Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Joshua Burton was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother and grandmother to death.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically determining the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 18 years, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the nature of the offences, the circumstances surrounding their commission (including the brutality, disposal of bodies, and impact on victims), the offender's character (lack of prior record, but also lack of insight and empathy), and the divided jury recommendations.

The judge imposed a concurrent parole ineligibility period of 17 years for each count, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol content.

On appeal, he raised several Charter arguments (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) concerning the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the roadside screening demand, the reliability of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) results, and the delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all arguments, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's rulings, including factual findings based on credibility and the proper application of legal principles regarding police authority and Charter rights.

This case record indicates that the reasons for the decision are not available at this time, preventing a detailed summary of the legal principles or factual background.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

This is a defence bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, appealing a decision to detain the applicant on secondary and tertiary bail grounds.

The applicant proposed a new surety (grandmother), increased surety amount, more stringent house arrest, and GPS electronic monitoring as material changes in circumstances.

The court found a material change based on the new surety, applying a flexible approach to due diligence in bail reviews as per R. v. St. Cloud.

However, the court ultimately found the proposed plan and sureties insufficient to mitigate the significant public safety risk posed by the serious firearms and dangerous driving charges, dismissing the bail review application on secondary grounds.

The Crown applied under Section 521 of the Criminal Code to review the respondent's bail release, seeking detention or surety supervision.

The application for detention or surety was denied, but the court found significant procedural errors in the original bail hearing where the Justice of the Peace unduly restricted the Crown's presentation of evidence.

The court emphasized the balance between efficiency and procedural fairness in bail hearings, noting that expedition should not compromise the Crown's right to be heard, especially regarding evidence pertinent to public safety.

Elia S. Awad was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine) and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered sentencing principles, mitigating factors (strict bail conditions, employment, family support, mental health issues) and aggravating factors (sophisticated mid-high level drug trafficker, extensive criminal record including prior drug offences).

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the Defence sought 3 years.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment, to be served concurrently for both charges, reduced by credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of five years, one month, and nineteen days.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter applications under s. 10(b), alleging police failed to assist her in contacting her counsel of choice and failed to provide adequate privacy during her consultation with duty counsel.

She also argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence regarding her impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the law, concluding the appellant's belief that she lacked privacy was not reasonably held.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with multiple counts of fraud related to bank loans, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a conditional stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel.

He argued he was indigent and had been denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's extensive business background and education made him capable of representing himself, meaning his right to a fair trial would not be compromised.

Furthermore, the court found the applicant failed to prove indigence, noting inconsistencies in evidence regarding his separation from his wife, his failure to pursue his share of the matrimonial home proceeds, and his lack of adequate financial disclosure.

The applicants, who were charged with conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from wiretap and dialed number recorder (DNR) authorizations.

They argued that the authorizations violated their s. 8 Charter rights because the informations to obtain (ITOs) contained false, misleading, and unconstitutionally obtained information, and that the issuing judge for the DNRs demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court found that while some information in the ITOs had to be excised, including jail visitor logs obtained in breach of s. 8, the remaining evidence was sufficient to support the issuance of the authorizations.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.

The applicant, facing multiple criminal charges including fraud over $5,000, sought a Rowbotham Order for publicly funded counsel.

The application was dismissed because the applicant failed to prove indigence, having provided inconsistent and dishonest financial information to Legal Aid Ontario and the court.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility, thereby failing the second criterion of the Rowbotham test.

Mr. Notaro appealed his conviction for driving with more than the legal concentration of alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing the arresting officer failed to consider "fresh mouth alcohol" before administering a roadside screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a palpable and overriding error standard of review, found that the trial judge implicitly accepted the officer's awareness of the mouth alcohol issue and reasonably concluded that no circumstances warranted a delay or further inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to cross‑examine the affiant officer and to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant authorizing a search of his residence for offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused argued that the warrant was issued without reasonable grounds because the Information to Obtain relied heavily on unproven confidential informants whose reliability had not been sufficiently established.

The court held that cross‑examination of the affiant was unnecessary because it would not assist in determining whether the authorizing justice could have granted the warrant.

Applying the totality of the circumstances approach from Debot, the court found that the informant information was compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation including background checks and electricity consumption data.

The search warrant was therefore valid and the Charter application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions arising out of an impaired care and control investigation where the appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of a vehicle stopped in a live lane with the engine on and gear in drive.

The appellant argued the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand, and the evidence did not prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal court held that the police acted reasonably in waiting in the sally-port and in contacting duty counsel given the appellant's state of intoxication, and that the officer had sufficient grounds based on the totality of observations.

The court further held that the trial judge's conclusion on impaired care and control was open on the evidence and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on impaired driving and excess blood alcohol charges after the trial judge barred the Crown from conducting a voluntariness voir dire concerning the accused’s statement to police.

The appeal court held that, although trial judges have broad authority to manage proceedings efficiently and fairly, that authority cannot be exercised in a manner that unfairly causes irreparable damage to the prosecution.

The court found the parties had notice from the judicial pretrial that the Crown intended to rely on the statement, and any delay or prejudice could have been managed by recalling officers on a limited voir dire.

The exclusion of the statement on trial management grounds was legal error.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code after being convicted of sexual interference involving a minor family member and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment.

The court considered whether the appeal was not frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant raised several grounds of appeal, including an arguable issue regarding whether sexual interference is an included offence under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the third ground raised a viable issue on appeal and that the applicant had previously complied with bail conditions and posed no significant public interest risk.

Judicial interim release pending appeal was therefore granted with conditions.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault but successfully appealed based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, resulting in an order for a new trial.

The applicant brought an application seeking to return to the pre-election stage to elect a trial by judge and jury and have a preliminary inquiry.

The court granted the application under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding that the lack of adequate legal representation included the initial election process, and denying a re-election would infringe the applicant's rights under sections 7 and 11(f).

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, arguing that a strip search conducted at a police detachment violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant contended that the search was conducted pursuant to a routine policy and lacked adequate privacy, contrary to the principles governing strip searches established in R. v. Golden.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the Golden framework and reasonably concluded that the search was not conducted as a routine policy without regard to individual circumstances.

The trial judge’s factual findings were entitled to deference and disclosed no palpable and overriding error.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, charged with unlawful production of marijuana, brought a pre-trial application alleging breaches of their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights following a warrantless police search of their apartment.

Police had responded to a report of a domestic disturbance and, despite the applicants' explanations and lack of apparent distress, entered and searched the apartment based on a general police policy, discovering a small marijuana grow operation.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe anyone else was in the apartment requiring assistance, rendering the search unreasonable and the detention arbitrary.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of multiple offences, including aggravated assault, after violently shaking his infant daughter, causing permanent and severe brain damage.

He also assaulted his girlfriend and the infant in a separate incident weeks prior.

The court rejected the application of the Kienapple principle to the assault and choking charges.

The accused was sentenced to a total of 8 years and 4 months imprisonment, with a 1.25 to 1 credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of 5 years going forward.