Novalea M.A. Jarvis

The applicant father brought a motion for equal parenting time with the 15-year-old child, M. The respondent mother sought dismissal, arguing no material change in circumstances.

The court rejected the material change argument, noting no prior order for regular parenting time existed.

The court determined that a Voice of the Child (VOC) report was advisable given the child's age and maturity, the high conflict between the parties, and the divergent evidence regarding the child's preferences.

The motion was adjourned sine die pending the completion of the VOC report, to be jointly funded by the parties.

The parties separated after the respondent mother left the family home with the children to a women's shelter, alleging the applicant father was abusive and a threat due to his rigid religious beliefs.

Following an 18-day trial, the court rejected the mother's allegations of abuse and neglect, finding the father to be a competent and involved parent.

The court declined to follow the recommendations of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which had suggested sole custody for the mother and restricted access for the father.

Instead, the court ordered joint custody with equal parenting time on an alternating weekly schedule.

Due to the parties' inability to communicate, the court ordered parallel decision-making, granting the father authority over medical decisions and the mother authority over education.

Finally, the court imputed income to the underemployed father based on his historical earnings as a counsellor for the purpose of calculating child support.

This is a child protection proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court ordered a parenting capacity assessment to be conducted by Dr. Walton-Allen to assess the parents' capacity to care for their five children.

At trial, the mother's counsel challenged the admissibility of the assessment report, alleging that Dr. Walton-Allen misrepresented her qualifications.

The mother contended that Dr. Walton-Allen is a school psychologist, not a clinical psychologist as represented, and therefore lacks the expertise to conduct such a complex assessment.

The court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The court found that Dr. Walton-Allen intentionally misrepresented her qualifications and that her expertise as a school psychologist was insufficient for the complex psychological and social issues involved.

The court struck the assessment report from the record and disqualified Dr. Walton-Allen from providing expert opinion evidence.

The applicant sought divorce, child and spousal support, and equalization of net family properties from the respondent.

The primary issue was whether income should be imputed to the respondent due to intentional underemployment or unemployment.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed, imputing an income of $83,394 per year based on his prior work history and admissions.

The court fixed retroactive spousal support for a specific period and left open further spousal support calculations.

An equalization payment of $10,149.26 was ordered to the applicant.

The court also determined the respondent's proportionate share for future Section 7 educational expenses.

A child protection trial involving three children (AB, AM, and MM) brought by the Halton Children's Aid Society.

The mother (MM) and father of two of the children (DJ) were convicted of sexual crimes against the mother's oldest child (JB).

The court found all three children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act based on risk of sexual molestation or exploitation and, for two children, parental unavailability.

AB was placed with her biological father under a supervision order; AM and MM were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle under a supervision order.

The mother was granted minimal access (one weekly phone call and one monthly letter) with no in-person access ordered at the time of judgment.

The court determined whether three children are Indian or native persons under the Child and Family Services Act.

The children's aid society argued the children were neither Indian nor native, while the mother sought a declaration that they were Indian with the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte as their band.

The court found that the children are entitled to be registered as Indians under the Indian Act through their maternal lineage, tracing entitlement through their great-great-grandfather (R.M.), great-grandmother (E.B.), grandfather (R.W.), and mother (M.M.).

The court identified the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte – Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory as the children's band.

The court heard two motions brought by respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The respondent mother sought a declaration that she and three youngest children are Native and/or eligible for status as Indians under the Child and Family Services Act, and requested that the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte be served and permitted to participate in proceedings.

The respondent father D.M.'s motion was dismissed as he did not appear.

The court adjourned the mother's motion to May 6, 2016, and made orders regarding service on the Band, participation at hearings, and case management to address delays caused by the parties' conduct and the voluminous materials filed.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for allegedly breaching a consent access order relating to the parties’ children.

Although affidavit evidence conflicted on most alleged breaches, the court found that the respondent had withheld access for approximately two weeks and that her justification for doing so lacked credibility.

Despite concluding that the elements of civil contempt could have been established beyond a reasonable doubt for that incident, the court declined to make a formal contempt finding.

Emphasizing that contempt in family law matters is a remedy of last resort, the court determined that the circumstances did not warrant such a sanction at that time.

The motion was dismissed, though the respondent’s conduct would be considered on the issue of costs.

A temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child with significant medical and developmental needs.

The child was apprehended from the mother's care due to substance abuse and neglect.

The maternal grandmother sought placement of the child in her care, subject to society supervision, or alternatively, expanded unsupervised access.

The court found that the society met its onus to establish that the child's best interests required remaining in the care and custody of the society.

The court dismissed the maternal grandmother's application, finding concerns regarding her ability to follow court orders and society directions, protect the child from the mother, and meet the child's complex medical and developmental needs.

A costs decision following a trial on child support, spousal support, and ancillary matters.

The applicant sought full recovery of costs of $65,774.81 plus $4,143.00 for costs submissions.

The respondent opposed, arguing limited financial means and that the applicant's counsel inflated costs.

The court found the applicant was the successful party, had served a reasonable offer to settle that was not accepted, and that the respondent acted unreasonably throughout the proceedings, including failing to pay temporary spousal support, providing late disclosure, fabricating evidence, and intentionally underemploying himself.

