Posadas et al. v. Khan et al. and Chaba v. Khan et al., 2015 ONSC 4077
Citation: Posadas et al. v. Khan et al. and Chaba v. Khan et al., 2015 ONSC 4077 Court File No.: CV-14-512359 and CV-14-511862 Date: 2015-06-23
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Between: Nicanor Colonia Posadas and Irene Elena Posadas Plaintiffs
-and-
Muhammad Aslam Khan, Saeeda Bibi, Farooq Mian and Zulfiqar Ali Sulfi Defendants
And Between: Muhammad Aslam Khan Plaintiff by Counterclaim
-and-
Nicanor Colonia Posadas, Irene Elena Posadas, Monica Goyal and Jonathan MacKenzie Defendants to the Counterclaim
Court File No.: CV-14-511862
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Between: Sam Chaba Plaintiff
-and-
Muhammad Aslam Khan Defendants
And Between: Muhammad Aslam Khan Plaintiff by Counterclaim
-and-
Surinder Chaba a.k.a. Sam Chaba, Monica Goyal and Jonathan MacKenzie Defendants by Counterclaim
Before: F.L. Myers J. Read: June 23, 2015
Endorsement
[1] Two motions were referred to me by the registrar’s office pursuant to rule 2.1.01(7) following receipt of written requests under subrule 2.1.01(6) from counsel for Monica Goyal and Jonathan MacKenzie who are defendants by counterclaim in each of the counterclaims.
[2] The moving defendants by counterclaim are also the solicitors for the plaintiffs in each of the actions. There is much that is wrong with the counterclaims on their faces. The plaintiff by counterclaim, Muhammad Aslam Khan, is a lawyer. He ought to be able to plead in a concise, grammatically coherent, and legally cognizable way. It seems likely that the counterclaims brought by Mr. Khan are tactical in intention and may well be completely answered by the doctrine of absolute privilege applicable to lawyers who carry out litigation for clients.
[3] However, the pleadings in the two actions set out a somewhat complicated real estate transaction in which the roles of the vendors, purchasers, mortgagees and especially Mr. Khan, are not perfectly clear. There was litigation, settlements, and yet further proceedings. While Mr. Khan raises a litany of complaints against counsel opposite in the counterclaims, I cannot conclude that it is apparent on the face of the counterclaims alone that they are frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process in breach of rule 2.1. Moreover, there does not appear to be any basis for the attenuated process of Rule 2.1 to apply to these actions. There is no apparent risk of a vexatious response should a motion be brought in the ordinary course. See Raji v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801 at paras 8 and 9. Accordingly this is not an appropriate case for the court to direct that a notice in Form 2.1A be delivered to the plaintiffs by counterclaim.
[4] Nothing herein should be taken to affect in any way the likely outcome of a proper motion to strike or to dismiss the counterclaims that may be brought under Rules 20, 21.01, and/or 25.11 as appropriate.
[5] No costs.
F.L. Myers J.
Date: June 23, 2015