Ritchie

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

He had a prior conviction from 1969 for being a party to a robbery where a firearm was used, which occurred before the enactment of the firearm offence provisions.

The trial judge imposed a one-year consecutive sentence as a first offence, but the Court of Appeal substituted a three-year minimum sentence for a subsequent offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the wording of the Criminal Code explicitly applied to prior offences and that being a party to an offence under section 21 was sufficient to trigger the subsequent offence provisions.

The appellant's husband owed an antecedent debt to the respondent and gave post-dated cheques.

The respondent later requested a promissory note, which both the husband and the appellant signed.

The appellant received no consideration for her signature and claimed she signed only to accommodate her husband and bolster the respondent's bank credit.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no consideration flowing to the appellant, she was liable as an accommodation party under s. 55 of the Bills of Exchange Act because the respondent was a holder for value.

The appellant appealed a conviction for trafficking in heroin, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to advert to the danger of acting on uncorroborated accomplice evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate to support the conviction, especially given that the accomplice's evidence was accepted and there was, in fact, corroboration.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision refusing a writ of prohibition against a Youth Court judge who proceeded with a robbery charge against a juvenile under the federal Juvenile Delinquents Act and Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the provincial Youth Protection Act precluded such proceedings unless brought in accordance with its provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 455 of the Criminal Code is valid federal legislation and that the relevant sections of the provincial Youth Protection Act are rendered inoperative in this context due to paramountcy, as they conflict with the valid federal criminal process.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario sought to compel RCMP officers to disclose the identities of physicians and hospital employees who had provided patients' medical information to the police without authorization.

The officers claimed police-informer privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police-informer privilege is a rule of law that applies generally, including in civil proceedings and public inquiries, to protect the identity of those who furnish information to the police in the course of their duties.

The privilege belongs to the Crown and is not defeated by the fact that the informants may have breached a duty of confidentiality in providing the information.

The appeal was allowed and the officers were not required to disclose the identities.

The appellants were acquitted at trial of unlawfully importing heroin.

The trial judge found a reasonable doubt regarding the nature of the substance because the analyst had compared the suspect substance's graph to a standard graph of unknown preparation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, assuming the standard graph was prepared in Ottawa.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellants' appeal and restored the acquittals.

The Court held that the trial judge's factual determination regarding the analyst's procedure could not be overturned on a Crown appeal limited to questions of law.

Furthermore, the analyst's reliance on an unverified standard graph constituted 'evidence to the contrary' under s. 9 of the Narcotic Control Act, which was capable of rebutting the presumption created by the certificate of analysis.

The appellant obtained writs of evocation from decisions of the Professions Tribunal, which had quashed a Discipline Committee's decision.

The Superior Court held that the wide powers conferred upon the Professions Tribunal, combined with privative clauses, offended s. 96 of the B.N.A. Act by effectively creating a s. 96 court.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial legislature cannot constitutionally insulate a statutory tribunal from curial review of its decisions on questions of jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the Superior Court judgments restored.

The appellant, a juvenile charged under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, appealed a decision allowing radio stations to attend and report on his trial.

The central issue was whether the requirement in s. 12(1) of the Act that trials of children take place 'without publicity' meant the proceedings must be held in camera.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'without publicity' means in camera, thereby excluding the public and media from attending juvenile trials, despite the general rule that trials be held in open court.

The appellant was the top candidate in two closed competitions for clerical positions with the RCMP but was denied the required 'Top Secret Security Clearance' without reasons.

She appealed the subsequent appointments of lower-ranked candidates to the Public Service Commission Appeal Board, which allowed her appeal on the basis that it could review the reasonableness of the security clearance denial.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the requirement of a security clearance is a condition of appointment within management's authority, not an evaluation of relative merit under the Public Service Employment Act, and therefore cannot be reviewed by an Appeal Board under section 21.

The appellant, Nova, appealed decisions of the Public Utilities Board of Alberta varying the rates it charged for transporting natural gas.

