P. R. Sweeny

The plaintiff developer sought a permanent injunction to remove protesters, including the named defendant Skyler Williams, from its property where it was constructing a residential subdivision.

The defendant argued that the common law test for injunctions was unconstitutional and disproportionately impacted Indigenous persons, and that the Crown had a duty to consult.

The court found that the defendant was not an authorized representative asserting collective s. 35 rights, and that the common law test for injunctions adequately balances Charter values.

Finding that the plaintiff held legal title and that damages would be inadequate for the ongoing trespass, the court granted the permanent injunction.

The plaintiff and the defendant were in a common law relationship and owned a home as joint tenants.

After they separated, the defendant retained lawyers to sever the joint tenancy by transferring her interest to herself as a tenant-in-common.

The plaintiff brought multiple actions against the defendant and her lawyers, alleging conspiracy, deceit, and fraudulent conveyance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the claims against the lawyers and the conspiracy/fraudulent conveyance claims against the defendant, finding no unlawful act, no agreement to injure, and no damages suffered by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's cross-motions, including for criminal contempt and constitutional declarations, were also dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to quash two summonses to witness issued by the plaintiffs, which sought to examine two of the defendant's lawyers on pending interlocutory motions regarding the sale of jointly owned property.

The court quashed the summonses on three grounds: failure to comply with service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to demonstrate that the lawyers' evidence was relevant and necessary, and abuse of process.

The court found the summonses were issued for ulterior purposes, including gathering evidence for a separate action against the lawyers and attempting to create a conflict of interest to preclude them from acting as counsel.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment regarding a defaulted commercial loan and mortgage.

The defendants failed to appear and relied on Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments (OPCA), claiming indigenous status and that the land was unceded.

The court found these defences to be nonsense, noting the defendants received the funds and defaulted on their obligations.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the debt owing, possession of the property, and substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff brought an action for mortgage default against the defendants.

The defendants filed a counterclaim using organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (OPCA), naming the provincial and federal Crowns, and issued summonses to the Chief Justice of Canada and a former registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court dismissed the counterclaim under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court also quashed the summonses to witness as an abuse of process and adjourned the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to allow the defendants to file responding material.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing its professional negligence action for delay.

The action had been case managed and was proceeding in tandem with a related shareholder action.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, demonstrated inadvertence in missing the deadline, moved promptly to address the dismissal, and that the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice.

The motion was granted and the registrar's order was set aside.

The moving party challenged the validity of the testator's 2007 Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

The testator, who had a lifelong history of bipolar disorder, changed her Will to name her niece as the sole beneficiary, removing the moving party.

The court found that the Will was duly executed and that the propounder of the Will satisfied the burden of proving capacity.

The court preferred the evidence of the respondent's medical expert and concluded the change in beneficiary was not the result of any delusion or disease of the mind.

The 2007 Will was declared valid.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $99,920.93 based on offers to settle, while the plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of $15,000 plus disbursements.

The court found no justification for substantial indemnity costs as the offers to settle encompassed the entire action, not just the motion.

After adjusting hourly rates and reducing time spent on the general defence of the action, the court awarded the successful defendants partial indemnity costs fixed at $44,000 all-inclusive.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants argued they should receive costs based on an offer to settle or the principle that a party seeking to amend should pay the responding party's costs.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments, noting the plaintiff beat the offer to settle and the amendment was sought well in advance of trial, unlike the precedent cited by the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the successful plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a judgment that reduced the amount claimed on a mortgage by $38,000, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought full indemnity costs of $22,851.46 based on standard charge terms, while the defendants sought their costs.

The court exercised its discretion to deny costs to the successful plaintiff, finding that the litigation was caused by the plaintiff's failure to properly document mortgage advances and its improper addition of third-party rent to the mortgage.

No order as to costs was made.

Following a successful application involving a breach of fiduciary duty and disputed signatures, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the respondents' conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the quantum at $87,100 inclusive of HST and disbursements, after making minor deductions for unissued claims and certain disbursements.

The plaintiff mortgage lender sought to recover amounts allegedly owing on a mortgage.

The defendants disputed six specific payments that the plaintiff had added to the mortgage principal.

Following a trial, the court found that three payments totaling $79,000 were properly added to the mortgage, while three other payments totaling $38,000 were not properly added due to lack of consent or documentation.

The court directed the parties to calculate the final amount owing based on these findings.

Following a 16-day jury trial where the plaintiff's claim against the police defendants was dismissed, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $296,602.70 based on an offer to settle and allegations of intentional torts against an officer.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the offer did not trigger such consequences and the allegations did not warrant them.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $127,000 all-inclusive, after deductions for travel time and a second counsel.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking relief from the deemed undertaking rule to use discovery evidence obtained in the civil proceeding to support a complaint to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and the College of Pharmacists.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's affidavit referring to prior complaints under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the public interest in pursuing a professional complaint did not outweigh the prejudice to the defendants, as the plaintiff was seeking to use the civil process to obtain evidence for a separate proceeding.

The cross-motion was also dismissed as the court did not need to rely on the impugned evidence.

The defendant vendor brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiff purchaser after a failed $55 million commercial real estate transaction.

The court found that the plaintiff made a false statement in its affidavit regarding a contractual obligation to resell the property, constituting material non-disclosure.

Applying the Dhunna factors, the court also determined that the property was purchased for investment purposes, damages could be readily calculated, and the CPL prejudiced the vendor's ability to refinance or sell.

The CPL was discharged.

The plaintiff's cross-motions for consolidation and document production were dismissed, though the actions were ordered to be heard together.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a second independent medical examination.

The plaintiff had surreptitiously recorded a previous examination by the defendant's expert, which the defendant argued compromised the expert's evidence.

The court granted the motion, finding the surreptitious recording improper and that fairness required a second examination.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to record the new examination, noting there is no right to record defence medical examinations without leave.

The defendant, an executive of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss a defamation action against him personally.

He argued he was protected by statutory immunity under s. 18(1) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and that he acted as an employee without personal liability.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith or with malice could not be determined on a summary judgment motion and required a full trial.

The defendants sought costs for a WSIAT hearing and for the conduct of the action, having previously made an all-inclusive offer to settle for $10,000.

The plaintiffs had significant success on the motion, successfully arguing that the costs of the WSIAT proceeding should not be awarded and achieving a significant reduction in the fees claimed by the defendants.

Finding that success was divided, the court made no order as to costs of the motion.

Following a 23-day trial that originated as a contested passing of accounts, the unsuccessful plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.

The defendants sought substantial or full indemnity costs based on unproven allegations of breach of trust and unaccepted offers to settle.

The court declined to award elevated costs, finding the allegations did not amount to fraud and the plaintiff was entitled to a trial.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs, significantly reducing claims for travel expenses, expert fees, and excessive trial preparation time, ultimately ordering the plaintiff to pay a total of $721,450 in costs to the various defendants.

Following a successful application regarding the interpretation of a cohabitation agreement, the applicant sought costs.

The applicant had made a time-limited settlement offer that was more advantageous than the final decision, though it did not attract automatic cost consequences under Rule 49.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 and the parties' bills of costs, the court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $21,000.