CITATION: ESTRADA v. ESTRADA, 2015 ONSC 12

COURT FILE NO.: FS-10-70298-00

DATE: 2015-01-05

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JULIA ESTRADA

Applicant

– and –

PEDRO ESTRADA

Respondent

Appearing on her own behalf

Appearing on his own behalf.

HEARD: NOVEMBER 18,19 and 20, 2014

reasons for judgment

Lemon, J.

THE ISSUES

1Ms. Estrada seeks spousal support, child support and section 7 expenses, an equalization of the parties’ net family property and a restraining order against Mr. Estrada. She also seeks an order varying the final order of Justice Seppi dated June 5, 2014 relating to access to the children.

BACKGROUND

2The parties married on April 30, 1998 and separated on September 9, 2006. They then reconciled but finally separated at a later date. There is an issue between them as to the separation date. Ms. Estrada says that they separated February 23, 2007 while Mr. Estrada says that they separated October 15, 2010.

3The parties have two children, Peter, now 13 and George, now 9.

CREDIBILITY

4Because some of the issues require an assessment of credibility, I will deal with that issue first. The only witnesses in this case were the two parties. Where their evidence conflicts, I accept the evidence of Mr. Estrada. Ms. Estrada’s evidence was filled with such inaccuracies, inconsistencies and exaggerations that I cannot rely upon it.

5At the outset of trial, Ms. Estrada initially requested an adjournment but then acknowledged that she was ready for trial. I confirmed with her that she was comfortable to proceed. The trial got underway and for the first day of trial, she was articulate and well prepared. On the morning of the second day, prior to the commencement of cross-examination, Mr. Estrada presented her with a number of documents relating to her previous day’s testimony. They were documents that eventually showed her to be incredible. She made a dramatic plea for an adjournment based on an undocumented and undiagnosed illness. I did not accept her request and the matter proceeded. Within minutes, she was again articulate and well prepared albeit somewhat nervous with respect to what was to come. While I do not have evidence to make a determination of her medical condition, it did not appear to be a factor to her presentation before or after her emotional request.

6The most obvious example of her lack of credibility is that, under cross examination, she acknowledged that, in 2013, she applied for and used a credit card in Mr. Estrada’s name without telling him that she had done so. This was six years after she says that they separated and at a time when he was paying the support that he was required to pay. Only after he was notified by the credit card company and an investigation was completed did she accept responsibility for the debt of $8,044.41. Although she admitted to the fraud and expressed sorrow about it, the evidence relating to that debt did not come out voluntarily and only under cross-examination by Mr. Estrada.

7The next example comes from her recollection of another debt. In her evidence in chief, she reviewed a joint mortgage refinancing statement and testified that from the mortgage proceeds from the bank, Mr. Estrada received the entire benefit of a particular payment of $2,951.00. Only under cross examination, and begrudgingly, did she acknowledge that this was the cost of the family trip to Florida placed entirely on Mr. Estrada’s credit card and that she therefore received a benefit from that expense.

8Ms. Estrada testified that Mr. Estrada had been charged a number of times with assault upon her. It required my question before she admitted that he was only convicted once.

9She denied that there was a joint credit card. She then could not remember if there was a joint credit card. When she was provided with a copy of the credit card statement, however, she admitted that shortly after separation she withdrew approximately $2,000 in cash from the joint credit card without notice to Mr. Estrada.

10Finally, she testified that she went to a justice of the peace to have further charges laid against Mr. Estrada but was unable to have a charge laid. It appears that others have also found her to be unreliable.

11In contrast, Mr. Estrada acknowledged that, on one occasion, he was charged with assault and pled guilty. No other charges with respect to Ms. Estrada led to a conviction.

12Next, over the last few years, Mr. Estrada has consistently made approximately $70,000 per year. In June of this year, he negotiated with his employer to obtain a raise to $110,000 per year. He advised Ms. Estrada of his increase before it came into pay. The effect of that information was an increase in his support payment at this trial. The voluntary admission of his pay increase, even before he received it, enhances his credibility on all other matters.

