Philip Hsiung

The accused was convicted at trial of Impaired Operation Causing Bodily Harm and Dangerous Operation Causing Bodily Harm following a high-speed crash that resulted in life-threatening injuries to a front-seat passenger and serious injuries to another passenger.

The court rejected the defence argument that the Kienapple rule precluded multiple convictions, finding the offences distinct as they address different aspects of road safety.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence for dangerous driving (with 12 months concurrent for impaired driving), followed by 18 months probation, a 3-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

The court balanced significant aggravating factors including the extreme speed, severity of injuries, and the accused's recent warning about drinking and driving against mitigating factors including his youth, good character, and low blood alcohol level.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing bodily harm, dangerous operation causing bodily harm, and impaired operation following a serious motor vehicle collision that resulted in life-threatening injuries to passengers.

The Crown's case relied on expert toxicology evidence establishing a projected blood alcohol concentration of 66-96 mgs/100ml at the time of driving, the manner of driving, and accident reconstruction evidence.

The defence argued that the absence of physical indicia of impairment created reasonable doubt.

The court found that the accused's driving demonstrated mental impairment consistent with alcohol consumption, including failure to perceive the need to slow speed and failure to react to wet road conditions.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate her vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption based on credible evidence from police officers and an independent witness.

However, the Crown failed to prove the refusal charge.

The court found that given the extent of the accused's intoxication and resulting mental confusion and disorientation at the time of the breath demand, a reasonable doubt existed regarding the mental element of the refusal offence.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving but acquitted of the refusal charge.

The court ruled on the admissibility of a statement given by the accused to police investigating a serious motor vehicle accident.

The Crown sought to establish that the statement was voluntary, while the defence challenged its admissibility on the grounds that the accused was detained without being advised of his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the statement was voluntary and that no detention occurred, making the statement admissible in evidence.

The accused was stopped at a mobile RIDE check, failed two Approved Screening Device tests, and was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The defence raised five Charter issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand based on odour of alcohol; whether an informal demand satisfied s. 254(2); whether the officer's failure to wait the full 15 minutes before the second ASD test was objectively unreasonable; whether s. 10(b) requires expanded information about accessing private counsel; and whether the officer undermined solicitor-client privilege by referring to legal advice during the Approved Instrument demand.

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the Crown proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.