SCJ 2015

The defendants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 2001 action for delay.

The court reviewed the Master's discretionary decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error or error in principle.

The court found that the Master properly considered the evidence, including the parties' settlement negotiations and the lack of actual prejudice to the defendants, who acted as an allied group.

The appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action.

The plaintiff's employment was terminated, which immediately ended his long-term disability (LTD) coverage under the employer's group policy.

Two months later, he became totally disabled in a motor vehicle accident.

The employer inadvertently continued paying LTD premiums, and the insurer initially denied the claim based on lack of total disability and late filing, while reserving the right to investigate eligibility.

The plaintiff argued the insurer waived the termination date of the policy.

The court dismissed the action, finding no waiver because the insurer lacked full knowledge of the termination and did not unequivocally intend to relinquish its right to rely on the policy's termination clause.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death, after driving the wrong way on a highway and causing a fatal head-on collision.

The accused argued that his drink had been spiked with a 'club drug' at a nightclub, resulting in involuntary intoxication and total memory loss.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible and found that his erratic driving was consistent with his blood alcohol concentration of 148 to 173 milligrams.

The court concluded the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol and found him guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with attempted murder following a shooting at a Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) apartment, brought an O'Connor application for third-party records held by TCHC relating to the complainant's tenancy.

The accused sought the records to test the complainant's credibility, identify other potential targets or suspects, and challenge her claims of fearing the accused.

Following a review of the records and with the assistance of counsel for the complainant and TCHC, the court ordered the production of specific relevant documents and redacted records, while sealing the unredacted copies.

The defendants by counterclaim, who were the plaintiffs' lawyers in the main actions, submitted written requests under Rule 2.1.01(6) to have the counterclaims against them dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff by counterclaim, a lawyer himself, raised various complaints against opposing counsel arising from a complicated real estate transaction.

The court declined to dismiss the counterclaims summarily under Rule 2.1, finding that while the claims might ultimately be defeated by absolute privilege, they were not clearly frivolous on their face and there was no apparent risk of a vexatious response to an ordinary motion to strike.

The plaintiff sued the municipality for $100,000, alleging that lifeguards ridiculed him for swimming too slowly in the fast lane.

The defendant's counsel requested a review under Rule 2.1.01.

The court found that the statement of claim appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the alleged causes of action provided no legal remedy for the discretionary exercise of lifeguarding duties.

The court stayed the action and directed the registrar to issue a notice that it was considering dismissing the claim.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add the principal of the defendant corporation as a party defendant.

The proposed defendant argued the motion was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was extended by email correspondence or, alternatively, that the amendment corrected a misnomer.

The court found the emails did not extend the limitation period as they were sent on behalf of the corporation, not the individual personally.

The court also held the amendment sought to add an entirely new party, not correct a misnomer, and dismissed the motion as statute-barred.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sued the defendant for a commission of $68,506.25 under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) after the defendant purchased a home using another brokerage.

The court found that the BRA had been repudiated by the defendant and that the plaintiff accepted the repudiation by its conduct in failing to provide further services.

Alternatively, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement by failing to assist the defendant in locating a home, which the defendant accepted.

The claim was dismissed.

Following a motion to change seeking termination or reduction of long‑term spousal support, the court addressed costs after the responding party successfully defended the support order.

Although the court found a material change in circumstances due to the recipient’s failure to pursue employment, it declined to reduce support and noted the payor had been paying less than the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggested.

The court held the responding party was the successful party and had beaten a prior settlement offer.

The court also considered the moving party’s incomplete financial disclosure and unreasonable settlement offers.

Full recovery costs were awarded to the responding party.

The defendant requested a review of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01(6).

The plaintiff sought bizarre relief against the government, including a job, a weapon, a stealth recording device, and $151 million in damages.

The court found the proceeding appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process on its face.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice of potential dismissal to the plaintiff and stayed the action pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The applicant, facing serious criminal charges, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

Legal Aid was denied because the applicant provided misleading financial information, including a claim that he earned $10,000 per week.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide credible evidence of his indigence and could not rely on a Legal Aid refusal that he caused through his own misleading conduct.

The dismissal was without prejudice to bringing a more fulsome application.

