Q.C.

The Crown appealed the Stage One and Stage Two decisions regarding the interpretation of the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties of 1850.

The trial judge found that the Treaties' augmentation clause imposed a mandatory obligation on the Crown to increase the perpetual annuities if the economic circumstances of the ceded territories warranted it, without a hard cap of $4 per person.

The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown has an obligation under the honour of the Crown to diligently implement the augmentation promise and that its discretion is not unfettered.

The Court unanimously set aside the trial judge's finding of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and her specific remedial directives regarding a 'fair share' of net resource revenues.

The Court also unanimously dismissed the Crown's limitations defence.

The Court split on the standard of review for historical treaties and whether the trial judge made extricable errors of law in her interpretation, but the majority upheld her core interpretation of the augmentation clause.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after driving her vehicle through a red light and striking a pedestrian in a crosswalk.

The accused argued she was in a momentary 'dreamlike state' due to grief over a friend's recent death, which she claimed negated the necessary fault element.

The court rejected this explanation, finding that the accused experienced a prolonged period of inattention that constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The accused was found guilty.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages for breach of fiduciary duty in a derivative action, the successful plaintiff and third parties sought full indemnity costs.

The court declined to award elevated costs, finding the defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $125,000, rejecting the defendants' argument that costs should be denied for failing to beat the simplified procedure threshold.

In an obstetrical malpractice action, the defendant midwives and physicians brought motions for an order compelling the infant plaintiff and his biological parents to undergo blood tests for specific genetic testing.

The defendants argued that the infant's severe neurocognitive impairments may have a genetic etiology rather than being caused by perinatal hypoxia.

The plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order genetic testing due to the federal Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, and that the defendants were liable for all injuries under the thin skull doctrine regardless of any genetic predisposition.

The court held that it has the authority to order genetic testing under section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33.

Finding that the possibility of a genetic cause was not frivolous and that the factors of fairness, necessity, and prejudice weighed in favour of the defendants, the court ordered the infant and his biological parents to provide blood samples for genetic testing.

In a derivative action brought on behalf of a real estate investment company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, who were equal shareholders and officers, misappropriated corporate funds while managing the company's properties.

The court found the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the Business Corporations Act by misappropriating rent payments, retaining insurance claim proceeds, and taking unequal advances that reduced a shareholder loan.

The court ordered the defendants to pay $87,048.57 in compensatory damages to the corporation.

Claims for punitive damages and a third-party action against the other shareholders were dismissed.

The appellant auditors sought to have the respondent province's negligence claim dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period.

The province had paid out $50 million in loan guarantees in reliance on the appellants' audit report, and later received a second firm's draft report revealing material misstatements in the audited financial statements.

The Court established that a claim is discovered when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the defendant's part can be drawn.

Applying this standard, the Court found the province discovered its claim when it received the draft report from the second firm, more than two years before commencing its action.

The appeals were allowed and the motions judge's summary judgment dismissing the province's claim as statute-barred was restored.

The appellant auditors sought to have the respondent province's negligence claim dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period.

The province had paid out $50 million in loan guarantees in reliance on the appellants' audit report, and later received a second firm's draft report revealing material misstatements in the audited financial statements.

The Court established that a claim is discovered when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the defendant's part can be drawn.

Applying this standard, the Court found the province discovered its claim when it received the draft report from the second firm, more than two years before commencing its action.

The appeals were allowed and the motions judge's summary judgment dismissing the province's claim as statute-barred was restored.

Following a judgment in the applicant's favour, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $75,163.75, arguing the respondent raised unproven allegations of forgery and fraud.

The court found the respondent's conduct did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs, noting the respondent attacked the integrity of non-parties rather than the applicant.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant Crown challenged court-ordered super-priority priming charges granted to an interim lender, monitor, and directors in CCAA restructuring proceedings, arguing that its deemed trust for unremitted employee source deductions under s. 227(4.1) of the Income Tax Act took priority over those charges.

The majority dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 227(4.1) does not create a proprietary interest in specific debtor assets and that court-ordered super-priority charges under s. 11 of the CCAA are not security interests within the meaning of s. 224(1.3) of the ITA, so no conflict arises between the two statutes.

The concurring justices agreed there was no conflict but relied on the CCAA's remedial flexibility and s. 6(3)'s requirement that the Crown be paid in full under any plan of compromise.

Four justices dissented, concluding that Parliament's use of broad notwithstanding language in s. 227(4.1) granted the Crown's deemed trust absolute priority over all claims including CCAA priming charges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, Abella, Moldaver, Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting.

The applicant sought to enforce an assignment agreement for a pre-construction condominium unit in downtown Toronto.

