M. Bordin

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against two pediatric neurologists for their treatment of an infant's intractable seizures in 2003.

The infant suffered from a rare condition, pyridoxine-dependent epilepsy (PDE).

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care by setting an insufficient observation period during a pyridoxine empirical trial, improperly concluding the treatment was ineffective, and failing to reconsider pyridoxine when seizures returned.

The court also found the defendants breached their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to advise the parents of the trial and alternative treatment options.

The court concluded these breaches caused or contributed to the infant's severe intellectual and developmental delay.

The applicant mortgagee sought an order setting aside a purported tenancy agreement after obtaining default judgment and a writ of possession against the mortgagors.

On the scheduled eviction date, the occupants produced a lease that the court found to be fabricated, noting numerous discrepancies including forged signatures and dates predating the mortgagors' ownership.

The court declared the occupants to be occupants rather than tenants, set aside the purported lease under section 52 of the Mortgages Act, and ordered vacant possession within 30 days.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on a business loan against the corporate borrower and the individual guarantor.

The individual defendant argued she was told by a representative of the plaintiff that she would not be personally liable on the guarantee.

The court utilized its expanded fact-finding powers to hear oral evidence from the individual defendant.

The court found the defendant's evidence lacked credibility and concluded she knew she was guaranteeing the loan.

Summary judgment was granted for the outstanding loan amount.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after stabbing a stranger who was trying to help him.

The accused conceded he caused the death but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the psychotic episode was solely substance-induced due to the accused's heavy drug use.

The court applied the holistic approach, considering the internal cause and continuing danger factors, and found the accused suffered from a pre-existing delusional disorder that was operative at the time of the offence.

The court concluded the accused lacked the capacity to know his act was morally wrong and rendered a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The plaintiff sued its former lawyer's estate and professional corporation for negligence and breach of contract after the lawyer allowed a construction lien to expire by failing to set the action down for trial within two years.

The defendants conceded the breach of the standard of care but disputed causation and damages, arguing the plaintiff failed to mitigate by not enforcing a related judgment and that the property lacked sufficient equity.

The court found the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in relying on the lawyer's advice that the lien was valid.

Assessing the complex evidence on the contaminated property's retrospective value, the court determined there was equity in the property and fixed damages at $472,000.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant to attend examinations for discovery, and the defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, arguing they were undischarged bankrupts and nominal plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the motion for security for costs, finding that the individual plaintiff was not a nominal plaintiff and that it would not be just to order security given the plaintiffs' strong case on the merits that their financial ruin was caused by the defendants' actions.

The court granted the motion to compel discovery, ordering the defendant to attend by video in short increments to accommodate his health issues.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against the school board, principal, and vice-principal for injuries sustained by the student plaintiff during a schoolyard assault by other students.

The plaintiffs alleged that the school failed to properly supervise the students and investigate prior incidents of bullying, which culminated in an assault that caused permanent tinnitus.

The court found that while the school breached the standard of care in failing to investigate a prior incident and losing an accident report, these breaches did not cause the assault, which was a sudden and unexpected event during a hidden game of tackle football.

The claim was dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to establish cause in fact.

The applicant moved to set aside a final order that terminated her spousal support, claiming she had no notice of the respondent's motion to change.

The court found that the respondent had obtained an order for substituted service and had served the applicant via her daughter and Facebook Messenger.

The court concluded that the applicant was either ignoring the proceedings or willfully blind to them.

Applying the Mountain View Farms factors, the court held that the applicant failed to provide a plausible explanation for her default and did not establish an arguable case on the merits, as she had significant assets and the support had been paid for 19 years.

The motion to set aside the order was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary the interim parenting schedule to a 2-2-3 schedule.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion to maintain the current schedule and requested an updated voice of the child report or the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The court reviewed a previous voice of the child report which indicated the children struggled with short transitions.

Finding that the status quo was not in the children's best interests, the court granted the father's motion to implement a 2-2-3 schedule to minimize transitions and dismissed the mother's request for further assessments.

The applicant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, brought an application to challenge the validity of a handwritten will leaving a condominium to the respondent church.

The respondent brought a motion for directions challenging the applicant's standing and seeking to limit her to a dependant support claim.

The applicant moved to strike portions of the respondent's relief and hearsay evidence in affidavits.

The court held that it was premature to determine the applicant's standing to challenge the will until she commenced a dependant support claim, for which the court extended the limitation period.

The court also found the respondent's requests for directions premature and declined to strike the hearsay evidence at the motion stage, leaving it for the application judge.

The applicant, a non-profit housing corporation providing affordable and rent-geared-to-income housing, sought a declaration that its three properties were exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)12(iii) of the Assessment Act.

The respondents conceded the applicant served the poor but argued it was not 'organized for the relief of the poor' as required by the exemption.

Applying binding appellate authority, the court found that because the applicant's operations were fully funded by government subsidies and tenant rents, and its day-to-day management was outsourced to a for-profit entity, it did not provide relief through its own endeavors or funds.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant guarantor on a personal guarantee and a collateral mortgage securing a corporate credit facility.

The defendant argued there were genuine issues for trial, including that the bank took excessive security, failed to advise him to obtain independent legal advice, and breached its duty of honest performance.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that the documentary evidence clearly established the terms of the security, the defendant was not owed a fiduciary duty, and the lack of independent legal advice did not invalidate the guarantee.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.