13Finally, Mr. Estrada’s conduct relating to the credit card fraud is illuminating as to his character. Once the investigation was carried out, the credit company determined that Ms. Estrada had improperly used his credit. He was given the choice that he could have her charged criminally, pay the balance himself, or get her to agree to take over the debt. He spoke to her about it and she took over the debt. This occurred in the midst of this heated litigation. Many might have had her charged in the same manner that she had him charged. Instead, Mr. Estrada took the high road and allowed her to acknowledge and take over the debt. This is not the conduct that characterizes Ms. Estrada’s behavior.

14Comparing the two witnesses, I can only rely on Mr. Estrada. As set out below, where the testimony of the parties conflict, I accept Mr. Estrada’s evidence.

CUSTODY/ACCESS

15On June 5, 2014, Seppi J. made a final consent order with respect to custody and access. On the first day of trial, the parties agreed that there would be further terms of access added to the access already finalized.

16Those terms are that the parties will split the Easter and Thanksgiving weekend. On even numbered years, Ms. Estrada will have the children with her for the first half of the holiday and on odd numbered years, Mr. Estrada will have them on the first half of the holiday.

17The parties agreed that for Easter, the “first half of the holiday” will be from after school at 3:15 p.m. on Thursday until Saturday morning at noon. The second half will be from Saturday morning at noon until Sunday evening at 7:00 p.m.

18For Thanksgiving, the “first half of the holiday” will be from Friday after school at 3:15 p.m. until Sunday morning at 10:00 a.m. The second half will be from Sunday at 10:00 a.m. until Monday at 7:00 p.m. Although the order of Justice Seppi is a final order, for simplicity, I shall incorporate all of the custody and access terms into this judgment.

19That would have been the end of that issue; however, on the morning of the second day of trial, Ms. Estrada said that since the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had earlier recommended that summer access should be three weeks, access for Mr. Estrada should be 2 to 3 weeks rather than the four weeks that was in the consent final order.

20Although the Office of the Children’s Lawyer may have referred to a standard of 2 to 3 weeks, the parties agreed upon a final order relating to summer access and there was no appeal of that order. There has been no change in circumstance since that time. Ms. Estrada’s request to reduce the summer access is denied.

DATE OF SEPARATION

21Ms. Estrada says that the parties separated February 23, 2007. Mr. Estrada, however, says that the parties separated October 15, 2010. In most cases, the date of separation would be significant in order to calculate the equalization payment. For reasons set out below, the date of separation makes no difference to the equalization payment. Whether the parties separated in 2007 or 2010, there is still no equalization payment to be paid. However, this point seemed to be of importance to the parties so I will resolve it.

22Ms. Estrada says that they separated for the first time in September 2006 but they reconciled from December 2006 until February 23, 2007. She provided a copy of the joint bank account which showed that she closed it in March 2007.

23She brought a proceeding relating to custody and support in the Ontario Court in 2009; however, it was withdrawn in 2010. The court documentation of May 2010 sets out that the parties wished an opportunity to reconcile. She testified that they attended counseling once but continued to live in separate residences.

24Ms. Estrada testified that in August 2010, Mr. Estrada forced his way into the house and took up residence against her wishes. They slept in separate bedrooms. Only on October 6, 2010 was she able to force him out of the house and change the locks. Accordingly, in her view, at no time did they reconcile after February 2007.

25Mr. Estrada says that after the proceedings were withdrawn in the Ontario court in May 2010, he and Ms. Estrada reconciled. Although they moved slowly at first towards reconciliation, by that summer, he had moved into the house on a full-time basis. They had family outings together and, after he moved into the house, the entire family went to Florida for a week in August. He denies that he forced his way into the home.

26When she was confronted with the flight documents to Florida, Ms. Estrada confirmed that they went as a family to Florida but that she did not want to go. She went because the children were excited about the trip and she thought the trip was her only chance for a holiday.

27Mr. Estrada seemed to be concerned about this issue because he thought that there was some importance to reconciling for more or less than 90 days. That has some significance as to whether spouses are entitled to a divorce after a period of one year of separation; it has no significance to this couple. At this point, they have been separated for more than a year whether the date is in February of 2007 or October of 2010.

28If it were important to determine this issue, I would find that the parties separated in October 2010. The Ontario court proceedings had been withdrawn. The family went to Florida for a week’s vacation in August. For reasons set out above, I do not accept Ms. Estrada’s evidence that Mr. Estrada forced himself into the house. Ms. Estrada’s application in this court was commenced October 15, 2010. On a balance of probabilities, I find that their final separation was October 15, 2010.

