Richard Minster

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision and interim decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal in respect to the questions of law identified in the moving parties' factum.

Consistent with the court's usual practice, no reasons were provided for the leave decision.

The appellants in a property assessment appeal brought a motion under Rule 99 of the Assessment Review Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure to clarify a prior disclosure decision.

They requested an order declaring the previously ordered disclosure confidential under Rule 89 and requiring the respondents to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) before receiving the documents.

The Board denied the motion, finding no misstatement or ambiguity in the prior decision.

The Board also held that the request for a confidentiality order was premature and that existing protections, including section 53 of the Assessment Act and the implied undertaking rule, were sufficient to protect the appellants' commercially sensitive information without the need for NDAs.

The appellants brought a motion requesting the Assessment Review Board clarify a previous disclosure order pursuant to Rule 99, declare the ordered disclosure confidential under Rule 89, and require the respondents to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) prior to receiving the documents.

The Board dismissed the motion, finding no ambiguity in the previous decision that required clarification.

The request for a confidentiality order was deemed premature as no documents had yet been filed with the Board.

Finally, the Board declined to make disclosure conditional on NDAs, noting that existing protections under section 53 of the Assessment Act and the implied undertaking rule were sufficient to address the appellants' concerns regarding commercial sensitivity.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that reclassified its student residence from the residential property class to the multi-residential property class.

The Board's decision relied on a previous ruling to interpret the term 'self-contained unit'.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding there was reason to doubt the legal correctness of the Board's statutory interpretation and that the issue was of sufficient importance, as it affected over 80 properties and established a new approach to defining self-contained units.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 38.11 to set aside portions of a partition and sale order made after he failed to appear at the application hearing.

The court found that the failure to appear was due to an administrative mistake by his newly retained counsel.

Applying the five-part test for setting aside an order, the court determined that the moving party moved forthwith, would suffer prejudice if the order stood, and had an arguable case on the merits regarding his claim for a constructive trust over the property.

The motion was granted, the disputed portions of the order were set aside, and the remaining issues were stayed in favour of an ongoing family law proceeding between the parties.

The appellant, a not-for-profit organization operating a student residence, appealed the reclassification of its property from the residential to the multi-residential property tax class.

The appellant argued the property should remain in the residential class because the units were not self-contained and the property was used on a seasonal basis.

The Assessment Review Board found that the property was not used on a seasonal basis as it was open year-round.

Applying a prior Board decision, the Board determined that the physical layout of the suites, which included shared kitchens and bathrooms, met the definition of self-contained units.

The Board also held that equity does not apply to property classification.

The appeal was dismissed and the multi-residential classification was upheld.

The appellant applied for a property tax refund under s. 357(1)(d)(ii) of the Municipal Act, 2001, arguing its commercial property was damaged by demolition during its conversion from a movie theatre to a fitness facility.

The City denied the application, arguing the work was a repair or renovation and that the appellant was already receiving a vacant unit rebate under s. 364.

The Assessment Review Board allowed the appeal, finding no statutory impediment to contemporaneous relief under both sections.

The Board concluded the property was damaged by partial demolition, rendering it substantially unusable for its previous purpose, and ordered a tax refund of $49,744.17.

The moving party, a commercial tenant responsible for property taxes, sought to reinstate assessment appeals for the 2013-2016 tax years.

The property owner had previously filed the appeals but subsequently withdrew them without the tenant's knowledge.

The tenant argued it would suffer prejudice if the appeals were not reinstated, as an error in the base year assessment would result in taxes being paid on non-existent property area.

With the consent of all respondents, the Board granted the motion and reinstated the appeals.

The Assessment Review Board approved a Draft Procedural Order submitted by the participating parties regarding property assessment appeals for the 2013, 2014, and 2015 taxation years for the property located at 55 Eglinton Avenue East in Toronto.

The parties were ordered to comply with all terms and procedural dates in the attached order.

The Assessment Review Board issued a procedural order setting the schedule for a property assessment appeal concerning a property in the City of Kingston.

The order establishes deadlines for discovery, exchange of witness lists and statements, expert reports, and sets a two-day hearing commencing in January 2016.

The appellants applied for the cancellation and refund of $203,145.85 charged by the City of Vaughan in 2005 to recover a shortfall in property taxes from 2003 and 2004.

The appellants argued the charge constituted an overcharge due to a gross or manifest clerical error under section 334 of the Municipal Act.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the application, finding that the City's deliberate request to recover the undercharge based on its legal interpretation of section 331 was not an inadvertent clerical or factual mistake on the 2005 tax roll that the Board had the authority to correct.

The appellant appealed the property assessment of a large pulp and paper mill in Thunder Bay for the 2009-2012 taxation years.

The parties agreed to use the cost approach to value and agreed on the reproduction cost new of the buildings and yardworks.

The Board had to determine the appropriate deductions for functional obsolescence (excess capital and operating costs), physical depreciation, and external obsolescence due to the severe decline in the pulp and paper industry.

The Board rejected the income-based return on capital method proposed by the municipality and largely adopted the modified greenfield method proposed by the appellant's expert.

The Board reduced the assessed value of the property from $72,232,000 to $32,620,000 and found no further adjustment was required for equity.

The Appellants appealed the 2012 property tax assessment of the Buttonville Airport Lands.

MPAC had increased the assessment of the main airport parcel from $31.4 million to $63.6 million, arguing that the highest and best use of the land had changed from an airport to urban development land following the sale of a partial interest to a developer.

The Assessment Review Board found that MPAC is legally permitted to change its opinion of value during the four-year assessment cycle.

However, the Board held that MPAC failed to prove that the highest and best use of the land had changed as of the valuation date, given the significant regulatory hurdles and long development timeframes still required.

The Board concluded that the cost approach remained the most appropriate valuation method and reduced the 2012 assessment back to $31.4 million.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which quashed its complaints regarding the property assessments of two properties.

The Board had found the City failed to comply with the notice provisions in s. 40(3) of the Assessment Act because it mailed the notices to the previous owner's address on the assessment roll despite knowing the properties had been sold.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the City acted reasonably and in good faith by using the address on the roll, which had not been revoked.

The Court found the Board erred in imposing a higher standard of inquiry on the municipality, set aside the decision, and remitted the complaints for a hearing on the merits.