Stephen J. Simpson

The defendant insurer, Sun Life, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's long-term disability claim as statute-barred.

Sun Life argued the two-year limitation period began in February 2014 when it sent a letter closing the file but inviting further medical information.

The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, provided additional information three years later, and Sun Life issued a final denial in June 2017, explicitly referencing the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed Sun Life's motion, finding that the February 2014 letter was equivocal and that the parties were engaged in an ongoing internal appeal process.

Therefore, a legal proceeding was not an "appropriate means to seek a remedy" until the clear and final denial in June 2017, which is when the limitation period commenced.

The plaintiff, Joe Swampillai, brought an action for long-term disability (LTD) benefits against his former employer, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (RSA), and Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (Sun Life).

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that a full and final release signed by Swampillai barred his claim.

Swampillai pleaded unconscionability to set aside the release as it pertained to LTD benefits.

The court found that the release was unconscionable regarding the LTD claim because the transaction was grossly unfair and improvident, Swampillai lacked independent legal advice on this specific aspect, there was an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power, and RSA knowingly took advantage of his vulnerability.

Consequently, the release was set aside as it related to the LTD claim, and the defendants' motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the commencement of a limitation period for a long-term disability benefits claim.

The respondent claimant's benefits were terminated on November 1, 2007, at which point he had a fully ripened cause of action.

The respondent retained litigation counsel in early January 2008 but did not commence proceedings within the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period commenced on November 1, 2007, when the claim became fully ripened, and that the motion judge erred in applying an evaluative gloss to the word "appropriate" in the limitation statute.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant, a unionized employee of Lakehead District School Board, sought long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which administered the benefits under contract with the school board, denied her claim.

The appellant commenced an action against Sun Life seeking a declaration of total disability and an order for payment of benefits.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the dispute arose from the interpretation and administration of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective agreement and that Sun Life, as a mere agent of the school board, lacked standing to be sued directly.

The appellant's remedy lay in arbitration against the school board.

Kevin Pepper sued The Standard Life Assurance Company of Canada ("Standard Life") for long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

Standard Life brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Pepper brought a cross-motion for a declaration that his action was not statute-barred.

The court dismissed Standard Life's motion and granted Pepper's cross-motion, finding that the limitation period for Pepper's claim was delayed.

The delay was attributed to the complex history of benefits denials, appeals, and Standard Life's continued invitations for further information, which led Pepper to reasonably believe that litigation was not yet an "appropriate" means to seek a remedy.

The defendant, Sun Life, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and that the proper forum was arbitration under the collective agreement.

The court reviewed the collective agreement, administrative services contract, and benefit booklet, noting contradictory language.

Applying the "essential character" test from Weber v. Hydro, the court found that the dispute, concerning entitlement to LTD benefits, arose from the interpretation, application, or administration of the collective agreement, even though the benefit plan was not explicitly incorporated.

The court concluded that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator and dismissed the action.