Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant challenged the police stop and subsequent search of his SUV on Charter grounds (sections 8 and 9), arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A loaded handgun and fentanyl were found.

The applicant alleged police officers falsified notes and testimony regarding the reason for the stop (burnt-out headlight vs. prior BOLO) and the observation of cannabis in plain view.

The court found the police evidence untrustworthy, concluding the stop was based on stale BOLO information, not a burnt-out headlight, and the cannabis observations were inconsistent and unreliable.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of wilful Charter violations and testimonial dishonesty.

The court also commented on the police's failure to record interactions when attempting to enlist the applicant as a confidential informant, recommending a procedure for such records.

The appellants, a corporation and its owner, appealed their convictions for tax evasion and making false statements under the Income Tax Act.

The trial judge had found that claiming the owner's son's wedding as a business expense was illegal, relying heavily on a finding that there was 'no evidence' that business associates attended the wedding.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of the company's accountant, who testified that the owner told him many business associates were present.

This misapprehension played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

A new trial was ordered.

The two accused were sentenced for their roles in a series of destructive crimes.

Joseph Pickstock pleaded guilty to multiple counts of fraud, arson, break and enter, and public mischief, causing extensive financial and emotional devastation to numerous victims, including an elderly man.

He was sentenced to a global term of 7 years' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $533,000 in restitution.

Robert Pickstock pleaded guilty to four counts of public mischief for diverting police attention from his brother's crimes.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, 3 years' probation, and ordered to pay partial restitution.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder following a brutal, unprovoked attack on a 75-year-old woman walking on a trail.

The offender, who had consumed marijuana and psilocybin, inflicted severe head injuries that ultimately caused the victim's death 14 months later.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 14-17 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the savage attack on a vulnerable victim against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and prospects for rehabilitation, ultimately setting parole ineligibility at 13 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment, arguing his guilty plea was not informed.

He believed there was a joint submission on sentence that would spare him a criminal record, confusing an agreement on facts with an agreement on sentence.

Applying the framework from R. v. Wong, the Superior Court of Justice found the appellant established a reasonable probability he would have opted for a trial had he known he risked a criminal record.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and weapons dangerous following a late-night altercation outside a nightclub.

The victims, who were highly intoxicated, instigated the confrontation and chased the accused and his friend when they attempted to flee.

The accused, fearing for his life, used a pocket knife to stab at least one of the pursuers.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence and that his possession of the knife was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The accused, who allegedly posed as a lawyer and defrauded his employer and the public, brought a motion for a directed verdict on counts of fraud and uttering forged documents at the close of the Crown's case.

The court applied the Shephard test to determine if there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a guilty verdict.

The court found that while there was no direct evidence of the accused forging cheques or a power of attorney, there was ample circumstantial evidence to support the charges.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The self-represented accused, facing fraud charges for allegedly holding himself out as a lawyer and misappropriating funds, brought an application for further first-party disclosure from the Crown and third-party records from his former employers, the police, and the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The court reviewed the requests under the Stinchcombe and O'Connor frameworks.

The court ordered the production of certain invoices and payments to establish the business relationship between the accused and the law firms, and ordered the Crown to provide witness lists and criminal records.

Requests for client files were denied due to solicitor-client privilege, and the request for Law Society records was dismissed as a fishing expedition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving, and failing to remain at the scene after striking two municipal workers with his truck.

The accused raised a defence of non-mental disorder automatism, arguing he was in a parasomniac state (sleep-driving) at the time of the collision.

The court rejected the automatism defence, finding the accused fell asleep at the wheel due to extreme fatigue and alcohol impairment, rather than a sleep disorder.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

However, he was acquitted of dangerous driving because it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would fall asleep during the short drive, and acquitted of failing to remain because he was asleep during the collision and unaware it had occurred.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorari to review and set aside his committal to trial on various firearm charges.

The central issue was whether there was any evidence from which a reasonably instructed jury could infer the applicant's knowledge of a firearm, an essential element of possession.

The court reviewed the preliminary hearing judge's reliance on circumstantial evidence, including the location of a hidden firearm, a single 9mm round in a jar, and the applicant's control over the apartment.