DIVISION OF PROPERTY

House

29When the parties separated, the house was jointly owned. Justice O’Connor ordered exclusive possession of the house to Ms. Estrada in October of 2010.

30Mr. Estrada paid the mortgage until the property was transferred to him on November 12, 2012. Although the home and mortgage were transferred into his name, he executed a trust document confirming Ms. Estrada still had a 50% interest in the property.

31In July 2012, Justice Baltman ordered that the house be listed and sold but that has not occurred. Neither side is in a hurry to have the house sold.

32Since separation, the mortgage has been refinanced three times. The first in 2007, the second in 2010 and the third in 2012. In her examination in chief, Ms. Estrada testified that Mr. Estrada had received more of the money from the refinancing than she had. As set out above, she did not think that the joint debt for the trip to Florida was of any benefit to her. She also left out the fact that in 2010 and 2012 approximately $13,000 for her Legal Aid bills was paid out of the joint refinancing. She also agreed that she took $2,400 cash out of the joint credit card shortly after the date of separation. It appears that it was later paid off in the 2012 joint refinancing. It does appear that some funds went to Mr. Estrada in the refinancing but I find that Ms. Estrada did far better in the refinancing than did Mr. Estrada. However, neither party made any complaint to the lawyers involved in the refinancing about the division of the proceeds of the mortgage. I am therefore satisfied that both parties are equally responsible for the present mortgage and outstanding tax liability on the property.

33Pursuant to the Family Law Act, I should order the sale of a home. Both parties implored that I not do that. Both appear to expect that Ms. Estrada will soon be finding employment and moving closer to the children’s school. Accordingly, I will not order the property sold; however, I find that it is owned jointly by the parties and they shall both be responsible for any liabilities encumbering the title to the property. Ms. Estrada shall be responsible for the utilities and routine maintenance on the house.

Jeep

34Ms. Estrada presently drives the 2010 Jeep Patriot that is registered in the name of Mr. Estrada. In 2010, Justice Wein ordered that the vehicle be provided to Ms. Estrada and it has been in her possession since. Ms. Estrada says that she needs the Jeep to take the children to their activities and to their school.

35Ms. Estrada agrees that Mr. Estrada has always paid the insurance and the payments on the vehicle until June of this year. Since June, she has paid the insurance but he still makes the loan payments on the vehicle.

36Mr. Estrada points out that both the ownership and the loan on the vehicle are in his name. His mother is a guarantor on the debt. In cross examination, he agreed that Ms. Estrada will need the car to transport the children to school and daycare. However, he says that she should return the vehicle or pay for it.

37As long as there is a debt on the vehicle and it is partially owned by Mr. Estrada’s mother, I cannot transfer title to the Jeep. Both the lender and Mr. Estrada’s mother have an interest in this vehicle and neither are parties to this litigation. Even though Ms. Estrada has said that she will continue to make the payments on the vehicle, Mr. Estrada and his mother cannot rely on her to protect their credit. Ms. Estrada has no ability to pay for the vehicle or purchase Mr. Estrada’s interest in the vehicle. I will deal with that difficulty when I consider spousal support later in these reasons.

38Mr. Estrada values the vehicle at $12,000 as of the date of separation, October 2010. Ms. Estrada seemed to agree with that value. I have no evidence as to its condition or value at the present time. The debt on the vehicle was $10,068.13 at the date of separation. Mr. Estrada has been paying the debt and most of the insurance while Ms. Estrada has had all of the benefit. She confirmed that she is willing to buy the Jeep on the sale of the house. For the purposes of calculating an equalization payment, I have given a net value of nil. However, until the debt is paid off, the vehicle shall remain with Ms. Estrada and the children.

Other property issues

39The only other significant property issue is the parties’ debts at the date of separation. Ms. Estrada says that she had a $22,000 student loan and denies Mr. Estrada’s evidence that he had an equal student loan. For reasons set out above, I do not accept Ms. Estrada’s evidence on this point. It would not be difficult to obtain documents to confirm that liability and none were provided. In this trial, generally speaking, documents have assisted me in finding that Ms. Estrada was not telling the truth and I see no reason to accept her evidence on this point.

