S.T. Bale

The Attorney General for Ontario applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a provincial court judge's refusal to issue a general warrant and assistance order.

The police sought to use the general warrant to seize cryptocurrency held on a third-party exchange (Binance) by compelling the exchange to transfer the funds to a police-controlled wallet.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the general warrant was not available because other provisions in the Criminal Code, specifically Part XII.2 relating to digital assets warrants and restraint orders, provide a substantive equivalent for seizing such assets.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought two defamation actions against several defendants regarding statements made on social media and at a town council meeting.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).

The court found that the expressions related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to satisfy the merits-based hurdle, as the defendants had valid defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed the public interest hurdle, as she could not demonstrate that the harm she suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions.

Both actions were dismissed.

The plaintiff foundation, established by a deceased donor, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction or an order under Rule 45.02 to prevent the defendant charitable foundation from making distributions from a donor-advised fund.

The plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to make distributions according to the plaintiff's instructions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried because a valid charitable gift requires the donor to divest all power and control over the property to the donee.

The plaintiff conceded it could not compel specific donations, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction.

Hiawatha First Nation applied for a permanent injunction to restrain three of its members from constructing a gas station on the reserve.

The band argued the construction violated the Indian Act, a band by-law requiring building permits, a band resolution imposing a moratorium on new businesses, and environmental legislation.

The court found that the building permit by-law and environmental legislation did not apply, and that the proposed business structure did not violate the Indian Act.

However, the court held that the band resolution imposing a moratorium was an enforceable by-law.

The court granted an injunction restraining construction while the moratorium remains in effect and until the proponents comply with all applicable laws.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase a newly built home from the defendant.

After discovering the home would not have a garage door access as expected, the plaintiff sent an angry email threatening litigation.

The defendant treated this as an anticipatory breach, refused to close the transaction, and sold the property to a related charity.

The court found that the plaintiff's email was an idle threat and did not amount to repudiation or a breach of the duty of good faith.

The defendant's refusal to close constituted a repudiation of the contract.

The plaintiff was awarded damages assessed as of the date of breach.

At the outset of a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved to exclude expert evidence based on a brain SPECT scan used to diagnose a traumatic brain injury (TBI).

The court held that using a SPECT scan to diagnose TBI and distinguish it from anxiety or depression constitutes novel science.

Applying the reliable foundation test from R. v. J.-L.J., the court found the methodology had not been tested, lacked peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The defendants moved for security for costs, substitute security, set-off of interlocutory costs, and withdrawal of writs of execution pending an assessment of damages for deceit.

The plaintiffs brought cross-motions including a request to add a vesting order issue to the assessment.

The court dismissed all motions, primarily citing the defendants' significant delay in bringing their motions and the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs, who had been exploiting the intellectual property collateral for years.

The court also found that considering a vesting order was beyond the scope of the assessment ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The third party moved to strike several paragraphs of the defendant's affidavit filed for a simplified procedure trial.

The moving party argued the paragraphs introduced evidence refused on discovery and relied on inadmissible hearsay.

The court struck two paragraphs: one that improperly adopted another witness's affidavit and one containing inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the remainder of the motion, finding the moving party was not prejudiced by the discovery refusal and that the other hearsay statements fell under the admissions exception.

The applicant pharmacy owner sought a declaration and injunction to enforce a non-competition clause against a former pharmacist employee who resigned and began working at a nearby pharmacy.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the non-competition clause was unenforceable because its description of prohibited activities was both ambiguous and overly broad, extending beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect the employer's proprietary interests.

The third party in an equipment rental dispute brought three preliminary motions before trial: to permanently stay the third party claim due to late disclosure of an alleged Mary Carter agreement, to permit calling an expert witness, and to permit cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness despite not defending the main action.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the agreed statement of facts was disclosed in a timely manner.

The court allowed the motions to call the expert witness and to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness, finding interference with the expert's retainer and relevance of the plaintiff's evidence to the third party's defence.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim under rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, a home builder and its principal, alleged various torts and statutory breaches against Tarion Warranty Corporation, several municipalities, CTV News, and a public health authority, claiming hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.

The court found the 40-page statement of claim to be unwieldy, repetitive, and deficient in pleading the necessary material facts for the alleged causes of action.

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, dismissing claims based on criminal statutes, the Competition Act, the Security of Information Act, intentional interference with economic relations, discrimination, and harassment without leave to amend.

However, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to move for an order permitting them to deliver a fresh statement of claim restricted to specific causes of action, including injurious falsehood, inducing breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and negligence, provided they can properly plead the required material facts.

The applicant brought an application for the delivery of a dog pursuant to the deceased's will.

The will provided a legacy of $100,000 for the care of the dog to the individual who assumed its care and residence.

The estate trustee had placed the dog with her son after the applicant allegedly declined to take it.

The court reviewed text messages between the parties and concluded that the applicant did not intend to be the guardian of the dog in accordance with the will.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved to certify a class action against the Government of Ontario for damages resulting from the early termination of the Ontario Basic Income Pilot project.

The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, breach of undertaking, negligence, breach of public law duty, and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the certification motion, finding it plain and obvious that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the relationship was not contractual, the government's decision to cancel the program was a core policy decision protected by common law and statutory immunity, and there is no constitutional right to the continuation of a government program.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose after striking two victims with a broken beer bottle during a wedding reception altercation.

The Crown sought a sentence between the mid and high ranges, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court found the offence fell within the mid-range of sentences for such assaults and sentenced the offender to two years less a day in custody, followed by two years of probation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, alleging the defendants failed to satisfactorily complete earth works and grading on their property as required by the minutes of settlement.

The parties relied on conflicting unsworn engineering reports regarding the adequacy of a buffer zone, berms, and general conformance with the grading plan.

The court found it could not resolve the factual disputes on the written record alone.

The court withheld its final order for 45 days to allow the parties to make submissions on holding a mini-trial or ordering the experts to meet and confer under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The offender was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl, using forged fentanyl patches, and obtaining merchandise by false pretence.

He participated in a scheme where he returned forged patches to a pharmacy under Ontario's patch-for-patch program to obtain new fentanyl patches, which he then trafficked.

The court rejected the argument that the trafficking was merely sharing among prescription holders, finding it to be a sophisticated commercial operation.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the extreme dangers of fentanyl, the court sentenced the offender to 26 months in penitentiary for trafficking, with concurrent 18-month sentences for the forgery and false pretence offences.

The offender requested an earlier hearing date for a pending dangerous offender application, arguing the only remaining issue was credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court initially agreed to proceed by teleconference.

However, after reviewing the sentencing briefs, the Crown requested to cross-examine the offender and call institutional evidence regarding Covid-19 measures, prompting the defence to also request to call evidence.

The court concluded the matter was not capable of being heard by teleconference and adjourned the application to its previously scheduled return date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to continue an interim Mareva injunction against the defendants following an aborted real estate transaction.

The plaintiffs also moved to file fresh evidence and for security for costs.

The court found the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case and a serious risk of asset dissipation, continuing the injunction against the defendants' real estate properties.

The motions to file fresh evidence and for security for costs were dismissed.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender assessment under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code following the offender's convictions for multiple firearms and violence offences, including attempt to commit murder.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history, which included a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour, and found reasonable grounds to believe he might be found to be a dangerous offender.

The application for an assessment was granted.