Peter Jervis

The plaintiffs brought actions against Ukraine International Airlines (UIA) under the Montreal Convention following the shoot-down of Flight PS752 by Iranian military surface-to-air missiles shortly after takeoff from Tehran.

UIA admitted the shoot-down was an 'accident' under the Convention, making it strictly liable, but sought to limit its liability by proving it was not negligent in allowing the flight to depart.

The Superior Court of Justice found that UIA failed to meet the standard of care for a reasonable airline operating in or near a conflict zone, as it did not conduct a proper security threat risk assessment or any safety risk assessment, and failed to gather available intelligence or brief the flight commander.

The court held that UIA failed to prove its negligence did not cause the passengers' deaths or that the harm was too remote, resulting in unlimited liability for the airline.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $125 million settlement in a class action against a major bank for secondary market misrepresentation related to subprime mortgage investments.

The plaintiffs also sought approval of class counsel fees of $37.5 million, representing a 30% contingency fee.

The court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable, noting the significant litigation risks the plaintiffs faced, including a due diligence defence and challenges to damages calculations.

The court also approved the requested counsel fees, emphasizing the substantial risk undertaken by class counsel over 14 years of litigation and the excellent result achieved for the class.

Following a 71-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $10 million in damages, the plaintiffs sought costs of approximately $8.5 million on a substantial indemnity basis or $5.3 million on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that substantial indemnity costs were unwarranted and that the partial indemnity claim included costs for interlocutory matters already decided.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the defendants to justify an elevated scale of costs.

Applying the partial indemnity scale and deducting amounts attributable to prior interlocutory motions, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $4,900,000 all-inclusive.

This is the damages phase of a multi-party action brought by 28 former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre.

In the liability phase, the defendants (two psychiatrists and the Crown) were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and battery for subjecting the plaintiffs to experimental and harmful psychiatric programs (DDT, Capsule, and MAPP) between the 1960s and 1980s.

The court assessed general, punitive, and income loss damages on an individual basis.

General damages were awarded to all plaintiffs, ranging from nominal amounts to over $2 million for the most severely impacted.

Punitive damages were awarded in cases involving particularly egregious conduct, such as the treatment of underage patients or the administration of alcohol to known alcoholics.

Income loss claims were largely limited or barred by the ex turpi causa doctrine, which prevented recovery for periods the plaintiffs spent lawfully incarcerated or institutionalized for subsequent criminal offenses.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, for the damages phase of the trial.

The defendants argued the expert's report did not comply with prior admissibility rulings, lacked expert evidence, and exhibited bias.

The court found that the expert's methodology in calculating the impact of harms on the plaintiffs' institutionalization timeline was within his expertise and complied with prior rulings.

The court rejected the allegations of bias, finding the expert's evolving views on patients reflected objective reliability rather than advocacy.

The motion was dismissed, and the expert report was ruled admissible, with any stray comments outside his expertise to be disregarded.

The defendants requested the court to issue a formal judgment following the liability phase of a bifurcated trial to establish res judicata for the upcoming damages phase.

The plaintiffs consented to the form of the draft judgment but argued it was unnecessary at this stage.

The court declined to issue the formal judgment, finding that the trial is a single proceeding and a comprehensive judgment should be issued after the damages phase is completed, though the liability findings remain binding.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a costs order made by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court had ordered that the parties bear their own costs in the Superior Court, based on a misdescription of the procedural history as involving two separate motions (one for certification, one for a stay).

The Superior Court interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling to mean that the plaintiff must repay the costs associated with the stay of proceedings argument, but could retain the costs awarded for the certification motion, which was not appealed to the Supreme Court.

The plaintiff was ordered to repay $12,180 to the defendants.

The Quebec Plaintiffs and the Defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an order of Belobaba J. dated November 21, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal.

Costs of $2,500 were ordered payable by each of the moving parties to the responding Ontario Plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

Two competing teams of legal counsel sought carriage of a proposed securities class action against CannTrust Holdings Inc. and other defendants for alleged misrepresentations regarding unlicensed cannabis production.

The court granted carriage to the Consortium team, finding that the competing TGF/RG team had a disqualifying conflict of interest because they excluded RBC Dominion Securities Inc., a current client of one of the firms, as a defendant.

The court held that excluding a necessary defendant to prefer a client's interests prejudiced the proposed class members by reducing potential recovery.

A case conference was held following a Supreme Court of Canada decision that limited the class to personal users of the defendants' cell phone services.

The defendants intended to bring motions to enforce a costs ruling and revisit the certification order.

The plaintiff sought to proceed with examinations for discovery, while the defendants preferred to wait until after their motions were heard.

The court ordered that the discovery process proceed in tandem with the motions, as the issues raised by the defendants were primarily legal and would not significantly impact the scope of discoveries.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The plaintiff pension fund sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act to commence a $3 billion secondary market securities class action against the defendant mining company.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentations in three categories: capital expenditure and scheduling, environmental compliance, and accounting and financial reporting.

The court dismissed the motion for leave regarding the capital expenditure and accounting allegations, finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the public correction requirement.

However, the court granted leave to proceed with one core environmental allegation, finding a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff could establish at trial that the defendant's July 26, 2012 representation about the completion of a water management system was an untrue statement of material fact.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

At a pre-trial conference for a six-week trial, the court provided procedural directions regarding the presentation of evidence.

The court permitted the plaintiffs to use affidavits for their evidence-in-chief to save time, but declined to admit discovery transcripts en masse.

The court also agreed with the defendant that the judge should not read the expert reports until after hearing the plaintiffs' viva voce evidence, to avoid being influenced by the experts' interpretation of the plaintiffs' testimony before hearing it firsthand.

Following an omnibus motion in a secondary market securities class action, the defendants sought costs payable forthwith.

The plaintiffs and one co-defendant argued for costs in the cause.

The court ordered costs in the cause, noting that the omnibus motion involved novel legal issues and was part of the fabric of the whole litigation, making it fairest that the ultimate victor in the action receive the costs.

Telecommunications companies sought leave to appeal certification orders permitting class proceedings concerning cellular phone billing practices.

The proposed class actions alleged that the defendants breached contracts, engaged in deceptive practices contrary to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, and were unjustly enriched by rounding call durations up to the nearest minute under plans described as billed “per minute.” The moving parties argued that individual contractual contexts prevented the existence of a common issue and that certification was therefore inappropriate.

The court held that the meaning of the contractual phrase “per minute billing” was a common issue capable of resolution across the class, particularly given the standardized and adhesive nature of the consumer contracts.

Leave to appeal was refused and the certification orders were left undisturbed.

Following dismissal of a motion by four donor‑distributors seeking to opt back into a class proceeding after previously opting out, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The responding party sought $28,893 on a partial indemnity basis, while the unsuccessful moving parties argued that costs should not exceed $2,500.

The court found that the motion to opt back in was misguided and largely predictable in outcome based on existing jurisprudence.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court of Appeal’s guidance that costs must be fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party, the court fixed costs at $10,000 all‑inclusive payable by the unsuccessful moving parties.