ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF The Police Act, R.S.O., 1980, c.381, and amendments thereto and Regulations thereunder,
-and-
IN THE MATTER OF an Appeal to the Ontario Police Commission by:
CONSTABLE RONALD TENNANT #128 YORK REGIONAL POLICE FORCE
DECISION
Panel: W.T. McGrenere, Esq., Q.C. John P. MacBeth, Esq., Q.C,
Hearing Date: Monday, December 20, 1982
Hearing Location: Toronto, Ontario
Ontario Civilian Police Commission 250 Dundas Street West, Suite 605 Toronto, Ontario M7A 2T3 Tel: 416-314-3004 Fax: 416-314-0198 Website: www.ocpc.ca
Before: W.T. McGrenere, Esq., Q.C. John P. MacBeth, Esq., Q.C,
Appearances: Paul Bailey, Esq. Counsel for the Appellant The Appellant Deputy Chief Donald Hillock For the Respondent
Held: Monday, December 20, 1982
This is an appeal by P.C. Ronald Tennant from his conviction, on November 10th, 1981, by Chief Bruce Crawford of the charge of damage to equipment contrary to Section 1, (h)(i) of the Schedule Code of Offences of Ontario Regulation 791, R.R.O. (1980) made in pursuance of the Police Act of Ontario. The conviction was confirmed by the Board of Commissioners of Police on September 16th, 1982.
This is an appeal by P.C. Ronald Tennant from his conviction, on November 10th, 1981, by Chief Bruce Crawford of the charge of damage to equipment contrary to Section 1, (h)(i) of the Schedule Code of Offences of Ontario Regulation 791, R.R.O. (1980) made in pursuance of thePolice Act of Ontario. The conviction was confirmed by the Board of Commissioners of Police on September 16th, 1982.
The statement of particulars reads as follows:
You the accused P.C. Ronald Tennant, #128, while on duty, Sunday, July 26th, 1981, at approximately 2:10 a.m. and operating a vehicle known as 212 northbound on Bayview Avenue, Lake Wilcox, in the Town of Richmond Hill, were careless when driving the vehicle when you lost control of it and the vehicle struck a hydro pole thereby causing damage to police vehicle 212.
The evidence against Constable Tennant was very brief and simply pertained to the investigation of the incident, in which it was found that a police car owned by York Regional Police and registered in the name of the Corporation of the Region of York, came into collision with a utility pole and a parked car. The investigating officer was advised by Constable Tennant that he was involved in a pursuit at high speeds. The driver of the other car was apparently later arrested and charged with dangerous driving.
The roadway upon which the accident had taken place was winding and it appeared that Constable Tennant lost control on a very sharp curve. He left a skid mark of 57.5 metres before striking a pole and parked car. The police car was damaged to the extent of $4,519.72 and the pole was replaced at a cost of $412.45. There was no evidence regarding the cost of the parked car.
No evidence was proffered by Constable Tennant.
The appellant's position was two fold:
- the evidence did not support a finding of carelessness and,
- there was no evidence of a written complaint tendered.
- Chief Crawford invited Constable Tennant through his representative to give some explanation of his conduct and when none was forthcoming, the Chief obviously felt compelled to convict.
While Constable Tennant had explained to the investigating officer that he had been involved in a high speed pursuit, and while it was suggested on his behalf at trial that he was unfamiliar with the area wherein the accident took place, this was not evidence before Chief Crawford. He was left to deal with the simple facts of the accident and certain inferences that could be drawn in the absence of an explanation to the contrary. The Ontario Court of Appeal and The Supreme Court of Canada have held that the facts of an accident itself, without any direct evidence of the manner of driving, in the absence of a contrary explanation, is sufficient to show careless driving. See Regina vs. Mclver, 1965, 2 O.K. pg 475 and Walker vs. Coates, 68 D.L.R. (2d) at 436.
- Constable Tennant's representative submitted that the charge against the Constable must fail because no complaint in writing had been proven as the basis of the charge, pursuant to Section 6 Regulations 791 R.R.O. (1980).
The decision of the Divisional Court in Giles vs Halton Regional Police Force et al 1981 33 O.R. pg 666 was relied upon. The Court in that decision indicated that the complaint required to support the laying of a charge under Section 6 must be in writing. No issue was taken with this aspect of the charge sheet at trial although the appellant's representative did raise two technical complaints.
This raises a question of whether the charge is void for failure to prove the written complaint or has the validity of the charge been accepted and has the appellant acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial officer.
While it is clear by the Divisional Court decision that the specify that the complaint or a copy of the complaint must be given to the officer charged. Section 5(1) of the Regulation provides that where an officer is charged with an offence against the Code the charge shall be in writing on a charge sheet and a true copy of the charge sheet shall be served upon the person charged together with a statement of the allegations upon which the charge is founded. The section then deals with other aspects of the charge sheet and Subsections 9 and 10 of Section 5 deal specifically with what must be included in the particulars.
In the Giles case, issue was taken with the jurisdiction of the inspector to proceed with the trial, on the grounds that there was no evidence of a complaint to support the charge. The Divisional Court was satisfied that that was the case and indeed the fact that a complaint could not be shown supported the position of the Court that the complaint must be in writing. It is obvious from this decision that an accused officer is at liberty to demand production of the written complaint to satisfy himself/ herself as to the jurisdiction of the trial officer. It would appear to us that this is a technical ground upon which an accused officer may take issue with the jurisdiction of the trial officer but upon failure to raise the issue at the inception of the trial proceedings he ha deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the tribunal at least in that regard.
We are not satisfied that the trial officer erred in his conclusion nor are we persuaded that the trial officer did not have jurisdiction.
The appeal is therefore dismissed,
DATED at the City of Toronto, in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, this 2nd day of February, A.D., 1983.
W.T. McGrenere, Q.C. Member
John P. MacBeth, Q.C, Vice Chairman