Yousef Jabbour

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following two motor vehicle accidents.

The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and the applicant applied for arbitration.

At the scheduled arbitration hearing, the applicant failed to appear, although his representative was present.

The insurer brought a motion to dismiss the applications.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had been notified of the proceedings and failed to meet his onus of proof by not attending.

The applications for arbitration were dismissed, and the insurer was awarded $500 in expenses for each application.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post security for costs.

The plaintiff, a citizen of India who returned there after his permanent resident card expired, argued the motion judge erred by not accepting an after-the-event legal protection insurance policy as adequate security and by failing to consider the merits of his slip and fall claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions on principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the judge properly applied the test for security for costs and reasonably assessed the evidence.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post security for costs.

The plaintiff, a citizen of India who had returned there after his permanent resident card expired, argued that a Legal Protection Certificate and Indemnity Agreement he purchased constituted sufficient security.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision on a matter of principle and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

In a motor vehicle action issued within the limitation period but not served on the defendants until well after expiry of the service period, the plaintiff sought substituted service on the insurer and an extension of time for service, while the defendants sought dismissal for delay.

The court found the plaintiff's service efforts wholly lacking and criticized counsel's dilatory conduct, but held the defendants had not established sufficient specific prejudice to their ability to defend the action.

Relying on appellate authority emphasizing prejudice over mere passage of time, the court extended time for service on strict terms, refused immediate substituted service on the insurer, denied the cross-motion to dismiss, and imposed a peremptory litigation timetable against the plaintiff.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed attendant care benefits for services provided by her two daughters.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the expenses were not 'incurred' under s. 3(7)(e) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because the daughters did not suffer an economic loss.

The arbitrator found that the daughters did suffer an economic loss by renting an apartment and paying household expenses to support the applicant during her convalescence.

The applicant was awarded attendant care benefits, but her claim for a special award was dismissed as the insurer's denial was not unreasonable given the justiciable issue of economic loss.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal for delay in a motor vehicle accident action.

Applying the contextual approach to the Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. criteria, the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found uncertainty regarding whether the dismissal order had ever come to the attention of the plaintiffs while they were unrepresented, and accepted that the plaintiffs intended to pursue the litigation.

The court also concluded that the presumption of prejudice from delay had been rebutted and that the defendants failed to establish actual prejudice.

In the interests of justice and adjudication on the merits, the dismissal was set aside.

Two tenants of a shopping plaza appealed the dismissal of their applications regarding parking covenants in their respective commercial leases.

Good Life Corporation argued its lease guaranteed unlimited access to all parking spaces and prohibited the landlord from granting exclusive spaces to other tenants.

Royal LePage argued its lease entitled it to 30 exclusive parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal held that Good Life's lease only guaranteed general access to the parking lot, but prohibited the landlord from reducing the number of available spaces by granting additional reserved spaces to other tenants after the lease commenced.

The Court also held that Royal LePage was only entitled to 6 reserved spaces, not 30.

Both appeals were allowed in part to issue declarations clarifying these rights.