Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The plaintiff, Tiffany Longarini, sued four lawyers for breach of confidence after a settlement email she sent was disclosed to the Crown in a related criminal proceeding.

The court found that the email was not protected by settlement privilege due to its content and the context of its use, and that even if it were, disclosure was justified by the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The claim was struck without leave to amend.

The court considered an application by Mustafa Elawad to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent search, on the basis of breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police engaged in racial profiling, that the stop was not justified by the stated reason of obscured plates, and that the subsequent search and seizure were unlawful.

The evidence of drugs and a firearm was excluded, and Mr. Elawad was acquitted of all charges.

The court sentenced A.S. to three years and six months' imprisonment for sexual assault of a 16-year-old, following a judge-alone trial.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offence and offender, victim impact, and the applicable sentencing principles, including proportionality, parity, and restraint.

The court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact of immigration consequences, and the appropriateness of conditional sentences or discharges.

The court found that the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility warranted a custodial sentence within the range of three to five years, as established by appellate authority, and imposed ancillary orders including a SOIRA order, DNA order, weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order.

The accused applied for a detention review after being arrested on new charges while on a release order.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's criminal record, substance abuse issues, and the serious nature of the allegations.

The defence proposed a comprehensive release plan involving residence with sureties in a remote Alberta camp with strict conditions.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Myers, R. v. Antic, and R. v. St-Cloud, found that the proposed plan met the accused's onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court emphasized the principle of restraint and the proportionality of continued detention to a realistic sentence, especially given the accused's mental health issues and time already served.

The accused was released on the proposed terms.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The application judge had included a six-month period during which the respondent pursued a good faith application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the delay calculation.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found this to be an error.

The court held that a good faith defence appeal period, being outside the Crown's control, constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" and should be deducted from the total delay.

With this deduction, the total delay was well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling, and thus not unreasonable.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

This is a placeholder decision indicating that the full reasons for judgment are not yet available.

The case involves a criminal matter, R. v. Singh, heard in the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario.

The defendant, Jean Auclair, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds obtained by crime.

The charges arose after nurses found drugs and cash in his shorts while he was in the ICU for a suspected overdose.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging unreasonable search and seizure by nurses (as state actors/agents) and police.

The court found that nurses were not state actors or police agents, and their search was reasonable for medical purposes.

The police seizure was found to engage s. 8 but was justified under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code.

Even if there were Charter breaches, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found Auclair guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, but not guilty of the included offence of simple possession due to the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act (CDSA s. 4.1(2)).

The Crown applied to admit three categories of discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Brandon Drakes-Simon and Justin Malcolm, in a first-degree murder trial: Drakes-Simon's acquisition of a firearm, his expressed intention to deal with legal bills, and evidence that he was seeking additional "contract killing" work.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling all three categories of evidence inadmissible.

The judge found the evidence to have negligible probative value due to its general nature and to be overwhelmingly prejudicial, particularly as it amounted to forbidden bad character reasoning.

The defendants were charged with various drug and firearms offences following the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove possession.

The court found the first defendant guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking based on drugs found near where she was sleeping, but not guilty regarding drugs found in a common kitchen area.

The second defendant, the principal occupant, was found guilty of possessing MDMA found in her bedroom, but not guilty of possessing the cocaine.

The careless storage of a firearm charge against the second defendant was dismissed due to an evidentiary gap regarding the standard of care.

The accused, JF, was tried on nine counts including sexual assault, unlawful confinement, choking, assault with weapon, assault causing bodily harm, assault, and robbery.

The complainant, AB, did not appear at trial, and her preliminary inquiry testimony was admitted.

The defence challenged AB's credibility regarding her relationship with JF, her pregnancy, and inconsistencies with forensic evidence.

The court found AB's testimony unreliable and inconsistent with other evidence, including JF's credible account and the lack of corroborating forensic findings.

JF was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for being in care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony that he exited his vehicle to drink wine in his garage before police arrived.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to consider independent corroborative evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge was alive to the independent evidence and reasonably concluded it was insufficient to rebut the presumption of care and control, especially given the appellant's lack of credibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ryan Luckese, appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge erred by failing to address the issue of consent and, alternatively, erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge implicitly considered consent by accepting the complainant's evidence of being threatened and taking defensive action.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly determined that self-defence under Section 34 of the Criminal Code did not apply, as the appellant initiated the threat with the axe before the complainant acted.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) sought to unseal the remaining redacted portions (approximately 25%) of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant related to an RCMP investigation into alleged investor fraud by Fortress Real Capital Inc. and associated entities.

The Crown resisted, arguing that further disclosure would compromise the ongoing investigation and prejudice innocent third parties.

The court, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, found that the Crown had justified the redactions, citing a serious and specific risk to the integrity of the investigation due to undisclosed law enforcement techniques and the potential for specific financial harm to an innocent person.

The court also noted the ongoing nature of the investigation and the large volume of unanalyzed seized material as factors supporting continued redaction of other third parties' identities.

The application for further unsealing was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired driving and exceeding the breathalyzer limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that impairment was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that breath samples were not taken within the two-hour period mandated by the Criminal Code, as the exact time of the accident could not be established.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to consider witness evidence of impairment, erred in not convicting on the included offence of care and control, and failed to apply the presumption of identity.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings on witness credibility, rejecting the attempt to change the particulars of the offence to a later time of care and control, and affirming the proper application of reasonable doubt arising from a lack of evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

He argued that the breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) due to a 90‑minute delay between the roadside stop and the first Intoxilyzer test, and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached by a delay before speaking with Legal Aid.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact regarding police resource allocation and transport to a detachment with a breath technician were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The evidence supported the conclusion that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable and that the right to counsel was not violated.

Even if a breach had occurred, the breath results would not have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought an application for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order dismissing forgery charges against the respondents, who operated a medical clinic and allegedly signed medical marijuana access forms without proper authorization or specialist concurrence.

The Crown argued the judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the definition of a 'false document' under s. 321(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge failed to assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of the offence, resulting in a loss of jurisdiction.

The dismissal of the forgery counts was quashed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter to exclude a firearm discovered during a police encounter.

Police officers observed the accused walking in a neighbourhood where they were searching for armed robbery suspects and noted behaviours consistent with a person carrying a concealed weapon, including slowing his pace, performing a 'safety pat', and blading his body away from officers.

The court found the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was armed and therefore lawfully conducted an investigative detention and safety search.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence and accepted the officers’ testimony regarding the circumstances of the detention, arrest, and search.

No Charter breaches were established and the firearm was ruled admissible.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of narcotics discovered during a search following arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest after observing what they believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The judge found the officers’ accounts inconsistent and unreliable, concluding the arrest was based largely on suspicion rather than objectively grounded reasonable and probable grounds.

The arrest was therefore unlawful and the search incidental to arrest violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused’s Charter-protected interests justified exclusion of the drug evidence.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault against a young man whom he had groomed.

The Crown sought 15 to 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought 8 months.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 months' incarceration to be served concurrently, followed by 3 years of probation, along with a lifetime SOIRA order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with armed robbery and disguise with intent.

The Crown alleged he was one of three men who robbed the victim after a woman acted as a decoy.

The trial judge found the identification evidence unreliable and accepted that the accused's alibi raised a reasonable doubt about his physical presence at the robbery.

However, based on text messages and accomplice testimony, the court found the accused participated extensively in planning the robbery and directing the decoy.

The accused was convicted of armed robbery as an aider and abettor, but acquitted of disguise with intent.