S. Armstrong

The plaintiff's wife died of metastatic breast cancer after suffering a fall that caused fractures.

The plaintiff claimed accidental death benefits under an employer-provided group insurance policy, which was denied by the insurer because the death was caused by illness, not an accident.

The plaintiff sued the employer, Chrysler, alleging negligent misrepresentation regarding the policy terms, negligent selection of the insurer, and negligent infliction of mental distress.

Chrysler moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue for trial as the employer's benefit summaries contained clear disclaimers directing employees to the actual policy wording, and the employer's conduct was not flagrant, outrageous, or malicious.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer a motor vehicle negligence action from the Superior Court of Justice to the Small Claims Court after concluding that the value of her claim for pain and suffering would fall within the Small Claims Court jurisdiction once the statutory deductible under the Insurance Act was applied.

She argued that subsequent workplace injuries constituted a change in circumstances that would reduce the value of her claim.

The defendant opposed the transfer, arguing prejudice arising from litigation strategy and costs incurred defending a $100,000 Superior Court action.

The court held that no material change in circumstances had been demonstrated and that transferring the action would be unfair to the defendant, who had structured his defence based on the plaintiff’s original claim and forum.

The motion to transfer was therefore dismissed.

In a proposed class action alleging a price‑fixing conspiracy in the optical disc drive (ODD) market contrary to common law and s. 45 of the Competition Act, the plaintiff sought leave to amend the claim to add eighteen additional corporate defendants.

The defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that limitation periods under the Limitations Act and s. 36(4) of the Competition Act had expired.

The court held that at the pleadings amendment stage it was inappropriate to make definitive findings on discoverability or the expiry of limitation periods where the evidentiary record was incomplete.

Although the plaintiff’s evidence regarding due diligence was thin, the court concluded it would be unfair to refuse the amendment solely on the deficient record.

The motion was adjourned to permit the plaintiff to file additional evidence addressing discoverability and diligence.