The respondent seller claimed she never accepted the final counteroffer and that the agreement contained fundamental mistakes.

The court found the respondent's evidence lacked credibility and that a binding contract was formed.

The court rectified minor mathematical errors in the agreement and ordered specific performance, finding the property was unique to the applicant's family needs and damages would be inadequate in a rising real estate market.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the release of net proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home, child support, allocation of chattels, and costs.

The court ordered the release of the net sale proceeds to the respondent, dismissing the applicant's request to hold back $400,000 for alleged loans, as that issue required a trial.

The court denied the respondent's request for security for future child support but ordered the applicant to pay child support arrears from his share of the sale proceeds.

A referee was appointed to allocate chattels, and the applicant was awarded $12,908.15 in costs for prior successful proceedings.

The respondent father brought a contempt motion against the applicant mother for overholding their child.

The child was returned before the motion, and the court dismissed the contempt motion as it was not in the child's best interests.

In this costs decision, the court found the father was justified in preparing the motion materials but should not have argued the motion after the child was returned.

The court awarded the father $1,500 in costs.

The applicant husband sought a declaration that the parties' 2009 marriage contract was valid.

The respondent wife challenged its validity, alleging duress, inadequate financial disclosure, and unconscionability.

At trial, the wife chose not to cross-examine the husband or his former lawyer on the issues of duress or unconscionability, violating the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The court found that the wife failed to establish grounds to set aside the contract under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting that she had independent legal advice, the contract listed the husband's corporate interests, and she did not pursue further disclosure at the time.

The marriage contract was declared valid.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice after attending the complainant's home uninvited to discuss the process for withdrawing criminal harassment charges she had recently laid against him.

The trial judge found the appellant's conduct was wilful and constituted an attempt to dissuade the complainant from giving evidence by corrupt means.

A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and a majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The majority held that the record clearly supported the inference that the appellant applied pressure on the complainant to manipulate her into dropping the charges.

Côté J. dissented, finding no evidence that the appellant used threats, bribes, or other corrupt means as required by s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, Laurentian University, brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings to extend the stay of proceedings, approve an amendment to its DIP facility increasing the available funds by $10 million, and approve settlement agreements with its faculty association, staff union, and Huntington University.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, making significant progress in its restructuring.

Despite opposition from Thorneloe University and the University of Sudbury regarding the DIP amendment, the court approved the requested relief, finding the DIP conditions reasonable and the extension necessary for the applicant's continued operations and restructuring efforts.

Thorneloe University brought a motion under section 32(2) of the CCAA to prohibit Laurentian University from disclaiming their Federation Agreement and Financial Distribution Notice.

Laurentian argued the disclaimer was necessary to achieve financial sustainability and present a viable restructuring plan, saving approximately $7.7 million annually.

Thorneloe argued the disclaimer would cause it significant financial hardship and force it into insolvency.

The court balanced the competing interests, giving significant weight to the Monitor's recommendation, and concluded that upholding the disclaimer was the least undesirable choice to prevent the potential collapse of Laurentian University.

The motion was dismissed.

Following motions by both parties regarding refusals and questions taken under advisement during questioning, the Estate Trustee was largely successful.

Both parties sought costs of the motions.

The court determined the Estate Trustee's entitlement to costs as the successful party and fixed the quantum on a partial indemnity basis at $25,200, plus $500 for a prior appointment, payable by the applicant.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a Request for Directions to appoint an Independent Special Advisor to review certain Independent Assessment Process claims by former students of St. Anne's Indian Residential School.

The review was prompted by concerns that some claims were resolved before additional document disclosure was made available.

The court agreed that an independent review was necessary but modified Canada's proposed process to ensure claimants' interests were represented by an amicus and to remove arbitrary restrictions on the review.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for certification of a proposed class action, the successful defendant sought costs.

The plaintiff argued that costs should not be awarded because the litigation was in the public interest.

The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $182,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, noting that online legal research charges are not a proper disbursement.

The appellant waste contractor alleged that the respondent municipal district breached a contractual duty of good faith by reallocating waste from a more distant disposal facility to a closer one, thereby preventing the appellant from achieving its target operating profit ratio for 2011.

The majority held that the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith requires exercise of discretion in a manner connected to the purposes for which the discretion was granted, and that exercising it unreasonably — meaning in a manner unconnected to those purposes — constitutes a breach.

The majority found that the respondent's reallocation was guided by legitimate objectives of maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs, and was therefore not unreasonable.

The concurring minority agreed the appeal should be dismissed, emphasizing that the standard of review was correctness given the statutory right of appeal, and that good faith cannot be used to create unbargained-for obligations.

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs.