Richelle M. Pollard

The plaintiffs brought a motion to stay the defendant's counterclaim pending the payment of approximately $138,000 in costs from previous unsuccessful motions, or alternatively, for an order requiring payment by a specific date.

The defendant sought an extension of 45 days to pay the costs, citing financial difficulties and an upcoming commercial closing that would provide funds.

The court balanced the need to enforce its orders with the context of the complex litigation and granted the defendant's request for an extension.

The court ordered that if the costs were not paid by the extended deadline, the counterclaim would be stayed.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a prior decision dismissing his motion to vary the terms of an interim injunction issued on consent.

The court considered rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It concluded that the moving party failed to meet the required onus under either branch of the rule.

The issues raised, while important to the parties, were not of sufficient importance to justify appellate review.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs, former insurance advisors affiliated with a large financial services company, sought payment of monthly “CORe” commissions following termination of their advisory agreements.

The agreements provided that post‑termination commissions would cease if the advisor advised, counselled, or induced clients to replace or cancel policies serviced through the company.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs breached those conditions by soliciting and transitioning hundreds of clients and significant assets to a competing business after termination.

The court held that CORe payments were conditional incentives rather than vested compensation and found that the plaintiffs had engaged in systematic replacement activities contrary to the agreements.

Relief from forfeiture and equitable claims such as quantum meruit were rejected, and the action was dismissed.

The defendant, Daniel Sherk, brought a motion to vary a consent interlocutory injunction that prohibited him from soliciting or servicing clients of his former employer, Verge Insurance Brokers Limited.

He sought to suspend and amend the injunction under Rules 59.06(2)(b) and (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the restrictive covenants had expired and the court had inherent jurisdiction to vary the order.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that a consent order can only be varied on the same grounds as a contract can be rectified, and that the court's inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the express provisions of the Rules or to upset a fairly negotiated bargain.

The respondent requested an order barring the applicant from adding new allegations to his human rights application through his witness statement and from seeking remedies beyond those set out in the application.

The Tribunal held that the applicant could only rely on allegations that were raised with some particularity in the Application or Reply.

Several new allegations in the witness statement were excluded.

However, the Tribunal granted the applicant's request to amend the monetary and non-monetary remedies sought, noting that the Tribunal retains discretion to determine appropriate remedies if a Code violation is found.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), an intervenor in a case challenging the constitutionality of section 25(2.1) of the Human Rights Code, requested an extension of time to file an expert report in reply to the respondent's expert report on labour relations.

The respondent and the Attorney General opposed the request, citing prejudice and delay.

The Tribunal granted the extension, finding that the contents of the respondent's expert report could not have been fully anticipated and that procedural fairness favoured allowing the OHRC to provide rebuttal evidence regarding section 1 of the Charter.

The Tribunal concluded that the extension would not cause undue prejudice as the opposing parties would still have sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination.

The applicant alleged age discrimination under the Human Rights Code after his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found unconstitutional.

Two teachers' unions, OECTA and ETFO, sought intervenor status to address the constitutional issues.

The respondent and the Attorney General requested limitations on their participation, including a requirement to act jointly.

The Tribunal granted the unions full intervenor status without the requested limitations, finding that their perspectives on the administration of benefits and the impact on older workers would assist the Tribunal in this significant constitutional challenge.

The applicant alleged that the respondent school board breached the Human Rights Code on the basis of age when his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found to be unconstitutional.

The Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) requested to intervene in the constitutional challenge.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that OCUFA has a significant interest in the issues and will make a special contribution to the case given its longstanding advocacy regarding mandatory retirement and the rights of faculty working past age 65.

A former senior executive sued for wrongful dismissal after termination without cause.

The dispute concerned whether a later employment document replaced an earlier agreement containing a 12‑month severance clause, the appropriate reasonable notice period, and entitlement to bonus payments.

The court held the later document constituted a new employment agreement that displaced the earlier severance provision, leaving notice to be determined under the common law.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded a 12‑month reasonable notice period despite the employee’s relatively short tenure and rejected the employer’s proposed three‑month period.

The court also denied the employee’s claim to bonus payments because the bonus plan required active employment at the payout date.

The plaintiffs brought motions for an interlocutory injunction and for production of documents against the defendants, who were former employees and a competing insurance brokerage.

The injunction motion was settled and the production motion was stayed.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of over $390,000, arguing the defendants unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings and engaged in wrongdoing.

