Paul Bailey

During a criminal trial for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of property obtained by crime, the Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in street drug slang.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence on the basis of lack of independence and inadequate expertise linking slang terms to specific controlled substances.

Applying the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court’s guidance in White Burgess, the court found that although the officer possessed experience with drug slang, his substantial involvement in the investigation created a realistic concern about his ability to act as an independent and impartial expert.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to establish the independence requirement on a balance of probabilities.

The proposed expert evidence was therefore excluded.

The applicants, an accused and his common-law wife, brought an application for the return of funds held in trust following the sale of their matrimonial home.

The Crown had placed a lien on the property to protect a potential bail estreatment claim.

The Crown brought a preliminary motion to remove the applicants' counsel, arguing she was in a conflict of interest because she represented both the accused and the wife, and had a personal interest in recovering her legal fees from the funds.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no disqualifying conflict of interest.

The wife had received independent legal advice, understood the potential conflict, and maintained that the funds were jointly owned.

The applicants, charged with drug offences following a warrantless search of their residence, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging breaches of their s. 7, s. 8, and s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The s. 7 claim arose from the principal police witness failing to disclose that his personal counsel was also representing one of the applicants at the preliminary inquiry.

The court found a s. 7 breach but held it did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

However, the court found that the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were violated due to an unreasonable delay of 28 months, largely stemming from the conflict of interest issue and institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.