7 total
A nine-minute delay in making a breath demand was justified by legitimate safety concerns involving multiple detainees.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The sole issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement in Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met.
The Crown argued that the requirement was satisfied despite a nine-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the making of the breath demand.
The court found that the delay was reasonably necessary due to legitimate safety concerns arising from the simultaneous stop of two vehicles and the officer's need to address an unknown second party.
The court upheld the validity of the breath sample and found the accused guilty of the over 80 charge.
The offender was sentenced to five and one-half years in prison and ordered to pay $5.3 million in restitution for a large-scale corporate fraud.
Herbert Adams was convicted after trial of four counts of fraud over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
The frauds involved defrauding shareholders of Majestic Supply Company of $5.3 million and three named individuals of $381,000 combined.
Adams personally received $1,610,444 in proceeds of crime.
The court imposed a custodial sentence of five and one-half years on the primary count with concurrent two-year sentences on the remaining counts, along with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1,610,444, a restitution order of $5.3 million, a no-contact order, and a DNA order.
Accused found guilty of four counts of fraud over $5000 for misleading investors about printing technologies.
The accused was charged with four counts of fraud over $5000 relating to his operation of Majestic Supply Company Inc. and Suncastle Developments Incorporated.
The Crown alleged that the accused made false representations to investors regarding the development and exclusivity of a revolutionary water-based ink and other printing technologies, and that he deliberately thwarted the Ontario Securities Act to avoid filing a prospectus.
The court found the accused's testimony to be untruthful and accepted the evidence of the investors and other witnesses.
The court concluded that the accused made false representations to entice investments and that his deliberate breaches of the Securities Act constituted 'other fraudulent means'.
The accused was found guilty on all four counts.
A certified drug recognition expert may testify on drug impairment without a Mohan voir dire, but the defence may challenge the tests' scientific validity.
The Crown sought to have a certified drug recognition expert (evaluating officer) testify regarding their opinion on whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug, without requiring the officer to meet the formal expert qualification criteria established in R. v. Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J. The accused argued that while the evaluating officer could testify about the evaluation tests and procedures conducted, any opinion on impairment would require formal expert qualification unless it was solely for the purpose of making a demand under section 254(3.4) of the Criminal Code.
The court ruled that a certified drug recognition expert accredited by the International Association of Chiefs of Police may provide expert opinion evidence regarding drug impairment without a Mohan voir dire, as Parliament intended through the enactment of the relevant legislation and regulations.
The court also permitted the accused to call expert evidence challenging the scientific validity of the evaluation tests without requiring constitutional notice.
The court held that failing to wear a seatbelt under the Highway Traffic Act is a strict liability offence.
The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.
The trial justice found the offence to be one of absolute liability and convicted the appellant.
On appeal, the court considered two issues: whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arose from the trial judge's premature pronouncement of guilt, and whether section 106(2) creates a strict liability or absolute liability offence.
The court dismissed the bias argument but found that section 106(2) is a strict liability offence, not absolute liability.
The Crown consented to a stay of proceedings rather than proceed with a new trial.
The court dismissed the elector's appeal for a compliance audit, finding no reasonable grounds to believe the candidate violated campaign finance rules.
An elector appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee declining to order a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.
The elector alleged that the candidate had made false, misleading, and untrue statements in her Form 4 Financial Statement, specifically regarding unreported contributions and underreported campaign expenses.
The court conducted a de novo hearing and applied the "reasonable grounds" test, requiring an objective belief based on compelling and credible information raising reasonable probability of a breach.
The court found that the elector's allegations were based on conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence insufficient to meet the threshold.
The appeal was dismissed and no compliance audit was ordered.
The court ordered a de novo hearing for a campaign finance compliance audit appeal due to the original committee's lack of procedural fairness.
An applicant appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee that rejected her application for a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.
The applicant alleged the candidate had filed false and misleading financial statements.
The court found that the Compliance Audit Committee failed to establish adequate administrative procedures as mandated by statute, failed to provide fair notice to the applicant regarding the hearing process, and failed to create a transparent and complete record of its proceedings.
The court determined that procedural fairness had been compromised and ordered a de novo hearing on appeal, allowing the applicant to present additional evidence that was not before the original committee.
