SCC 2026

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellant to surrender himself into custody within 48 hours, with reasons to follow.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day, unanimously dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction.

Short reasons were indicated to follow.

The appellant challenged a Superior Court of Quebec decision concerning the federal election in the electoral district of Terrebonne.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

A majority allowed the appeal and annulled the federal election held on April 28, 2025, in Terrebonne.

Reasons were reserved, including on costs.

The appellant's spouse disappeared in 2008.

In 2016, the appellant obtained a declaratory judgment of death.

The respondent life insurance company subsequently applied to annul the judgment, presenting evidence that the spouse was alive and living in Iran, but failed to serve the spouse with the application.

The trial judge annulled the declaratory judgment of death, finding on a balance of probabilities that the spouse had 'returned' within the meaning of the Civil Code of Québec.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the failure to serve the spouse was a procedural defect, it did not warrant dismissal of the application as it caused no prejudice.

The Court further held that the 'return' of a person declared dead can be established by any contemporaneous manifestation that they are alive, proved on a balance of probabilities, without requiring their physical return or a higher standard of certainty.

The Crown appealed from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision acquitting the respondent of refusing to comply with a breath demand.

Police had entered a private driveway to investigate an impaired driving complaint, found the accused asleep in a running truck, knocked on the window without response, then opened the truck door and detected a strong odour of alcohol.

The majority held that police had an implied licence to enter the driveway and knock on the truck window, but exceeded that licence by opening the door, constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given society's strong interest in prosecuting the serious offence.

Four justices dissented, finding that the police exceeded the implied licence from the moment they entered the property with the intent to gather evidence, and that the evidence should be excluded.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 3 of Quebec's Reduced Contribution Regulation, which excluded refugee claimants from eligibility for subsidized childcare.

The majority found the provision created an adverse impact distinction based on sex and on refugee claimant status (an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter), and that this distinction was discriminatory as it reinforced disadvantage.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The Court read refugee claimants into s. 3 of the Regulation as an eligible category.

One justice dissented, concluding neither sex-based nor refugee-claimant-status-based discrimination was established.

The appellants challenged a criminal appeal judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral ruling the same day.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority below.

The intervener participated, but the dispositive issue was resolved by adopting the appellate majority's reasoning.

On a mootness appeal arising from pandemic-era entry restrictions, the Court exercised discretion to decide the constitutional questions on the merits.

The Court held that mobility rights under s. 6 of the Charter protect movement across provincial borders and that the challenged travel restrictions limited rights under s. 6(1) and s. 6(2).

Applying the Oakes framework, the Court found the limitations justified under s. 1 in the circumstances of a grave public health emergency.

The appeal was allowed in part, the mootness dismissal was set aside, and the lower court order was modified accordingly.

In a Crown appeal from an acquittal for attempted obstruction of justice, the Court addressed whether an accused lawyer may invoke the innocence-at-stake exception to seek access to privileged client communications.

The Court held the exception is available to accused lawyers and that the McClure framework can be adapted, but found it was premature for lower courts to find a fair-trial breach before such an application was brought.

On the Crown’s concession of a s. 8 breach arising from unauthorized monitoring of a lawyer-client call, the majority applied s. 24(2) and excluded the non-privileged portion of the intercepted call.

The majority concluded the seriousness of state conduct and privacy impact outweighed society’s strong interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was dismissed, with dissenting reasons favouring admission of the evidence and a new trial.

In a property insurance appeal, insured homeowners sought full guaranteed rebuilding costs after a total-loss flood, including legal-compliance costs imposed by conservation authority requirements.

The Court interpreted the standard form policy and guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement together, holding the compliance-cost exclusion remained operative except for the specified additional $10,000 coverage.

The majority held the exclusion’s language was unambiguous and that applying it did not nullify the endorsement’s core benefit of coverage beyond the policy limit.

Dissenting reasons would have allowed broader recovery at least for compliance costs tied to laws in force at renewal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a trial ruling under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act that permitted cross-examination on prior convictions after a Corbett application in a murder jury trial.

The Court clarified the Corbett framework, emphasizing that admissibility turns on whether convictions meaningfully support a credibility inference and whether prejudice, including moral and propensity prejudice, outweighs probative value.

The majority held the trial judge erred by admitting youth and certain violent convictions, but applied the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

Concurring judges would have found no reviewable Corbett error and dismissed the appeal on that basis.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction was upheld.

The appellant challenged a criminal appeal decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

It held that the appeal should be dismissed substantially for the reasons of the majority in the provincial appellate court.

The appeal was dismissed.