The court found that the inferences drawn by the preliminary hearing judge regarding the applicant's knowledge of the firearm and the link between the single round and the hidden firearm were speculative and not supported by the evidence, which was equally consistent with the co-accused's possession.

Consequently, the application for certiorari was granted, and the committal to trial was quashed.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where victim surcharges were ordered concurrently for two theft offences.

The court examined whether victim surcharges, considered ancillary orders rather than fines or penalties, could be imposed concurrently.

It concluded that there is no legal impediment to concurrent victim surcharge orders, consistent with the totality principle and judicial discretion in sentencing, and that the jurisprudence precluding concurrent fines does not apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and the concurrent victim surcharge orders were upheld.

The accused applied for judicial interim release on a bail review after previously consenting to detention on charges including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The accused proposed a release plan involving two sureties, including his mother and a former employer, with supervision and potential electronic monitoring.

The court found the Crown’s case to be strong and concluded that the proposed supervision plan contained significant gaps that created a substantial risk of reoffending.

Given the accused’s prior firearms convictions and repeated breaches of prohibition orders, detention remained necessary for public safety.

The court also found detention justified on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion, the co-accused applied to redact portions of two videotaped police statements made by two of the accused.

The applicants argued that the statements contained inadmissible hearsay that was highly prejudicial to the non-makers.

The court applied the principles for editing co-accused statements, balancing the probative value of the narrative context against the prejudicial effect.

The court ordered the redaction of gratuitous police comments, irrelevant bad character evidence, and highly prejudicial post-offence conduct (wiping a coffee cup), but retained the core narrative descriptions of the events, holding that limiting instructions would adequately protect the co-accused.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During a joint murder trial involving five accused, one accused (Mylvaganam) sought to introduce an alternate suspect defence, which included propensity evidence against a co-accused (Carty).

The trial judge prematurely ruled on the admissibility of this propensity evidence without a full evidentiary record or complete submissions.

Carty brought an application for severance, arguing the premature ruling gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the ruling was premature, a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias, as the error could be remedied by conducting a proper and fulsome voir dire on the propensity evidence.

During jury selection for a complex, six-month murder trial, the applicant sought to discharge the sworn jurors and increase juror compensation, arguing that the high rate of excusals for financial hardship violated her Charter right to a representative jury panel.

The court acknowledged the inadequacy of current juror compensation but found that the remaining panel, after hardship excusals, was still sufficiently representative of the community.

The court held that the characteristic of being paid by an employer for jury service is not material to juror competence or impartiality, and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence for offences involving the killing and wounding of two dogs contrary to the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal alleged errors in credibility assessment and sought admission of extensive fresh evidence, including veterinary expert evidence suggesting vasculopathy, accidental injuries from falls, and revised dating of rib fractures.

Applying the Palmer test, the court held the proposed evidence failed the due diligence, credibility, and impact requirements and was not admissible.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

However, the court found an error in principle in sentencing where denunciation and deterrence were overemphasized relative to rehabilitation for a first offender, and reduced the custodial sentence while adjusting ancillary orders.

Sentencing following a conviction for robbery contrary to s. 344(b) of the Criminal Code involving a physical attack and robbery of elderly victims.

The court considered aggravating factors including the offender’s role as the principal assailant, the vulnerability of the senior victims, and a lengthy prior criminal record including previous robberies.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth and evidence of emerging insight into an opioid addiction with potential rehabilitation support.

Applying the principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, the court rejected a time-served proposal aimed at facilitating immediate treatment placement.

A custodial sentence was imposed along with probation and ancillary orders.

In an extradition committal hearing, the moving party sought an order committing the responding party for extradition to face drug conspiracy prosecution in the United States.

The court held that the responding party's affidavit evidence was inadmissible because it largely advanced defence evidence and did not establish manifest unreliability in the requesting state's record.

Applying the Extradition Act committal test, the court found sufficient evidence on each essential element of the corresponding Canadian offence and found identity established on a balance of probabilities.

The court rejected challenges to identification reliability as matters for trial and ordered committal for extradition.