Sam Rogers

The moving party, a church, sought an injunction restraining the termination of its commercial lease by the landlord pending its appeal of a decision validating a 30-day notice of termination.

The Court of Appeal granted the injunction, finding that the interpretation of conflicting lease amendments raised a serious issue to be tried, the church would suffer irreparable harm due to its extensive charitable operations and the risk of the appeal becoming moot, and the balance of convenience favoured the church as it continued to pay rent.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against two pediatric neurologists for their treatment of an infant's intractable seizures in 2003.

The infant suffered from a rare condition, pyridoxine-dependent epilepsy (PDE).

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care by setting an insufficient observation period during a pyridoxine empirical trial, improperly concluding the treatment was ineffective, and failing to reconsider pyridoxine when seizures returned.

The court also found the defendants breached their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to advise the parents of the trial and alternative treatment options.

The court concluded these breaches caused or contributed to the infant's severe intellectual and developmental delay.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against three obstetricians and a hospital regarding the birth of the infant plaintiff.

The mother alleged that she did not consent to the use of a vacuum or forceps during delivery, claiming medical battery and lack of informed consent.

She also alleged that the doctors breached the standard of care in their antenatal record keeping, failure to recommend a Caesarean section earlier, and the decision to attempt a vacuum and forceps-assisted delivery.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the mother had provided informed consent to the use of the instruments in the face of an urgent obstetrical situation involving fetal distress.

The court also found that the doctors met the standard of care in all respects and that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the neonatal injuries caused the infant plaintiff's subsequent neurodevelopmental limitations.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) brought an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing mature trees and commencing construction of a subway station on the historic Osgoode Hall site.

The LSO argued that Metrolinx's actions required municipal approval under s. 33(1) of the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding no serious issue to be tried because s. 33(1) does not apply to neighboring property owners or to prescribed public bodies like Metrolinx, which are governed by a separate statutory regime.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the critical public transit project to proceed.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing 11 trees on its property near Osgoode Hall, pending adequate engagement regarding the Ontario Line subway project.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that HDI would suffer no irreparable harm as the trees were not historically unique and would be replaced, and that monetary damages would suffice for any compensation claims.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience strongly favoured Metrolinx due to the severe financial and public interest consequences of delaying the transit project.

The defendants brought a motion at the commencement of trial to exclude a late-served expert radiology report from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued the report was necessary for a fair determination on the merits, as it analyzed actual CT images rather than relying on previous radiology reports.

The court found the evidence relevant, probative, and necessary.

The court granted leave to admit the late-served report and adjourned the trial to allow the defendants to obtain a responding radiologist's report.

The parents of a one-year-old infant who suffered a catastrophic brain injury appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had found that the parents failed to comply with the principles of substitute decision-making under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 by refusing to consent to the withdrawal of life support proposed by the treating physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board made no error in its objective assessment that the withdrawal of life support was in the infant's best interests, given her irreversible condition and lack of any prospect of recovery.

The appellants, parents of an infant with a catastrophic brain injury, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision directing them to consent to a palliative care treatment plan proposed by the treating physician.

As the parents' legal aid certificates did not cover the appeals and the matter was highly urgent, the court issued a procedural direction appointing their previous counsel and the infant's counsel as amicus curiae to ensure the appeals could proceed fairly and quickly without waiting for Legal Aid Ontario decisions.

The moving parties, subcontractors on a mining project, sought leave to intervene in an application brought by the project owners to set aside an arbitral award in favour of the general contractor.

The arbitral award included damages for the subcontractors' lost profits and standby charges.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene, finding that the subcontractors' financial interest in the outcome did not constitute a legal interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, which concerned the construction of the contracts between the owners and the general contractor.

The court also held that the subcontractors would not make a useful contribution to the issues on the application.

The plaintiff attended the emergency department after suffering multiple stab wounds, including one to his right knee.

The defendant emergency physician assessed the wounds as superficial, sutured them, and discharged the plaintiff.

Weeks later, an MRI revealed a completely transected patellar tendon, requiring complex reconstructive surgery due to the delay.

The court found that the tendon was completely transected at the time of the initial emergency visit.

The defendant breached the standard of care by failing to properly assess the knee's extensor mechanism, failing to detect air in the knee joint on x-rays, and failing to refer the plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon.

The court concluded that this negligence caused the delayed diagnosis and worsened the plaintiff's outcome.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Following a 71-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $10 million in damages, the plaintiffs sought costs of approximately $8.5 million on a substantial indemnity basis or $5.3 million on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that substantial indemnity costs were unwarranted and that the partial indemnity claim included costs for interlocutory matters already decided.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the defendants to justify an elevated scale of costs.

Applying the partial indemnity scale and deducting amounts attributable to prior interlocutory motions, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $4,900,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff construction manager brought an action against the defendant developer for unpaid invoices totaling over $1 million.

The defendant counterclaimed for delay damages, costs to rectify deficiencies, and return of construction management fees, alleging the plaintiff failed to perform its contractual obligations.

The court found that the parties had varied the written contract by their conduct and that the plaintiff was not responsible for any of the project delays, which were caused by the defendant's failure to provide a completed design and obtain permits on time.

The court also held that the plaintiff was not liable for construction deficiencies, as those were the responsibility of the trades.

The plaintiff was awarded $644,871.69 for unpaid invoices, with deductions made for overcharges and unproven payments.

This is the damages phase of a multi-party action brought by 28 former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre.

In the liability phase, the defendants (two psychiatrists and the Crown) were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and battery for subjecting the plaintiffs to experimental and harmful psychiatric programs (DDT, Capsule, and MAPP) between the 1960s and 1980s.

The court assessed general, punitive, and income loss damages on an individual basis.

General damages were awarded to all plaintiffs, ranging from nominal amounts to over $2 million for the most severely impacted.

Punitive damages were awarded in cases involving particularly egregious conduct, such as the treatment of underage patients or the administration of alcohol to known alcoholics.

Income loss claims were largely limited or barred by the ex turpi causa doctrine, which prevented recovery for periods the plaintiffs spent lawfully incarcerated or institutionalized for subsequent criminal offenses.

The defendants sought to dismiss two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The actions involved allegations of improper disclosure of medical information and forged consent, which had already been conclusively dismissed in a prior summary judgment motion.

The court found that the new actions were an attempt to relitigate the same issues, constituting an improper collateral attack and res judicata.

The actions were dismissed as an abuse of process.

The defendants requested the court to issue a formal judgment following the liability phase of a bifurcated trial to establish res judicata for the upcoming damages phase.

The plaintiffs consented to the form of the draft judgment but argued it was unnecessary at this stage.

The court declined to issue the formal judgment, finding that the trial is a single proceeding and a comprehensive judgment should be issued after the damages phase is completed, though the liability findings remain binding.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

The plaintiff, a diabetic patient, brought a medical malpractice action against her family physician after requiring a below-knee amputation due to an undiagnosed neuropathic fracture (Charcot foot).

The plaintiff alleged the physician breached the standard of care by failing to order timely imaging or refer her to an orthopedic specialist.

The court found that the physician's treatment did not fall below the standard of care, noting that the condition was rare and not detected by other specialists who examined the plaintiff during the same period.

Although the court concluded that timely imaging would likely have saved the leg, the action was dismissed because the standard of care was not breached.

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.