The applicant, a self-represented former client, moved under Rule 37.14 to strike out a motion brought by the respondent law firm to stay an ongoing assessment of its accounts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Rule 37.14 does not apply to assessment proceedings under the Solicitors Act, nor does it apply to motions heard on notice or motions that have not yet resulted in an order.

The court awarded costs of $1,500 to the respondent, noting the applicant's unsupportable allegations of wrongdoing against the Assessment Officer and opposing counsel.

Following a successful trial judgment in a fire loss subrogated claim, the plaintiff sought costs of $222,804.

The plaintiff had served a pre-trial offer to settle for $625,000, which was significantly beaten by the $810,016.75 judgment, entitling the plaintiff to partial indemnity costs up to the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The defendant argued for a reduction based on a strict percentage of actual fees billed.

The court rejected the defendant's mathematical approach, finding the plaintiff's counsel's discounted hourly rates reasonable and the time spent appropriate given the complexity of the case.

The court awarded the plaintiff the full amount claimed.

The self-represented plaintiffs commenced an action seeking $939 million in damages, alleging a vast conspiracy involving artificial human reproduction, terrorism fabrication, and high-profile individuals.

The claim named a Superior Court judge who had previously dismissed their claims against a law firm.

The court initiated a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After reviewing the plaintiffs' written submissions, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting it was a collateral attack on previous binding decisions.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of drug trafficking involving fentanyl and buprenorphine.

The court considered a joint sentencing submission recommending a global sentence of four years and one and a half months, with significant credit for pre-trial custody leaving a custodial term of two years less a day.

The sentencing judge reviewed the offender’s Gladue report detailing Indigenous background factors, intergenerational residential school trauma, addiction issues, and mental health challenges.

The court emphasized that Gladue principles must inform sentencing while recognizing the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking and the offender’s prior criminal record.

The joint submission was accepted and ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition were imposed.

During a defamation trial, the plaintiff brought a motion to read into the record an affidavit sworn by a deceased witness.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the affidavit met the requirement of threshold reliability.

The motion was granted, and the affidavit was admitted with a mid-trial instruction to the jury regarding its weight.

On a pre-trial application in a cocaine importation prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of a Panamanian laboratory report identifying the seized substance as cocaine, together with related foreign investigative documents obtained under mutual legal assistance procedures.

The court held that s. 36(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act permits admission of foreign records containing opinion evidence and does not exclude expert opinion evidence from its scope.

Applying the court’s gatekeeper role and reasoning by analogy to analyst-certificate jurisprudence, the court found no evidentiary basis to doubt the accuracy or reliability of the Panamanian testing process.

The court further held that s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code did not govern because the evidence was tendered under the MLACMA, and in any event the Mohan criteria were satisfied.

The application to exclude both the expert report and the other Panamanian materials was dismissed.

The applicants, former students of St. Anne's and Bishop Horden Indian Residential Schools, brought a Request for Directions asserting that Canada failed to comply with its report writing obligations under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

They sought orders requiring Canada to revise School Narratives and Person of Interest Reports, and to provide unredacted source documents to adjudicators and claimants.

The court found that Canada's updated reports for St. Anne's did not comply with the Agreement and ordered Canada to revise them to include a detailed chart of abuse allegations and corresponding documents.

The court also ordered Canada, on consent, to provide unredacted copies of publicly available court records, but dismissed the request for unredacted copies of other documents, citing privacy safeguards in the Agreement.

The parties separated after an 11-year cohabitation and marriage during which they operated a joint property maintenance business.

The applicant sought an equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The court preferred the applicant's evidence due to the respondent's failure to provide accurate financial disclosure and valuations.

The court determined the value of disputed assets, including a partially built home and business equipment, and ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $161,727.28 (as corrected in the addendum).

The court also found the applicant entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, imputing an income of $80,000 to the respondent and ordering him to pay $800 per month for five years.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2013 order, seeking to reduce child support arrears, terminate spousal support, impute income to the respondent mother, and reduce his own imputed income.

The court granted relief for a 10-month period when one child lived with the applicant, eliminating those months from his arrears.

However, the court refused to reduce the applicant's imputed income of $39,000 or terminate spousal support, noting the respondent's efforts to find employment and her entitlement to compensatory support.

Child support was set off under section 8 of the Child Support Guidelines, and the applicant was ordered to pay a proportionate share of extraordinary expenses.