40Similarly, I have no documents from Mr. Estrada to confirm his debt at the time. On this evidence, I find that they had equal debt at the time of separation.

Pension

41Ms. Estrada seeks an interest in Mr. Estrada’s Canada Pension Plan credits. Pursuant to section 55.1 (1) of the Canada Pension Plan, (R.S.C., 1988, c, C-8) either party is free to apply to the Minister of Employment and Social Development for a division of those credits without the need of any order from this court.

Result

42Mr. and Ms. Estrada’s financial statements and net family property statements disclose no other significant assets or liabilities still to be divided. The end result is that their net family properties have been divided equally regardless of the date of separation. Accordingly, I find that neither party owes an equalization payment to the other.

CHILD SUPPORT

Guideline Support

43Ms. Estrada seeks child support in the same terms as Justice Emery ordered June 19, 2014. He ordered Mr. Estrada to pay $1,538 per month based on an annual income of $110,000. Mr. Estrada was also ordered to pay section 7 expenses for child care if Ms. Estrada became employed.

44Mr. Estrada is agreeable to paying child support in the amount of $1538.00 per month based on an income of $110,000. He is also content to pay his proportionate share of section 7 expenses for daycare expenses when Ms. Estrada returns to work.

S. 7 Expenses

45Although I was provided with a document that set out the charges for one daycare provider for a possible expense in the future, the children are not presently in daycare. I cannot determine what the expense might be in the future. No other s. 7 expenses were claimed. Until Ms. Estrada returns to work, I cannot determine what share each should pay. Without that information, I make no order with respect to s. 7 expenses at this time.

46This is a straight forward calculation that the parties should be able to do themselves once the income figures are available. They should not have to return to court to have this determined.

Payment Method

47Both parties agree that support should be paid directly to Ms. Estrada and not through the Family Responsibility Office. At first, Ms. Estrada wanted payments by internet transfer but in final argument, she asked that it be paid in yearly or half yearly postdated cheques.

48Rather than email the support, Mr. Estrada wishes to use cheques to show proof of the dates that they were paid and dates that they were cashed. He does not believe that emails will confirm the dates of the payments nor will they give him a receipt.

49Exhibits filed at trial show that, except in 2010, Mr. Estrada has paid support on time and is not now in arrears. The Family Responsibility Office records show that he has no arrears. I find that Mr. Estrada is reasonable in his concerns about needing good records of his payments. He should not be left to hope that Ms. Estrada will tell the truth about his payments. My own preference would be that payments would continue through the FRO however both parties describe problems with getting payments through to Ms. Estrada and concerns about Mr. Estrada’s employer being unhappy with the extra paperwork. If both parties agree to withdraw from the FRO, Mr. Estrada shall pay support on the last of day of each month for the following month by cheque payable to Ms. Estrada and she shall immediately provide a receipt for that payment.

Arrears

50Before this proceeding was commenced, Ms. Estrada brought an application in the Ontario Court. That action was commenced in 2009. In May of 2010, the action was withdrawn at the consent of both parties. The records of the FRO show that Mr. Estrada was in arrears as at March 1, 2010. Ms. Estrada asks that he reimburse her for those arrears.

51The records go on to show that by March 24, 2010, the balance had been reduced to zero based on an entry that appears to say that the order was withdrawn on March 19, 2010. Without more evidence, I cannot tell what occurred at that time. The records themselves make little sense in relation to the support order that was made. If Ms. Estrada was concerned about these arrears, the time to make an issue of this was in 2010 in the Ontario court; not here and not now. This claim is dismissed.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

Positions of the parties

52Ms. Estrada seeks spousal support in the midrange of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines of $1,791 per month. She bases that on her income of $2,163 for 2013 and Mr. Estrada’s income of $110,000.

53To date she acknowledges that he has been paying $1,538 in child support and $1,525 for the mortgage along with approximately $340 per month for car payments.

54Mr. Estrada submits that Ms. Estrada is not entitled to support. Because she has had no economic loss arising from the marriage, the parties both contributed while they were together; she should be self-supporting now. He is of the view that it was Ms. Estrada’s choice not to go to work after the children were born.

