Vanessa Amyot

The applicant sought costs following a contested family law motion, requesting full recovery costs of $33,539 or alternatively partial recovery costs of $22,136.

The respondent argued that a clause in a Partial Interim Separation Agreement barred any costs award or, alternatively, that costs should be limited to a substantially lower amount.

The court held that the contractual clause requiring each party to pay their own legal and professional fees did not waive the applicant’s right to seek a judicial award of costs.

Finding the applicant to be the successful party and noting that an offer to settle engaged full recovery entitlement for part of the proceeding, the court reduced the claimed amounts due to excessive hourly rates, duplication of work, and unnecessary attendance by multiple counsel.

Costs were fixed on an all‑inclusive basis.

The respondent moved to bifurcate a family law trial to determine custody, support, and the validity of a marriage contract before addressing equalization of net family property.

The applicant opposed and sought extensive financial disclosure, arguing the issues of property division and spousal support were interrelated.

The court held that the validity of the marriage contract and spousal support analysis under Miglin require knowledge of the parties’ financial positions at separation.

Because property equalization must precede spousal support and the issues were intertwined, bifurcation would risk prejudice and inefficiency.

The motion for bifurcation was dismissed and the respondent was ordered to provide full financial disclosure regarding assets and liabilities at separation.

The appellant sought to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act as of right, arguing that section 21(1) of the Divorce Act provides a direct right of appeal that is paramount over the leave requirement in section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal held that section 21(6) of the Divorce Act requires appeals to be asserted according to the ordinary procedure of the province, which in Ontario includes the leave requirement.

The court found no conflict between the federal and provincial legislation, concluding that the doctrine of paramountcy was not engaged and leave to appeal was required.