The respondent producers had complained about Nova's depreciation rates and income tax calculations.

The Board ordered variations to these components retroactively to the beginning of the year.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board had the authority to make retroactive orders to the date of the complaint, could deal with specific components of the rates without a general inquiry into overall reasonableness, and had jurisdiction to determine the method of calculating income taxes for rate-making purposes without improperly directing how the company paid its actual taxes.

The appellant bank, owner of a commercial building, installed diesel-powered electrical generators for back-up power.

The appellant applied for a declaration that the generators were exempt from consumption or sales tax under the Excise Tax Act, arguing it was a manufacturer or producer of goods (electricity).

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant manufactured electricity when its generators were in operation and that the Act did not restrict the definition of manufacturing to exclude such operations.

The appellant was charged with a summary conviction offence under the Game Act.

The trial judge quashed the information for multiplicity.

The Court of Queen's Bench issued mandamus ordering the trial to proceed.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to allow the Crown to elect which charge to proceed upon, provided the information could be amended without injustice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, endorsing the Court of Appeal's practical approach, noting there was no express prohibition against multiple charges in the provincial Summary Convictions Act.

The appellants, Swiss nationals residing in Switzerland, were charged in Manitoba with fraud.

Because Swiss law prevents the extradition of its citizens, Canada requested that Switzerland prosecute them pursuant to an 1880 treaty.

Swiss investigating judges sought to take commission evidence in Canada for the pre-trial stage of the Swiss proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the order granting the commission, finding that section 43 of the Canada Evidence Act should be interpreted liberally to fulfill Canada's international treaty obligations, even if the evidence was for pre-trial use.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a bill of lading.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that section 4 of the conditions attached to the bill of lading did not preclude the respondents' claim for consequential damages.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of conspiracy to import a narcotic.

The respondent did not file a factum, did not appear, and was unrepresented.

Given that the respondent had been acquitted in two lower courts and the appeal raised difficult questions of law, the Supreme Court of Canada adjourned the appeal to allow the Department of Justice to appoint an amicus curiae.

The appellant was acquitted of rape at trial after the judge excluded the complainant's sister's testimony regarding an early complaint.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in not leaving the sister's evidence to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a complaint is any statement by the alleged victim that has probative value in negating adverse conclusions from silence.

The Court clarified that the trial judge's role on a voir dire is to determine if there is some evidence of a complaint, its spontaneity, and whether it was made at the first reasonable opportunity, but the ultimate weighing of conflicting evidence regarding the complaint's existence is for the jury.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling.

At trial, his counsel waived the holding of a voir dire regarding the voluntariness of a statement made to police.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire despite the waiver, and in failing to conduct one to determine if the statement was actually made or after the appellant testified about alleged threats and inducements.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an accused or their counsel may expressly waive a voir dire, and that the trial judge did not err in his exercise of discretion.

The appellant vendor and respondent purchaser were negotiating a real estate transaction.

The purchaser made a counter offer and requested the vendor to initial the changes and return the agreement 'as soon as possible'.

The vendor initialled the changes within the time limit but the mailed acceptance was received after the deadline.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the closing words of the purchaser's letter indicated that prompt return of the initialled document would satisfy any formal provision for acceptance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment finding a valid contract was restored.

The appellant was charged with robbery and using a firearm.

During the preliminary inquiry, the appellant re-elected to be tried by a magistrate.

The magistrate granted the motion, took a plea, and continued the proceedings as a trial.

However, the evidence adduced prior to the re-election was inadvertently not read into the trial record.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused can only be convicted on evidence legally adduced before the trier of fact during the trial.

Since the preliminary inquiry evidence was not read into the record, the conviction could not stand.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with possession of unlawfully imported goods under the Customs Act.

The Crown proved possession and foreign origin, relying on a reverse onus provision to establish unlawful importation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that applying the reverse onus without the Crown showing some knowledge or means of knowledge of the importation by the accused would impose an impossible burden, violating the presumption of innocence under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.