R. Paul Marshall

The applicants, a French-language public school board and a parent, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to suspend new regulations enacted by the Ontario Federation of School Athletics Associations (OFSAA).

The applicants argued that the regulations, which restricted students outside designated attendance zones from participating in OFSAA-sanctioned competitions in their designated sport, violated section 23 of the Charter by disproportionately impacting minority language students attending a specialized sports-study program.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious constitutional issue, irreparable harm due to the potential assimilation and loss of students, and a balance of convenience favouring the applicants.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

Parents brought an application alleging that the refusal to provide a door‑to‑door school bus stop for their children attending a French-language Catholic elementary school violated their rights under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They sought an order compelling the school transportation consortium to provide a stop directly in front of their residence.

The court held that the consortium’s transportation decisions were subject to Charter scrutiny because the consortium exercised a governmental function delegated by school boards.

However, the applicants failed to demonstrate that the existing bus stops, located approximately 60 metres and 150 metres from the residence, created a meaningful barrier to access to French-language education.

The court concluded that the inconvenience of walking that distance did not constitute a denial of minority-language education rights under s. 23.

The defendant sought costs following a motion that combined a motion to strike the statement of claim and a motion for summary judgment.

The court had previously indicated the original pleading disclosed no viable cause of action and permitted the plaintiff to file a fresh amended statement of claim with costs thrown away.

The defendant claimed over $115,000 in costs, arguing the amended pleading introduced entirely new causes of action and rendered extensive preparation for the summary judgment motion wasted.

The court held that the costs relating to the summary judgment motion should be treated as costs in the cause because it was unclear whether the motion would ultimately have succeeded or whether it had been premature under the principles articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch.

Costs for the successful motion to strike were fixed and ordered payable immediately, while the balance relating to summary judgment was deferred pending the outcome of the action.