55Mr. Estrada believes that, based on Ms. Estrada’s training and experience, I should impute a salary of $40,000 to her. He points out that she has graduated with a degree in environmental engineering. He produced web information showing average incomes for engineers in the Toronto area.

56Mr. Estrada is concerned that if he is required to pay monthly spousal support directly to Ms. Estrada, she will not maintain the mortgage and the vehicle debt which will affect his mother’s credit along with his.

57He submits that spousal support should be based on his income at the time of separation 2007. That was approximately $70,000.

Ms. Estrada’s Circumstances

58She last worked as an engineer in 2001. She also worked for six months in 2008 and had a short term job as a customer service representative in 2012. She has otherwise been at home taking care of the children, now aged 9 and 13. She needs work that accommodates her obligations to the children.

59In 2007, she earned $14,424. In 2008, she earned $21,243. In 2009, she earned $21,084. In 2010, she earned $14,092. In 2011, she earned $2,462. In 2012, she earned $2,344. In 2013, she earned $2,134. These figures are not disputed.

60Mr. Estrada acknowledges that Ms. Estrada is now looking for work. He agreed that from his memory, she went to work after their first child was born but only sporadically. She may have had a job that lasted two years at most.

Mr. Estrada’s Circumstances

61Mr. Estrada is a project manager for a company that does restoration projects. He has been with the same employer for 10 years. He averaged approximately $70,000 a year prior to June 2014.

62His pay stubs for 2014 confirm an income of 70,000 in the first half of the year and an income of 110,000 for the balance of the year.

Principles of Spousal Support

63According to s.15.2 of the Divorce Act, a court may make an order requiring a spouse to pay such lump sum or periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. The court may also impose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just.

64In making such an order the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

65In making that order the court shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage.

66An order for spousal support should;

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

67Where a court is considering an application for a child support order and an application for a spousal support order, the court shall give priority to child support in determining the applications.

Analysis

i) Amount of Support

68Ms. Estrada has been out of the workforce since 2001. While she certainly has significant credentials and an ability to earn a living, at the present time it is reasonable that she is giving the children her priority. She confirms that she will be looking for work in the coming year. That is necessary and appropriate, but for now, she requires support.

69The parties have been married for 12 years. It is too early to end her support. I do not find that she has been unreasonable in taking care of the children rather than going out to work. It is not appropriate that I impute income to her for the time being.

70I have some doubts about Ms. Estrada’s financial circumstances. There is no doubt however that she is in need and Mr. Estrada has an ability to pay support. Support is generally based on the current income of the payor, not a prior year. This case is no exception. In any event, given the compensatory nature of this support, it is appropriate that Ms. Estrada share in Mr. Estrada’s increased income.

71Ms. Estrada bases her case on the midpoint of the spousal support guidelines. Based on my calculations of spousal support using the Divorcemate software, the mid-range for spousal support would be $1,777 per month. The high end of the range is $2,058. Child support of $1,538 is payable on top of that.

72I agree with Mr. Estrada that leaving Ms. Estrada responsible for the car payment and the mortgage payment would be risky for all concerned. Accordingly, pursuant to section 15.2(3) of the Divorce Act, I order that Mr. Estrada pay the monthly mortgage payment in the amount of $1,525 along with the car payment in the amount of $340 per month.

73Since Ms. Estrada wishes to keep the Jeep, that payment is for her entire benefit. However, since half of the mortgage payment is his debt as well, only half of that payment is equivalent to spousal support. The combination of the two payments is the equivalent of $1,102.50 in support. He shall pay a further $674.50 in spousal support per month until the house is sold.

74As the car debt or the mortgage is paid off, Mr. Estrada shall continue to make that payment to Ms. Estrada as spousal support.

75That payment shall be made in the same fashion as the child support set out above.

76Mr. Estrada says that his mother is a joint owner of the vehicle. As such, I cannot order the transfer of title to Ms. Estrada. However, upon the payment in full of the debt, it would seem appropriate that he attempt to transfer the title to Ms. Estrada failing which the vehicle will be returned to Mr. Estrada.

ii) Support to date

77On October 22, 2010, one week after separation, Wein J. ordered Mr. Estrada to pay the mortgage in lieu of spousal support. Based on Mr. Estrada’s income at that time until June of this year, that is a reasonable amount of support.

78Since that order, he has been paying the mortgage, the car payments and most of the insurance on the car. In considering the parties’ incomes, the sums that Mr. Estrada has been paying either in support payments or mortgage and other debt payments, he has been paying at least the correct amount of support since separation if not somewhat more than he was required in some years. I do not need to order retroactive support.

RESTRAINING ORDER

Positions of the parties

79Ms. Estrada relies on her affidavit of October 15, 2010. There, she said that she had called the police several times but Mr. Estrada continued to beat her and terrorized her until she changed the locks to the home one day when he was at work. In her evidence, she also referred to incidents that occurred in June, September and October of 2010.

80She described how she was assaulted in November 2009 and April 2010 by two women after a co-parenting time with Mr. Estrada. Because of these assaults and the harassment of the two women, she moved away from the neighborhood. There have been no threats from the women since.

81She tried to get a peace bond against Mr. Estrada but was not able to proceed.

82She acknowledged sending abusive text messages to Mr. Estrada in the summer of 2014. She said that she regretted sending those texts.

83She says that Mr. Estrada has a drinking and drug problem.

84Mr. Estrada denies that there is any reason for a restraining order. He points out that he was the one to call police after the October 2010 events. He denied that he assaulted Ms. Estrada. He denied that he threw a chair through the window or ripped the screen at the house.

85He produced lab tests that indicated that he has no alcohol or drug concerns. The tests are for different dates and different times and included a hair follicle test.

86In cross-examination, he said that he had no knowledge of what occurred between her and the two women. He denied that he had his girlfriend assault her.

87With respect to the charges against him, he said that he was charged with assault upon her three times and pled guilty to one of them in March or early 2004. The others were resolved in some other way than a conviction.

88Despite Ms. Estrada’s behavior, he continued to finance the house and maintained her interest in the property. He could have had her charged with respect to the fraudulent credit card but did not do so. He told her about his increase in income as soon as it occurred in 2014.

Analysis

89There is nothing put forward by Ms. Estrada other than her own description of these events. They are denied by Mr. Estrada. In the past, she has made complaints and the authorities have not proceeded on her allegations. Mr. Estrada has only been convicted once based on her allegations and that was when he pled guilty. There have been no events described by Ms. Estrada since 2012. The text messages of 2014 clearly show that Ms. Estrada is not fearful of Mr. Estrada. The documents support Mr. Estrada’s testimony that he has neither a drug or alcohol difficulty. Ms. Estrada’s greatest complaints are with respect to two women in 2010.

90Given Ms. Estrada’s allegations, Mr. Estrada would be wise to stay away from her when possible and have witnesses with him when not possible but there is no basis for a restraining order. That claim is dismissed.

DIVORCE

91Although both parties claimed a divorce in their originating pleadings, it does not appear that a divorce has been granted. Neither have filed the appropriate material nor paid the appropriate fee for the divorce. The issue of divorce is severed and either party may apply for a divorce on an uncontested basis.

RESULT

92Accordingly, an order shall go as follows:

1. The applicant/mother, Julia Estrada, shall have sole custody of the children namely, Pedro (Peter) Estrada born September 30, 2001 and George Estrada born March 20, 2005.

2. The Applicant/mother will consult with the Respondent/father, Pedro Estrada, with respect to any and all major decisions concerning the children and advise him in advance prior to making any major decisions.

3. The Applicant/mother will sign whatever authorizations are required in order for the Respondent/father to obtain information directly from any third party providers including the children’s schools, extracurricular activities, medical issues, etc.

4. The Applicant/mother shall be prohibited from moving on a permanent basis with the children outside of the Region of Peel without first obtaining the consent of the Respondent/father or obtaining a Court Order.

5. The Applicant/mother and Respondent/father shall have access to all medical and school records and direct contact with any third parties who are involved with the children.

6. The Applicant/mother and Respondent/father shall notify the other parent immediately in case of any emergency with respect to the children.

7. The Applicant/mother and Respondent/father shall be permitted to attend the children’s extracurricular activities and any school events even if the child is not residing with that parent at that time.

