Roy McMurtry

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of contract and negligent performance regarding the construction of a golf course reservoir.

On appeal, they brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, which had not been pleaded at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the amendment were allowed post-trial.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in finding that the respondents complied with the amended agreement and that the agreement did not stipulate an average depth for the reservoir.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The respondent, a federal employee working in Saskatchewan, brought a constructive dismissal action in Ontario after experiencing workplace harassment in Saskatchewan and resigning due to a delayed response to his grievance from Ottawa.

The Crown appealed the motions judge's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, the claim arose in Saskatchewan where the employment and harassment occurred, not in Ontario where the delayed response originated.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of s. 16(1.02) of the Young Offenders Act.

The issue was whether an oral application for a transfer to youth court made before a justice of the peace constituted an application made in 'youth court'.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that a justice of the peace does not preside over a 'youth court' as defined in the Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's decision was set aside, without prejudice to a future defence application in the proper court.