However, the court reduced the costs award to $35,000.00 as the claimed costs were excessive, while still recognizing the need to control the court process and sanction unreasonable litigation conduct.

A trial concerning child support, spousal support, and determination of the respondent's income for support purposes in a common law relationship.

The parties cohabited from October 2004 until separation in March 2011 and had one child with cerebral palsy.

The applicant remained out of the workforce as the child's primary caregiver.

The court found the respondent intentionally left employment to avoid spousal support obligations and imputed income to him.

The court awarded retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, with a three-year review period for spousal support.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, sought costs following his successful opposition to the respondent's motion for spousal support.

The applicant claimed $5,920.38 for lost wages, disbursements, and preparation time.

The respondent opposed the costs award, arguing that the applicant had behaved unreasonably, that a costs award would cause financial hardship to her and their child, and that self-represented litigants are not entitled to costs on the same basis as represented litigants.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant but reduced the amount from the range of $3,000-$4,000 to $1,500 to account for the respondent's limited financial means as a custodial parent.

The respondent sought spousal support from the applicant in the amount of $1,354.00 per month.

The applicant opposed the claim, arguing that the respondent was not a "spouse" under the Family Law Act.

The parties had a single intimate encounter at a party, resulting in the birth of a child.

They never cohabited, never dated, and maintained separate residences.

The court dismissed the motion for spousal support, finding that the respondent failed to establish standing to claim spousal support as she could not demonstrate that the parties had cohabited in a relationship of some permanence as required by the statute.

The parties each brought motions to change prior final family law orders relating to parenting time and child support.

One party sought expanded access and adjustments to the dispute resolution process concerning parenting arrangements, while the other sought variation of child support and extensive financial disclosure alleging undisclosed corporate interests and higher income.

At a settlement conference, the court addressed disclosure obligations, examination scheduling, and mediation steps, and established a detailed procedural timetable for production, questioning, and the hearing of both motions.

The court also directed the parties to pursue mediation and potential counseling with a child psychiatrist and made interim directions regarding the children's extracurricular activities.

Costs of the conference were reserved.

Paternal grandparents sought temporary custody of their granddaughter, Maddison, born May 2, 2009, who had been in their care since July 2010 following an incident of alleged domestic violence between the parents.

The mother sought expanded access from alternate Saturdays to alternate weekly access, including overnight visits.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act and the principle of maintaining the status quo on temporary motions.

The court found that the grandparents had provided stable care for nearly two years, while the mother had abandoned the child for over a year and demonstrated poor judgment and instability.

The court granted temporary custody to the grandparents and maintained the existing access arrangement of alternate Saturdays, rejecting the mother's request for expanded access pending the Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation.

An elector appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee declining to order a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The elector alleged that the candidate had made false, misleading, and untrue statements in her Form 4 Financial Statement, specifically regarding unreported contributions and underreported campaign expenses.

The court conducted a de novo hearing and applied the "reasonable grounds" test, requiring an objective belief based on compelling and credible information raising reasonable probability of a breach.

The court found that the elector's allegations were based on conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence insufficient to meet the threshold.

The appeal was dismissed and no compliance audit was ordered.

The applicant sought costs of a motion heard on December 2, 2011 and reviewed on March 6, 2012 regarding spousal support and other family law matters.

The respondent argued that the costs submissions were untimely and that there was mixed success on the motion.

The court found that the applicant was the successful party on the primary issue of spousal support and was entitled to costs.

The court fixed costs at $3,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes on a partial indemnity basis, considering the factors set out in Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support from the respondent effective January 1, 2012, along with orders requiring the respondent to maintain medical, extended health, dental, and life insurance coverage.

The respondent opposed the claim, arguing the applicant was underemployed and capable of finding work, and that he lacked the ability to pay.

The court found the applicant had a strong compensatory claim based on her five-year absence from the workforce to care for their severely disabled child.

The court determined the respondent's income at $43,600 for 2012 and awarded temporary spousal support of $800 per month, with arrears of $3,200 payable at $250 monthly.

The insurance issues were adjourned pending further evidence.

An applicant appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee that rejected her application for a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The applicant alleged the candidate had filed false and misleading financial statements.

The court found that the Compliance Audit Committee failed to establish adequate administrative procedures as mandated by statute, failed to provide fair notice to the applicant regarding the hearing process, and failed to create a transparent and complete record of its proceedings.

The court determined that procedural fairness had been compromised and ordered a de novo hearing on appeal, allowing the applicant to present additional evidence that was not before the original committee.

The applicant sought a determination that the Ontario court had jurisdiction to address spousal support and net family property following a divorce proceeding commenced in Texas.

The respondent argued that a Texas court had already issued a final divorce order and determined issues relating to spousal support and property rights.

The court held that where a foreign court has granted a valid divorce, Ontario courts lack jurisdiction to determine corollary relief under the Divorce Act and claims under the Family Law Act.

The court found that the applicant had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Texas court by participating in the proceedings and failing to appeal the jurisdiction ruling.

The Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act was held not to apply because the foreign order denied spousal support rather than ordering payment.