8. For the purposes of obtaining a passport renewal for the children, the Applicant/mother or Respondent/father may apply to obtain the renewal of the children’s passports. The party applying for the renewal shall obtain the written consent from the other parent or a Court Order to obtain the renewal of the children’s passports.

9. The Applicant/mother shall provide the Respondent/father the children’s passports, social insurance cards and health cards when requested by the Respondent/father. The Respondent/father will then return the above mentioned documents to the Applicant/mother when the children return to her residence.

10. The Applicant/mother and Respondent/father shall be prohibited from travelling out of the Province or Country with the children without first obtaining the written consent of the other parent.

11. The Respondent/father shall have access to the above mentioned children as follows:

a) Alternate weekends from Friday after school until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. to extend to Monday at 6:00 p.m., if the Monday is a Statutory Holiday commencing February 21, 2014;

b) Alternate Thursdays from after school until 8:00 p.m. commencing February 27, 2014.

Holiday Schedule

12. Father’s Day

a) If it is not the Respondent/father’s regular access weekend he will have the children from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

b) If the children are with the Respondent/father on Mother’s Day weekend, he will return them on Mother’s Day to the Applicant/other at 10:00 a.m.

13. Thanksgiving Holiday

a) In even numbered years, the children will be with the Applicant/mother from Friday afternoon after school until Sunday morning at 10:00 a.m. and with the Respondent/father from Sunday morning at 10:00 a.m. until Monday at 7:00 p.m. In odd numbered years, the children will be with the Respondent/father from Friday afterschool until Sunday morning at 10:00 a.m. and with the Applicant/wife from Sunday at 10:00 a.m. until Monday at 7:00 p.m.

Easter Weekend

a) In even numbered years, the children will be with the Applicant/mother from Thursday after school until Saturday morning at noon and with the Respondent/father from Saturday at noon until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. In odd numbered years, the children will be with the Respondent/father from Thursday after school until Saturday morning at noon and with the Applicant/wife from Saturday at noon until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.

14. March Break

a) In even numbered years the children will be with the Applicant/mother from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. at the commencement of March Break until Wednesday at noon and with the Respondent/father from Wednesday at noon until Friday at 5:00 p.m.

b) In odd numbered years the children will be with the Respondent/father from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. at the commencement of March Break until Wednesday at noon and they shall be with the Applicant/mother from Wednesday at noon until Friday at 5:00 p.m.

15. Christmas

a) In even numbered years the children will be with the Applicant/mother for the first week of the Christmas break at the commencement of the Christmas break from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. until Friday at 5:00 p.m. For the second week of the Christmas break the children will be with the Respondent/father from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. until Friday at 5:00 p.m.

b) In even numbered years the children will be with the Applicant/mother from 9:00 a.m. on December 25th to 6:00 p.m. on December 26th.

c) In odd numbered years the children will be with the Respondent/father for the first week of the Christmas break at the commencement of the Christmas break from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. on Friday. For the second week of the Christmas break the children will be with the Applicant/mother from Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. until Friday at 5:00 p.m.

d) In odd numbered years the children will be with the Respondent/father from 9:00 a.m. on December 25th to 6:00 p.m. on December 26th.

16. Summer Holidays

a) The children will be on a week about schedule during their summer holidays. The children will be with the Applicant/mother for the first week and then with the Respondent/father for the next week. The change over day shall be on Fridays at 5:00 p.m. The maximum amount of time the Respondent/father will spend with the children each summer shall be four weeks.

17. Commencing January 1, 2015, the respondent/father shall pay child support in the amount of $1,538 per month based on an annual income of $110,000.

18. Commencing January 1, 2015, the respondent/ father shall pay spousal support in the amount of $1,777 per month by paying the the mortgage payment in the amount of $1,525 per month, the car payment in the amount of $340 per month, and spousal support in the amount of $674.50. He shall make that payment by cheque in the month prior and she shall provide a receipt immediately. As the car debt or the mortgage is paid off, Mr. Estrada shall continue to make the payments set out above to Ms. Estrada as spousal support but, in any event, he shall pay no more than $1,777 per month.

19. The claim for an equalization payment is dismissed.

20. The Applicant’s claim for a restraining order is dismissed.

21. The issue of divorce is severed and either party may apply for a divorce on an uncontested basis.

Lemon, J.