The court found the injunction component of the action was effectively spent, justifying fixing costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $255,237, apportioned equally among the three responding defendants, after making deductions for services not directly related to the motions.

The applicant, a teacher, alleged age discrimination and reprisal after his health benefits ceased at age 65.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that section 25(2.1) of the Human Rights Code provides a complete defence to the age discrimination claim regarding benefits, meaning it has no reasonable prospect of success unless the applicant's constitutional challenge to that section succeeds.

The Tribunal also dismissed the reprisal claim, finding no evidence that the respondent threatened or took adverse action against the applicant when it negotiated a bridge funding agreement with his union.

A former senior banking executive sought recovery of forfeited restricted share units under an employer’s long-term compensation plan after resigning to start a hedge fund.

The plan provided that restricted share units would mature and be paid in cash three years after grant, but would be forfeited if the employee resigned before the maturity date.

The plaintiff argued that the forfeiture-on-resignation provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was therefore unenforceable.

The court held that the provision merely conditioned entitlement to deferred compensation on continued service and did not restrict the employee’s ability to work elsewhere.

Because the awards had not vested prior to maturity and the forfeiture was triggered solely by resignation rather than post-employment conduct, the clause was valid and enforceable.

The defendant appealed an interlocutory order that dismissed his motion to strike the plaintiffs' civil contempt motion for lack of particulars, but ordered the plaintiffs to provide clear and concise particulars.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the motions judge erred in applying the test for adequate particulars by failing to recognize the strictissimi juris nature of civil contempt proceedings.

The court also held that the motions judge erred in principle by granting the plaintiffs an unsolicited right to amend their defective motion without balancing the relevant factors.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action seeking damages equivalent to 24 months’ reasonable notice after being dismissed without cause following more than 22 years of employment.

The defendant argued that the notice period should be between 12 and 16 months and that the plaintiff failed to reasonably mitigate her damages.

The court held that the motion record was inadequate to resolve conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff’s mitigation efforts and the availability of comparable employment opportunities, both of which are relevant to determining reasonable notice under the Bardal factors.

Because credibility assessments and fuller evidence were required, the court found genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the matter was scheduled for a two‑day trial.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing because his spouse was undergoing medical treatment for a life-threatening illness.

The respondent objected to the request.

The Tribunal found that the seriousness of the illness and treatment constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying the adjournment under its Practice Direction.

The adjournment was granted.

Following an application proceeding, the court considered written submissions regarding costs.

The applicant argued that because the respondents had not objected to proceeding by way of application, the issue of costs should be determined by the trial judge.

The court agreed that the trial judge would be better positioned to assess any costs thrown away as a result of the application and noted that the record lacked sufficient evidence regarding the parties’ positions on the procedural choice.

The court therefore declined to determine costs at this stage.

Following an unsuccessful motion by the defendant to dismiss a contempt motion, the court addressed costs.

Although the defendant did not succeed on the motion, the court found merit in the defendant’s complaints regarding the organization and drafting of the plaintiffs’ materials, which were described as poorly organized and “reader hostile.” Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the parties’ conduct and its impact on the duration and efficiency of the proceeding.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conduct justified a costs award against them despite their success on the motion.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay a civil contempt motion arising from an alleged breach of a prior injunction restricting dealings with former firm clients.

The defendant argued the contempt motion lacked sufficient particulars, served no purpose because the underlying order had expired, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that although the materials were poorly organized and lacked clarity, the defendant had not demonstrated a complete absence of fair notice of the allegations.

The court also found that the expiry of the order did not eliminate the public interest in enforcing respect for court orders and that the high threshold for abuse of process had not been met.

The motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding was refused, but the plaintiffs were ordered to serve clear and concise particulars of the alleged contempt.

A former bank employee brought an application seeking payment of allegedly outstanding bonuses under a Restricted Share Unit plan following his resignation.

The employer denied liability on the basis that the plan provided for forfeiture of unvested units upon resignation.

The applicant argued that the forfeiture provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was unconscionable.

The court held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the provision constituted an enforceable restraint of trade and concluded that the issues raised involved material factual disputes.

The court determined that the matter was not properly brought by way of application and directed that submissions be made regarding continuation of the proceeding as a trial.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to services on the basis of disability.

The applicant repeatedly failed to comply with Tribunal directions regarding disclosure, witness statements, and attendance at a conference call.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed as an abuse of process.

After the applicant failed to respond to the request or subsequent Tribunal directions, the Tribunal found that the applicant had abandoned the application and dismissed it.