arguing it was too late and would cause prejudice.

The Grievance Settlement Board allowed the Union's motion, finding no prejudice to the Employer as the Union's main witnesses on the issue had not yet testified, the Employer's witnesses could be recalled, and the Employer had sufficient time to prepare before the next hearing date.

The complainant alleged sex discrimination after being denied membership in the Italian Society of Port Arthur, an organization of men of Italian descent.

The Society argued it was exempt under section 18 of the Human Rights Code as a fraternal organization primarily engaged in serving the interests of its members.

The Board of Inquiry found that the Society met the three criteria of section 18: it is a fraternal organization, it is primarily engaged in serving the interests of its members, and its membership is restricted to persons similarly identified.

The complaint was dismissed.

The complainant, a police constable, requested light duties during the latter stages of her pregnancy due to safety concerns for herself and her fetus.

The Police Services Board denied her request, relying on a policy that prohibited modified work programs, and forced her to take an unpaid leave of absence.

The Board of Inquiry found that the policy constituted both direct and adverse effect discrimination on the basis of sex.

The respondents failed to establish that the policy was a bona fide occupational qualification or that they had accommodated the complainant to the point of undue hardship.

The complainant was awarded lost wages and general damages for mental anguish.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to amend a complaint of pregnancy discrimination against the Office of the Legislative Assembly to include an allegation of sexual harassment.

The respondents objected, arguing the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction to amend the complaint and that doing so would be an abuse of process.

The Board granted the motion, finding it had jurisdiction under the Human Rights Code to determine whether a right was infringed, and that the new allegation arose from the same facts.

The Board also dismissed the respondents' motions to remove the Speaker of the House and the Board of Internal Economy as named respondents, and to dismiss the sick leave issues as moot.

Following a preliminary decision that the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction to hear the human rights complaints due to the Commission's failure to fulfill a condition precedent, the respondent Four Star Variety brought a motion for costs under s. 41(4) of the Human Rights Code.

The majority of the Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs because the complaints were not 'dismissed' within the strict meaning of the Code.

The motion for costs was denied.

A dissenting member would have found jurisdiction to award costs but denied them on the basis that the respondent suffered no undue hardship, as its legal fees were paid by a third party.